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Terrorism, Law, and Sovereignty in India and 
the League of Nations, 1897-1945 
Joseph McQuade 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research examines the emergence of terrorism as a legal and political category in late 
colonial India from 1897 to 1946. Chapter 1 traces debates surrounding laws of sedition from 
the 19th century and follows these laws into the early twentieth century, where they come to 
be viewed as increasingly inadequate in dealing with the unprecedented challenge presented 
to the colonial regime by secret societies using bomb assassinations against the government. 
Chapter 2 then examines how these discussions change in the context of the First World War, 
when a language of war and concerns regarding third party German involvement provide the 
opportunity for the imperial government to strengthen its emergency laws by legislating 
against 'conspiracy'. Chapter 3 demonstrates how, following the end of the war, conspiracy 
became itself viewed as an inadequate term and officials made a conscious decision to 
present revolutionaries under the label of 'terrorism' in subsequent speeches. This continued 
into the early 1930s, where laws in India began to target terrorism as a discrete category of 
crime, in legislation such as the Suppression of Terrorism Outrages Act of 1932. Chapter 4 
situates this process within the context of the international system of the interwar period, first 
exploring India's under-studied relationship with the League of Nations and then indicating 
how this relationship became a point of critique for those labelled by the government as 
terrorists, particularly the Bengali revolutionary Rash Behari Bose. Chapter 5 shows how the 
discussions surrounding the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 
1937, the world's first international law to target terrorism as a discrete category of crime, 
reflected many of the concerns that animated discussions in India. The chapter also examines 
India's role in the Convention, as the only member-state of the League to ultimately ratify the 
treaty.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Authority is, it seems, at one all the world over, and we must recognize that there 
is now no longer the least illogical loophole of escape for a fleeing man on this 
earth or in its waters; it is merely a question of which uniform shall arrest him. In 
old days there was always some leakage, some chunk for escape between the 
machineries of different nationalities ... But the nets are drawn closer now ... 
daily the elaborate international system for maintaining the status quo becomes 
more perfect, and from it there is no appeal. The fugitive - 'assassin', or 'patriot', 
'avatar' or that weird monster the 'anarchist' of the newspapers, whatever he may 
be ... can find no corner of the globe to shelter him, and the only doubt is under 
which precise code of regulations he shall be judged, punished, and put away. 
  - Josiah Wedgwood, Essays and Adventures of a Labour M.P. (1924), p. 153 
 
 Josiah Wedgwood wrote the above quotation in response to the famous re-capture of 
the Indian revolutionary nationalist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, following a daring escape 
attempt at the port of Marseilles in 1910. Savarkar was a college student at the time of the 
anti-colonial swadeshi agitation that followed Viceroy of India Lord Curzon’s decision to 
partition the province of Bengal in 1905 along communal lines. Following this, he came 
under the influence of the extreme wing of Indian nationalism that emerged due to growing 
impatience with the slow progress made by the moderate Indian National Congress. 
Becoming affiliated with the secret Indian Home Rule Society set up by the radical 
nationalist Shyamji Krishnavarma in London, Savarkar was arrested on charges of treason 
and abetment of murder following the assassination of a British official by the young 
revolutionary Madan Lal Dhingra. Detained in England, Savarkar was on route to India as a 
prisoner aboard a P&O liner when he escaped through an open port hole while the ship was 
docked at Marseilles. Although Savarkar hoped that he would be detained by French 
authorities and protected from extradition due to the political nature of the charges against 
him, he was promptly arrested by British detectives who went ashore to capture him. French 
authorities protested this violation of French sovereignty and brought the case before The 
Hague Tribunal, which concluded that there was no obligation on the part of the British to 
restore Savarkar to the French government.1  
Writing about the incident in his memoirs more than a decade later, Josiah 
Wedgwood, a Member of Parliament for the British Labour Party, described the incident as 
indicative of a ‘natural evolution’ through which the international law of Europe was 
																																																						
1	See	Janaki	Bakhle,	‘Savarkar	(1883-1966),	Sedition	and	Surveillance:	the	rule	of	law	in	a	colonial	situation’,	
Social	History	35,	No.	1	(2010),	pp.	51-75.	
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inexorably ‘closing down the hatches on every rebel against the existing order.’ Wedgwood 
identified the central conflict of the twentieth century in Asia not as the tension between 
Britain and India or East and West, but rather between ‘Liberty and Authority.’2 Wedgwood 
argued that while in previous centuries a political refugee could flee one sovereign by 
seeking refuge in the territory of another, there was now no such refuge possible from ‘the 
straight-waistcoat of modern civilization.’ The increasing bureaucratization of the 
international system was, according to Wedgwood, rapidly eliminating channels for political 
redress, and laying the groundwork for a potential ‘bureaucratic tyranny’, wherein individual 
liberty would give way entirely to the logic of national and international security.3 A vocal 
critic of British colonialism in India and an advocate for the rights of refugees, Wedgwood 
exemplified many of the tensions that existed between metropolitan politics and high 
imperialism in early twentieth century Britain. While party leaderships – whether Liberal, 
Conservative, or Labour – were often complicit in maintaining the structures of Britain’s 
global empire, dissenting voices like that of Wedgwood represented an important site of 
critique against imperialism that consistently forced the language of empire to adapt to 
changing international moral norms. 
 The Savarkar incident reflects the deeply entangled relationship that existed between 
domestic political extremism and international law in the early twentieth century. With the 
rise of European anarchism over the course of the long nineteenth century, an international 
system previously defined by the relationships between sovereign states became increasingly 
concerned with the threat posed to state sovereignty itself by the existence of radical 
insurgents capable of subverting domestic authority. This occurred, however, at precisely the 
same time that state sovereignty was evolving to encompass the new political community 
defined by the territorially bounded nation-state. As a world of empires transformed into a 
world of nations following the global cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment 
of the new international society that achieved tangible expression through the League of 
Nations based out of Geneva,4 the spectre of ‘the terrorist’ began to stalk the margins of the 
international. 
 This spectral figure – a conceptual as well as a legal category that defies international 
attempts at standardized definition to this day – came to take on a globally intelligible 
																																																						
2	Josiah	Wedgwood,	Essays	and	Adventures	of	a	Labour	M.P.	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin	Ltd,	1924),	p.	
144.	
3	Ibid,	pp.	152-53.	
4	See	David	Armitage,	Foundations	of	Modern	International	Thought	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	
2013),	p.	191.	
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meaning during the first half of the twentieth century. Yet despite a growing recognition of 
the important role played by ‘terrorism’ in the history of Indian nationalism, and despite an 
increasingly rich historiography detailing the international, transnational, and global 
dimensions of Indian anti-colonial revolutionary networks, nothing has yet been written 
tracing a politico-legal genealogy of terrorism as a conceptual category in colonial India. This 
dissertation uses the history of emergency legislation in India throughout the early twentieth 
century to examine the origins of ‘terrorism’ as a politico-legal category within this colonial 
context. The dissertation further examines the neglected history of India’s relationship to the 
League of Nations in order to provide necessary context for understanding how the domestic 
concerns of the colonial government within the subcontinent reflected and were reflected by a 
larger international context wherein the category of ‘terrorism’ was beginning to achieve 
unprecedented prominence. 
 
‘Terrorism’ in Colonial India: Historiographical and Conceptual Issues 
 
In 1917 James Campbell Ker, who previously served as personal assistant to the 
Director of Criminal Intelligence, published a summary of the first decade of revolutionary 
politics in India, with the title Political Trouble in India, 1907-1917. The government 
restricted the volume to official usage and circulated it among administrators and security 
services to provide a manual for understanding the history of revolutionary networks such as 
the Dacca Anushilan Society and Jugantar. H.W. Hale of the Indian Police composed the 
sequel to this volume, titled Terrorism in India, 1917-1936, following a temporary posting to 
the Intelligence Bureau. Aside from the useful primary material that these volumes provide 
for historians through their comprehensive documentation of various actions and crimes 
undertaken by revolutionaries throughout the early twentieth century, the titles of the books 
are themselves instructive of an evolving colonial discourse of counterinsurgency during this 
period. By the time that Hale composed his volume in 1937, the term ‘terrorism’ had 
definitively replaced older labels such as ‘sedition’, ‘conspiracy’, or ‘political crime’ as the 
primary lens through which acts of anti-colonial revolutionary violence were understood. 
This dissertation traces a politico-legal genealogy of the concept of terrorism in late colonial 
India to understand why and how this transformation occurred. In the first page of the 
volume, Hale defined terrorism as follows:  
 
Terrorism, as distinct from other revolutionary methods such as  
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Communism or the Ghadar Movement, may be said to denote  
the commission of outrages of a comparatively ‘individual’ nature.  
That is to say, the terrorist holds the belief that Indian independence  
can best be brought about by a series of revolutionary outrages  
calculated to instil fear into the British official classes and to drive  
them out of India. He commits outrages for the purpose of collecting  
funds for the purchase of arms, for the making of bombs and for the  
maintenance of his party, hoping that the masses will be drawn to his  
support either by fear or admiration.5 
 
This attempt to explicitly define terrorism in relation to other forms of revolutionary 
politics reflects a growing need in the late 1930s to clarify the meaning of a term that, by this 
point in time, became ubiquitous in its usage by government officials. The word ‘terrorism’, 
alongside its physical personification in the figure of ‘the terrorist’, appears so frequently in 
the colonial police records of 1930s India that a reader could easily be misled into assuming 
that this term was the natural definition through which revolutionary activities were always 
described. In fact, the growing field of scholarship surrounding the history of anti-colonial 
revolutionary violence in India has produced remarkably little critical engagement with the 
history of this term within the political and legal discourse of the colonial state. Most scholars 
of the Indian revolutionary movement have sought to clarify their own terminology to avoid 
replicating a colonial discourse of criminality or applying an unintended value judgment 
through an uncritical usage of the politically-charged label of terrorism. But none has yet 
traced a politico-legal genealogy of the term ‘terrorism’ within the context of colonial India 
in order to trace its emergence as a distinct category of criminality. 
The historiography of the anti-colonial revolutionary movement in India has 
undergone several distinct phases. The first main body of scholarship to focus on anti-
colonial revolutionaries, rather than the more ‘mainstream’ non-violent nationalism of 
Mohandas Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, began in the 1970s with Sumit Sarkar’s 
The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, A.C. Bose’s Indian revolutionaries abroad, and David 
M. Lausey’s Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Left.6 These texts provided important context 
for understanding the previously ignored role of violence in the politics of Indian 
																																																						
5	H.W.	Hale,	Terrorism	in	India,	1917-1936	(Simla:	Government	of	India	Press,	1937),	IOR:	L/P&J/12/403,	p.	1.	
6	See	Sumit	Sarkar,	The	Swadeshi	Movement	in	Bengal,	1903-1908	(New	Delhi:	People’s	Publishing	House,	
1973),	A.C.	Bose,	Indian	revolutionaries	abroad	1905-1922,	in	the	background	of	international	developments	
(Patna:	Bharati	Bawan,	1971)	and	David	M.	Lausey,	Bengal	Terrorism	and	the	Marxist	Left:	Aspects	of	Regional	
Nationalism	in	India,	1905-1942	(Calcutta:	Firma	K.L.	Mukhopadhyay,	1975).	A	re-examination	of	Sarkar’s	work	
can	be	found	in	the	special	issue	Swadeshi	in	the	Time	of	Nations,	in	Economic	&	Political	Weekly	47,	42	(2012).	
See	also	Lisa	Trivedi,	‘Visually	Mapping	the	‘Nation’:	Swadeshi	Politics	in	Nationalist	India,	1920-1930’,	The	
Journal	of	African	Studies	62,	1	(2003),	pp.	11-41,	Amit	Bhattacharyya,	Swadeshi	enterprise	in	Bengal,	1900-
1920	(Calcutta:	Mita	Bhattacharyya:	Distributed	by	Seagull	Bookshop,	1986).	
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independence. Sarkar’s magisterial work on the swadeshi movement has proved particularly 
influential, not only for the history of revolutionary ‘terrorism’ in India but for the political 
history of Bengal more broadly. In it, Sarkar explains his own use of the term ‘terrorism’ by 
clarifying that for him the term connotes elite action in contrast to the more popular militancy 
that typically defines revolutionary insurgency. For Sarkar, the key terminological dividing 
line is not violence versus non-violence, but rather elite action as opposed to mass action. 
Explaining this distinction, Sarkar points out that out of 186 persons convicted of 
revolutionary crimes or killed committing them from 1907 to 1917, 165 came from the upper 
three castes of Brahmin, Kayastha, and Baidya.7  
In the 1990s, new work on the history of revolutionary violence in India included 
studies by Peter Heehs, Richard Popplewell, and Patrick French, among others. In The Bomb 
in Bengal, Heehs presented a comprehensive narrative history of the Jugantar revolutionary 
group based out of Manicktolla garden, which was responsible for the famous bomb attack 
that killed two English women in Muzaffarpur in 1908.8 Heehs also published a collection of 
essays in 1998 that traced some of the international connections and inspirations of the 
Bengali revolutionary movement, with a particular focus on the writings of Aurobindo 
Ghose. Popplewell, on the other hand, produced the most detailed analysis to date of the 
expansion of British imperial intelligence services during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century.9 His book, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, argued that the threat of 
Indian revolutionary networks stimulated the unprecedented expansion of imperial 
information networks, particularly during the First World War.10 Although Popplewell 
contends that a distaste for ‘Russian methods’ of autocratic domestic surveillance ensured 
that security services limited their surveillance to revolutionaries, this was disproven by 
Patrick French’s study of the Indian Political Intelligence files released shortly after the 
publication of Popplewell’s book.11 
																																																						
7	Sarkar,	Swadeshi	Movement,	63-76.	
8	Peter	Heehs,	The	Bomb	in	Bengal:	the	rise	of	revolutionary	terrorism	in	India,	1900-1910	(New	Delhi;	Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	1993).	
9	Peter	Heehs,	Nationalism,	terrorism,	communalism:	essays	in	modern	Indian	history	(New	Delhi;	Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	1998).	
10	Richard	Popplewell,	Intelligence	and	imperial	defence:	British	intelligence	and	the	defence	of	the	Indian	
Empire,	1904-1924	(London:	Frank	Cass,	1995).	
11	Patrick	French,	Liberty	or	Death:	India’s	journey	to	independence	and	division	(London:	Penguin,	2011),	97-
101.	
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Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the topic of ‘terrorism’ in colonial 
India – and elsewhere – has understandably attracted increased interest among scholars.12 
Much of this recent work has been concerned with connecting the history of revolutionary 
violence in India to the emerging subdiscipline of global history, in order to trace the 
transnational linkages through which anti-colonial radicals operated in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Examples of such work include the scholarship of Michael Silvestri, Maia 
Ramnath, Carolien Stolte, Durba Ghosh, Kris Manjapra, and Harald Fischer-Tiné.13 A recent 
special issue of South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies titled ‘Writing Revolution: 
Practice, History, Politics in Modern South Asia’ has further provided a range of diverse 
perspectives and methodologies for critically engaging with the revolutionary politics of late 
colonial India.14  
One aspect missing from all of these different scholarly approaches is a critical 
engagement with the concept of terrorism itself, or a politico-legal genealogy of this term 
within the context of late colonial India. Although this dissertation does not dispute Sarkar’s 
claim regarding the primarily upper-caste demographics of the revolutionary movement, it 
will nonetheless continue to use ‘revolutionaries’, ‘anti-colonial revolutionaries’, and ‘anti-
colonial radicals’ as the main labels designating those that Sarkar and others define as 
terrorists. For the purposes of this dissertation, these three terms will be used 
interchangeably, while the term ‘terrorist’ is used only insofar as it relates to how these 
figures were labelled either by their contemporaries, the colonial state, or future historians. 
There are three key reasons underlying this decision. 
																																																						
12	For	some	examples	of	the	broader	literature	on	terrorism,	see	Walter	Lacqueur,	A	History	of	Terrorism	(New	
Brunswick,	NJ:	Transaction	Publishers,	2001),	Bruce	Hoffman,	Inside	Terrorism	(New	York:	Columbia	University	
Press,	2006),	Lisa	Stampnitzky,	Disciplining	Terror:	How	experts	invented	‘terrorism’	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	2013),	Reza	Aslan,	Beyond	Fundamentalism:	Confronting	religious	extremism	in	the	age	of	
globalization	(New	York:	Random	House	Trade	Paperbacks,	2010),	Michael	Burleigh,	Blood	and	rage:	a	cultural	
history	of	terrorism	(London:	HarperPress,	2008),	and	Robert	A.	Pape,	Dying	to	win:	the	strategic	logic	of	
suicide	terrorism	(London:	Gibson	Square,	2006).	
13	Michael	Silvestri,	‘The	Bomb,	Bhadralok,	Bhagavad	Gita,	and	Dan	Breen:	Terrorism	in	Bengal	and	its	relation	
to	the	European	experience’,	Terrorism	and	Political	Violence	21,	No.	1	(2009),	pp.	1-27,	Maia	Ramnath,	Haj	to	
Utopia:	how	the	Ghadar	movement	charted	global	radicalism	and	attempted	to	overthrow	the	British	empire	
(Berkeley,	Calif.;	London:	University	of	California	Press,	2011),	Carolien	Stolte	and	Fischer-Tiné,	‘Imagining	Asia	
in	India:	Nationalism	and	Internationalism	(ca.	1905-1940)’,	Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History	54,	no.	
1	(2012),	pp.	65-92,	Durba	Ghosh,	‘Terrorism	in	Bengal:	Political	Violence	in	the	Interwar	Years’,	in	Durba	
Ghosh	and	Dane	Kennedy	(eds.),	Decentring	Empire:	Britain,	India	and	the	Transcolonial	World	(New	Delhi:	
Orient	Longman	Private	Ltd.,	2006),	pp.	270-92,	Kris	Manjapra,	M.N.	Roy:	Marxism	and	Colonial	
Cosmopolitanism	(Delhi:	Routledge,	2010),	and	Harald	Fischer-Tiné,	Shyamji	Krishnavarma:	Sanskrit,	Sociology	
and	Anti-Imperialism	(London;	New	Delhi:	Routledge	India,	2014).	
14	Daniel	Elam,	Kama	Maclean,	Chris	Moffat	(eds.),	‘Writing	Revolution:	Practice,	History,	Politics’	in	South	Asia:	
Journal	of	South	Asian	Studies	39,	No.	3	(2016).	
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First, Sarkar’s description of ‘terrorism’ as elite action risks oversimplifying the 
political thought of ‘terrorists’ like Rash Behari Bose. Despite his own relatively elite 
background and reliance on individual acts of insurgency such as his bomb attack against 
Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, Bose articulated a political 
philosophy that was no less revolutionary than that proposed by Communists such as M.N. 
Roy. Here I follow Keith Baker’s definition of ‘revolution’ as articulated in his work on the 
French Revolution, in which he argues that we should understand revolution not only as ‘the 
rather mechanical change of political regime or as the necessary end result of a conflict 
between social classes’, but rather as ‘the ultimate moment of political choice, in which the 
givens of social existence seem suspended, the only power was the power of the imagination, 
and the world could be made anew.’15 Such a description is absolutely applicable to the 
writings of Bose, who used the pages of his monthly journal New Asia to describe an 
emancipatory vision whereby the ‘coloured people’ of the world would reverse the global 
balance of power and remake the world along racial lines that would erase the 
disproportionate power of the Anglo-European imperial states.16 
Second, as this dissertation will make clear, the distinction between the ‘individual’ 
action ascribed to terrorism by Hale and the more collective form of insurgency that Sarkar 
defines as appropriately revolutionary is often very difficult, if not impossible, to clearly 
demarcate. Again taking Rash Behari Bose as an example, it is difficult to imagine a more 
‘individual’ act of ‘terrorism’ than personally attempting to assassinate the Viceroy of India 
through a spectacular bomb attack during the middle of a public procession. Taking Hale or 
Sarkar’s definition then, this would certainly constitute an act of terrorism. But less than three 
years after this incident, Bose was instrumental in planning an abortive uprising that intended 
to cripple Britain’s war effort against Germany by stimulating mutinies among the British 
Indian garrisons across northern India. Reflecting upon the failure of this plot, Bose later 
concluded that a future rising would require arms to be distributed throughout the general 
population in order to be successful.17 Despite this, he continued to be involved in gun-
running operations connected to Sachindranath Sanyal’s self-described ‘terrorist’ activities in 
the mid-1920s. He also provided the animating force behind the formation of the Indian 
National Army, a military unit comprised of captured Indian prisoners of war during the 
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Second World War that was ultimately taken over by the better-known Subhas Chandra 
Bose. The career of Rash Behari Bose thus demonstrates the inherently problematic nature of 
any attempt to draw a neat line of demarcation between ‘elite terrorist’ and ‘popular 
revolutionary’ activities. 
Finally, given the emphasis of this dissertation on tracing a politico-legal genealogy 
of the term ‘terrorism’ in twentieth century India, it is impossible to disentangle the 
complicated history through which this term came into common usage without a strong 
methodological skepticism towards using the word itself in such an analysis. While most 
historians of revolutionary India clearly spell out their intention to avoid moral judgments in 
referring to anti-colonial revolutionaries as terrorists, this misses the point. The discussion 
surrounding whether or not radicals such as Rash Behari Bose were morally justified in using 
violent means in pursuit of their goal of independence entirely avoids the larger question of 
how the term ‘terrorism’ came to acquire a particular set of moral connotations in the first 
place. Asking whether a particular historical or contemporary figure or set of figures should 
or should not be considered a terrorist is often a political question, not a historical one. 
Furthermore, although the term ‘terrorism’ did indeed exist in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, it did not come to be used as the primary category for describing revolutionary 
violence in India until the 1920s, making its uniform usage by historians referring to the 
1900s or 1910s potentially anachronistic.  
While this dissertation traces the genealogy of terrorism as a political and legal 
category in India – and to some extent within international law as well – it does not seek to 
provide a comprehensive intellectual history of terrorism in global terms. Although global 
and international processes are taken into account throughout the work, the focus is much 
more limited, identifying instead the specific history of laws of emergency in colonial India 
from roughly 1897 to 1939. Although the dissertation draws some inspiration from 
conceptual approaches derived from intellectual history or political theory, the primary 
methodology is a close reading of materials collected through extensive research within the 
colonial archive. The archive here is not to be understood simply as a repository of collected 
knowledge, but rather as a space of knowledge production, or what Ann Stoler has referred to 
as a site of state ethnography.18 The goal is not so much to draw on colonial records in an 
attempt to uncover ‘what really happened’, but rather to reconstruct a set of colonial 
assumptions and priorities regarding the articulation – sometimes conscious, sometimes 
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unconscious – of a particular ‘prose of counterinsurgency’, or in this case, a prose of 
counterterrorism.19 
To this end, the dissertation draws on materials collected in archives across four 
countries. Government records, private correspondence, newspaper articles, and legislative 
and parliamentary debates found within the U.K. are derived primarily from the India Office 
Records at the British Library and the National Archives in Kew, London, as well as the 
Cambridge University Library collections. For similar records in India, material has been 
drawn primarily from the National Archives of India and the Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library in New Delhi, and the National Library of India in Kolkata. For records of the 
League of Nations, including the full proceedings of the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism, I relied mainly on the League of Nations Archives in Geneva. 
Finally, New Asia, the monthly journal of the Bengali revolutionary Rash Behari Bose, is 
available through the Waseda University Library in Tokyo, Japan. These archives provide a 
cross section of colonial, revolutionary, and international perspectives regarding the 
relationship between terrorism and law in early twentieth century India, and form the basis of 
the empirical evidence cited throughout the dissertation. 
Despite this strong archival focus, the dissertation also draws heavily from insights 
produced from several theoretical approaches to questions of security, terrorism, and law in 
framing its larger question of understanding the politico-legal genealogy of terrorism as a 
concept in colonial India. The best recent example of a piece of scholarship that seeks to trace 
a genealogy of concepts connected to particular forms of violence is David Armitage’s Civil 
War: A History in Ideas. This book follows notions of civil war from Roman times to the 
present, in an effort to understand the various intellectual and legal genealogies that have 
produced the particular concept of civil war that informs contemporary debates on conflicts 
such as the crisis in Syria.20 While providing path-breaking research in the field of global 
intellectual history, this approach has its limits, most notably the necessarily cursory 
treatment of some episodes – such as the Spanish Civil War – arising out of the book’s 
expansive chronology, as well as the lack of attention to the agency of non-European peoples 
in shaping and contesting the ideas of civil war discussed therein. Still, this text represents a 
strong addition to a larger body of intellectual history which, as Armitage acknowledges, 
found its earliest expression in the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the 
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Genealogy of Morals, which charted the emergence of a distinct Judeo-Christian morality in 
relation to the prevailing norms of the Romano-Hellenistic system that predated it.21 
A similar approach was famously taken up by Michel Foucault in the 1970s with his 
influential genealogies of sexuality, psychiatry, and crime and punishment. Throughout the 
corpus of his writings and public lectures, Foucault sought to understand the architecture of 
the modern state through paradigms such as sovereignty, security, and power/knowledge. 
Current scholarship on the very notion of security and its disciplinary function in managing 
populations is heavily influenced by Foucault’s 1977 to 1978 lectures on Security, Territory, 
Population, and by his analysis of surveillance in Discipline and Punish.22 For Foucault, the 
function of security does not lie in preventing things, but rather in relying on the collection of 
details to obtain ‘something that is considered to be pertinent in itself because situated at the 
level of the population.’23 In Foucault’s analysis, the apparatus of security is connected to the 
governmentalization of the state, by which he means the replacement of the sovereign/subject 
relationship with that of government/population. This shift marks a transition towards new 
statistics-based modes of knowledge production, by which governments seek to regulate 
populations through organizing, or allowing the development of, ever-wider circuits of 
political, economic, and social management.24 
While Foucault has been central to contemporary understandings of security, the 
profusion of scholarship adopting critical or theoretical approaches to the topic of terrorism 
following the attacks of 9/11 has also drawn heavily on the work of the German jurist and 
political theorist Carl Schmitt. Writing in the mid-twentieth century, Schmitt’s role within the 
Nazi party made him unpopular in Western academic circles until the early 2000s, when the 
9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terror that followed led to increased scholarly interest in 
questions of global ordering and insurgency. For Schmitt, the problem with the universal 
humanitarian discourse that emerged out of the liberal internationalism of the interwar period 
was its potential for presupposing the category of the inhuman. Schmitt traced the history of 
the jus publicum Europeaum – or the public law governing international relations between 
European states – arguing that under previous international legal frameworks, war was a 
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contest between two just opponents, or justus hostis, who were entitled to the right of 
resistance and could be negotiated with or defeated in battle.25  
For Schmitt, the central legal innovation of the early twentieth century was the 
attempt to outlaw war, rather than simply bracket it as previous international legal regimes 
sought to accomplish. This criminalization of war, accomplished through the League of 
Nations’ desire to enforce a perpetual peace, led to the transformation from a justum bellum – 
a war between just states – to a justa causa belli – a just war. Within such a war, ‘the asserted 
juridical right and moral legitimacy of one’s own cause and the alleged injustice of the 
opponent’s cause only sharpen and deepen the belligerents’ hostility’, according to Schmitt.26 
This in turn would lead to what Schmitt called, ‘the modern transformation of penal law into 
social pest control’,27 particularly with regard to revolutionaries or partisans, who would be 
regarded by their very nature as unjust ‘foes’ unworthy of recognition under the law. 
Schmitt’s work has proved highly influential, providing the foundation for much of the 
current scholarship on critical terrorism studies.28  
One such example of this is Faisal Devji’s book, The Terrorist in Search of Humanity. 
In this book, Devji argues that the contemporary terrorism of Al Qaeda is comparable to the 
humanitarian projects of environmentalism or pacifism due to its search for a global politics. 
Devji’s central argument is that although a global society has been formed over the second 
half of the twentieth century, it does not possess any political institutions of similar scope. 
For Devji, new forms of transnational militancy seek to fill this institutional vacuum in 
pursuit of this global politics. Such a politics takes humanity as its object, due to the role of 
nuclear weapons and global warming in reframing humanity into global, rather than national 
or international terms. It also seeks to locate humanity as an agent, rather than a victim of 
history, or what Devji calls the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ of history.29 While this analysis has been 
important for understanding the global politics of contemporary terrorist networks such as Al 
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Qaeda, it is less useful in understanding the historical context within which the notion of ‘the 
terrorist’ first emerged in colonial India. This is because the events covered within this 
dissertation occurred decades before the emergence of phenomena such as nuclear war, 
climate change, or space travel produced a global society cognizant of its own potential for 
planetary destruction. Terrorism in the 1920s and 1930s was indeed linked to questions of 
humanity, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, but this was a different conception of humanity 
than that envisioned by Devji. 
Some recent work connecting this critical reading of terrorism and law with the local 
history of colonial India includes the writings of Nasser Hussain, John Pincince, and Partha 
Chatterjee. In his book The jurisprudence of emergency: colonialism and the rule of law, 
Nasser Hussain looks at the concept of emergency law in India in relation to the theories of 
Foucault and Schmitt. Hussain examines the tensions between ‘political exigencies and legal 
rule’, as well as between the ‘operation of law as universal, formal, and rational and the 
absolute sovereignty of the state.’30 Drawing on the work of E.P. Thompson in revealing ‘the 
historical construction of the normative itself’,31 Hussain argues that while Foucault locates 
the normative force of power relations within the disciplinary functions of the social rather 
than the interdictory mechanisms of law, this analysis provides an inadequate account of the 
sovereignty of the state.32 For Hussain, this is best expressed through the limits on the 
functioning of the normative through the mechanism of emergency. Here Hussain draws on 
Schmitt’s famous definition of the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the exception’, and 
asserts that while the concept of emergency has been studied, the ‘indicative function of 
emergency as a constitutive relation between modern law and sovereignty’, as formative in 
our understanding of modern power, has not.33 Rather than understand the state of emergency 
as existing outside the rule of law, Hussain argues that the relationship between the rule of 
law and emergency is as intimate as it is anxious, and that within the context of colonial India 
emergency law is to be understood in relation to the expression of colonial sovereignty. 
For Partha Chatterjee, the relationship between law and sovereignty is intimately 
connected to the emergence of state sovereignty as the normative unit of political 
organization over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chatterjee asserts that 
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this is intimately tied to the history of empire, and that in fact the very definition of the 
imperial prerogative lay in the ability to declare the colonial exception.34 That is to say, the 
exception for Chatterjee marks the moment at which one sovereign state can deny the 
sovereignty of another in order to pursue its own aims. At the more local level of colonial law 
in practice, Chatterjee argues that anti-colonial violence served the same function as anti-
colonial non-violence, in that both forced the state to deploy its own ‘legal’ violence through 
the assertion of emergency measures that violated the legal principles on which colonial rule 
ostensibly rested its authority.35 Chatterjee further contends that convicting revolutionaries 
through normal legal means was made more difficult due to the fact that their crimes 
amounted to a political offence through challenging the sovereign powers of the state.36 As 
John Pincince argues, the very notion of ‘political offences’  (while of central importance to 
British metropolitan and international law) was thus wholly excluded from the prosecution of 
anti-colonial revolutionary activities in India, which the imperial government instead 
criminalized. Pincince asserts that this amounts to the colonial state existing in a permanent 
state of exception, as challenges to colonial authority revealed the precarious order of the 
colonial state at precisely the same time that emergency measures and increased surveillance 
highlighted the further criminalization of the colonial subject.37  
This dissertation seeks to break new ground by assessing the strategies of 
legitimization pursued by colonial authorities in articulating and justifying new emergency 
measures that targeted revolutionary politics in the early twentieth century. Tracing the 
evolving discursive strategies of the colonial state through its legal categorization first of 
sedition, then conspiracy, and finally terrorism, this project will demonstrate the role of a new 
prose of counterterrorism in the formulation of colonial laws of emergency. It will 
furthermore demonstrate the continued importance of British sovereignty, personified in the 
figure of the viceroy, in maintaining colonial interests throughout the first four decades of the 
twentieth century despite gestures towards greater political participation on the part of Indian 
subjects through a series of legal and political reforms. Finally, the dissertation will connect 
this history to India’s growing participation within an international society founded upon the 
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mutual recognition of state sovereignty, indicating the importance of the international for 
understanding the emergence of a politico-legal discourse of terrorism in colonial India. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 
According to Michael Silvestri, the phenomenon of revolutionary violence in Bengal 
can be loosely grouped into four main phases, although it remained a consistent feature of 
political life until Indian independence in 1947.  These phases include the periods from 1907 
to 1912, 1914 to 1918, 1919 to 1925, and 1930 to 1934.38 This dissertation is in broad 
agreement with Silvestri’s periodization, although for the purposes of the chapter breakdown, 
the first chapter covers the period from 1897 to 1913, the second covers the period of the 
First World War from 1914 to 1918, and the third will address terrorism in the interwar 
period from 1919 to 1939. In this way, the first three chapters take a broadly chronological 
approach, tracing the genealogy of terrorism as a legal category in India from the 
assassination of W.C. Rand of the Pune Plague Commission in 1897 to the emergence of 
explicit counter-‘terrorism’ legislation in 1930s Bengal.  
Chapter 1 examines the relationship between bombs and ideas during the period 
between 1897 and 1913. Beginning with the murder of Rand, this chapter explores both the 
politics underlying the actions of his assassins, the Chapekar brothers, as well as the way in 
which the prominent nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak wrote about political assassination. 
Charged with sedition on two separate occasions, Tilak provides important insight into how 
the rhetoric of anti-colonial revolutionary politics interpreted and articulated such acts of 
violence during this period. The assassination attempt against Douglas Kingsford in 1908 by 
Khudiram Bose and Prafulla Chaki, resulting in the accidental killing of two English women, 
marked an important milestone in both the development of emergency legislation in India and 
the development of a new politics that came to see the bomb as a tool of anti-colonial 
liberation. This form of revolutionary politics was articulated by figures such as Tilak and 
Bipin Chandra Pal, both of whom regarded the bomb as an inherently political tool of 
destruction that could only be understood with reference to an emancipatory struggle against 
colonial rule. From a legal standpoint, the murders also resulted in the famous Alipore trial, 
in which a number of important Calcutta-based revolutionaries including Aurobindo Ghose 
and his brother Barindra were put on trial for conspiracy. It also prompted the passage of new 
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emergency laws including the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Newspapers (Incitement to 
Offences) Act, and the Explosives Substances Act. Assessing the relationship between the 
politics of the bomb and the colonial government’s legal strategies of repression, the chapter 
ends with an examination of the assassination attempt against Lord Hardinge in 1912 by the 
Bengali revolutionary Rash Behari Bose. 
Following the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the colonial government in 
India deployed a series of emergency laws that sought to further restrict revolutionary 
politics. Chapter 2 examines the discussions that surrounded the drafting of these laws, 
identifying the way in which colonial officials framed these measures as necessary responses 
to the global crisis triggered by the war. Although this was the official explanation, laws such 
as the Ingress into India Ordinance and the Defence of India Act were in fact designed to 
target pre-existing revolutionary movements, and used the language of war as a way of 
justifying exceptional measures for public consumption. Evidence for this can be found in 
private correspondence and internal memoranda circulated among top officials, reflecting a 
desire to publically associate counter-revolutionary legislation with the global war against 
Germany, despite an acknowledgement on the part of administrators that the measures being 
adopted were a response to a political crisis that preceded the war. This chapter traces the 
malleability of the concept of ‘war measures’ by identifying the ways in which officials 
consistently sought to stretch the meaning and applicability of the Defence of India Act to 
allow them to deal with a range of challenges not covered by the initial mandate of this law. 
Following the end of the war, colonial administrators sought to retain key elements of these 
war measures and appointed a committee chaired by Sydney Rowlatt in order to provide a 
public rationale for this decision. In attempting to extend these war measures into peacetime 
with the imposition of the so-called Rowlatt Act, the colonial government triggered a massive 
popular backlash which, following the massacre of 379 unarmed protestors at Amritsar, 
forced the government to abandon the desired law. 
 Chapter 3 examines the ways in which new developments in the interwar period 
shaped both the nature of revolutionary politics and the legal responses adopted by the 
colonial government to these politics through the emergence of the category of ‘the terrorist’ 
in Bengal. At the end of the First World War, two key developments changed the political 
landscape of colonial India. First, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms provided a limited 
gesture towards greater political participation for Indians living under British colonial rule by 
creating a system of diarchy. Through this system, the central government devolved certain 
responsibilities to officials elected through a restricted franchise, while executive power 
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remained firmly in the hands of the British viceroy. At the same time, the emergence of 
Mohandas Gandhi as a spiritual and political leader with mass appeal fundamentally 
transformed the nature of nationalist politics in India. Gandhi’s great innovations included his 
success at both bringing anti-colonial mobilization into the forefront of public discourse, as 
well as orienting the nature of this mobilization towards non-violent forms of anti-
governmental protest through his campaign of non-cooperation. In seeking to legislate 
against revolutionaries in a way that would not alienate moderate opinion in India and 
Britain, colonial administrators increasingly relied upon a language of terrorism that de-
legitimized radical politics by labeling them as violent and criminal. This process was 
explicitly articulated in the redrafting of Viceroy and Governor General Lord Reading’s 
speech regarding the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1925, in which Reading 
deliberately replaced the term ‘revolutionaries’ with the word ‘terrorists’ at the suggestion of 
the Secretary of State. From this point on, ‘terrorism’ became the primary category used by 
colonial officials in describing revolutionary politics, eventually adopting explicit legal form 
in the Terrorist Outrages Act of 1932. Although acts of revolutionary violence declined after 
1934, ‘terrorism’ remained a category of great concern to colonial police services up until the 
beginning of the 1940s, when the outbreak of a new world war and the emergence of 
widespread civil disobedience and communal tensions replaced it as a priority for officials. 
 The next two chapters trace India’s relationship to the international system of the 
interwar period, and particularly the League of Nations, and investigate how this relationship 
impacted India’s engagement with terrorism at the scale of the international. Chapter 4 begins 
with the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and provides an overview of India’s anomalous 
position within the League of Nations, as the only non-self-governing member state. The 
chapter then proceeds to highlight some of the key relationships and tensions between India 
and the international in this period, examining the role of publicity and petitions as alternate 
methods by which imperial and anti-imperial actors sought to make their voices heard within 
an emerging global public sphere. Situating itself within the growing field of international 
history, this chapter argues that the existing literature has neglected the international 
dimensions of India’s interwar history, despite the fact that these dimensions provide 
important insights into the nature of empire at in this period. Finally, the chapter uses the life 
and thought of Rash Behari Bose, a Bengali revolutionary covered extensively throughout the 
preceding three chapters, to explore how the international itself became a site of critique for 
anti-colonial radicals, who came to see the League of Nations as nothing more than a tool for 
the furtherance of European imperialism. This chapter explores an almost altogether 
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overlooked aspect of interwar Indian history, and provides the context necessary for making 
sense of India’s role in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
which is the subject of Chapter 5. 
 The final chapter focuses on the drafting of the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism, which became the first international law to explicitly target 
terrorism as a distinct category of crime in 1937. Situating this convention within the context 
of previous international legislation that targeted ‘anarchism’, terrorism’s nineteenth century 
antecedent, this chapter examines the process by which the League of Nations sought to 
define and police terrorism as a new category of international crime in the 1930s. The chapter 
adopts a thematic approach, tracing the priorities of the Indian and British delegations and 
situating these within the context of larger international discourses regarding territory, 
politics, civilisation, and authority. In this way, the chapter seeks to analyse the ways in 
which terrorism became useful to international governments as a trope of criminality by 
which a diverse range of political challengers in different territories could be made 
intelligible through a standardised discourse of terrorism. As the only member-state to 
ultimately ratify the convention, India’s role in the discussions, though understated at times, 
is fundamentally important to understanding governmental priorities within India itself. This 
chapter also highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between international and 
domestic politics during the interwar period, by indicating the ways in which India’s 
relationship to the emerging category of terrorism influenced and was influenced by larger 
global processes of international organization and imperial authority. 
 Taken together, these chapters trace the emergence of terrorism as a distinct category 
of political and legal discourse in late colonial India, and connect it to the global history of 
terrorism as a universalisable trope within the international system of the League of Nations. 
Although focused specifically on the genealogy of discourses on terrorism within the context 
of colonial India, this research has important implications for the deeper history of a global 
prose of counterterrorism. While the existing scholarship on anti-colonial revolutionary 
violence in India does not adequately interrogate the politico-legal genealogy of terrorism as 
a discursive tool of governmental authority, critical scholarship on terrorism tends to limit its 
analysis only to more recent trends in global jihadism, at the expense of a deeper history of 
the normative acceptance of the category of ‘terrorism’ within its early twentieth century 
context. By situating revolutionary violence in India within its international context, this 
dissertation seeks to contribute to these two distinct fields of scholarship, offering a 
conceptually informed but archivally rich documentation of ‘terrorism’ in late colonial India.
	26	
Chapter 1: 
Sedition and Assassination in Bengal, 1905-1913 
 
Introduction 
 
 On the 23rd of December 1912, a bomb exploded in the heart of British India. Lord 
Hardinge, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, entered Delhi on the back of an 
elephant in a procession meant to celebrate the transition of India's capital from Calcutta, 
while simultaneously showcasing the ‘inevitableness of a British Raj.’1 Hardinge was nearly 
killed when the bomb exploded just behind him, killing an attendant and embedding shrapnel 
in the Viceroy's back. Media outlets around the world condemned the assassination attempt, 
which even Pope Pius X criticized in his Christmas greeting.2 Investigation into the attack 
became the top priority of British intelligence services in India who, in the absence of reliable 
information, were willing to consider increasingly farfetched tactics for uncovering 
information on Hardinge's attacker such as offering a free pardon to co-conspirators in the 
bomb plot and importing detectives from Scotland Yard to assist in the investigation.3 
Despite the offer of a reward of 100,000 rupees, the identity of Hardinge's attacker remained 
a mystery until information surfaced in connection with a separate conspiracy case, revealing 
that the man who threw the bomb was the Bengali revolutionary, Rash Behari Bose.4 
The Delhi bomb plot was the culmination of a series of plots and so-called ‘outrages’ 
carried out by Indian revolutionaries against the apparatus of British colonial rule prior to the 
development of more organized transnational insurgent networks during the First World War. 
The murder of W.C. Rand, the Chairman of the Pune Plague Committee, and Lieutenant 
Charles Ayerst by the Chapekar brothers in 1897 is often regarded as the first political 
assassination carried out against the British Raj.5 There are issues with such a periodization, 
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particularly given the tendency of such a narrative to reinforce the distinction between the 
political and the pre-political that Ranajit Guha sought to critique, by affording political 
agency only to the more ‘modern’ insurgents of the twentieth century.6 There are in fact 
examples of murders throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century that could and 
perhaps should be deemed political, most notably the killing of the Chief Justice of Calcutta 
in 1871 by a Muslim who the Saturday Review reported did not ‘show any of the wild fury or 
unreasoning passion which might have given a clue to his motives in personal hatred or the 
fancies of a diseased brain.’7 This murder, and others like it, fit into a deeper history of anti-
colonial violence that extends back as far as colonial rule itself, and was particularly 
prevalent in frontier regions, such as those addressed by the recent work of Mark Condos and 
Elizabeth Kolsky.8  
Nonetheless, given that the primary aim of this dissertation is to trace the genealogy 
of a colonial discourse of terrorism, such acts of nineteenth century political violence lie 
outside the scope of the current project. Instead, this chapter will begin, as previous studies 
have, with the Chapekars’ murder of Rand and Ayerst, the first such attack to be recognized 
by colonial officials as a deliberate political assassination. The chapter will then detail some 
of the plots that followed this double murder, focusing particularly on Khudiram Bose’s 
murder of the Kennedy women by bomb in Muzzaffarpur in 1908, and concluding with an 
analysis of the Delhi assassination plot against Hardinge, in order to assess the relationship 
between political violence and political communication in early twentieth century India. By 
tracing colonial responses to real and imagined relationships between political assassinations 
and newspaper articles deemed ‘seditious’, the chapter will argue for a new understanding of 
assassination, and specifically assassination by bomb, as a deliberate form of communication 
conducted by anti-colonial revolutionaries. In addition to theorizing the relationship between 
communication and violence, this chapter will also theorize the bomb as a vessel for the 
political, an analysis which will lay the groundwork for understanding the evolution of a new 
prose of counter-terrorism in subsequent chapters. 
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Sedition and Assassination in India, 1897 
 
 According to the account of Damodar Hari Chapekar, one of the three brothers 
involved in the murders of Rand and Ayerst, Rand was not targeted for assassination because 
of any personal characteristics or actions. In fact, Damodar specifically wrote that despite 
Rand’s reputation as a wicked man of great perversity, surveillance of Rand revealed that he 
‘was a proud man like ourselves … not addicted to any vice. There was no meanness in his 
character.’9 The murder of Rand should therefore be understood as an inherently political 
action that came in response to biopolitical measures adopted by the British colonial 
government following the outbreak of bubonic plague in Bombay and the surrounding area 
beginning in 1896. Following from a period of devastating famine, the plague killed 
thousands of Indian people, and prompted the imposition of harsh sanitation measures by 
colonial officials. These included forcible entry into the homes of locals, the destruction of 
personal possessions, quarantine measures and forced relocation of those believed to be 
infected to hospitals and special segregation camps. Although British officials viewed these 
measures as prudent responses to a dangerous epidemic, many Indians were harshly critical 
of the heavy-handedness of the British response, and accused the colonial government of 
tyranny. Commenting on the murders of Rand and Ayerst in an interview with The 
Manchester Guardian, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, an important figure within the early Indian 
National Congress, said that there could be ‘no doubt that the deplorable outrages of June 22 
are to be connected with the measures taken in Poona against the plague.’10 In the interview, 
Gokhale accused the British soldiers tasked with carrying out the anti-plague measures of 
entering kitchens and places of worship, ‘contaminating food and spitting upon idols or 
breaking them and throwing them into the street … Women were dragged into the streets and 
stripped for inspection …’11 Such accusations were widespread and appeared in the 
autobiography of Damodar Chapekar, who wrote that Rand was marked for death as an 
enemy of Indian religion, due to the work of the Plague Committee. 
The selection of Rand as the target for assassination fits into a broad intellectual 
transformation of political violence which Mikkel Thorup links to the French Revolution of 
1789. According to Thorup, what was particularly significant about the killing of King Louis 
XVI was the fact that while previous acts of tyrannicide intended to uphold justice through 
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the murder of an unjust ruler, Louis’ execution occurred simply because of his identity as 
king, rather than as the result of any particular actions of injustice. For Thorup then, terrorism 
became a historically new form of violence due to the fact that ‘even though actual persons 
are being targeted, and perhaps their killing is being legitimated by specific actions they have 
committed, the real target of the attack is not the person but the abstraction of the system.’12 
 This runs contrary to Peter Hees’ reference to the assassinations as ‘semi-political 
revolts actuated largely by personal resentment and religious enthusiasm.’13 The targeting of 
Rand should rather be regarded as an inherently political act through which the Chapekars 
sought to deliberately target and challenge the authority of the colonial government. 
Although in the context of late nineteenth century India the label of terrorism had not 
yet gained the popular purchase that it would exercise during the interwar period, it is 
nonetheless significant that the Chapekars targeted Rand, not for his own personal actions 
during the plague, but due to his position as a representative of the larger machinery of the 
colonial state. Rand’s role as a stand-in for colonial sovereignty is further evidenced by the 
Chapekar brothers’ tarring of a statue of Queen Victoria prior to the assassination, which 
Damodar described in the following terms: 
 
There is a statue of the Queen of England situated at a certain crossing  
off our roads in the Fort in Bombay … This woman, after the Mutiny  
of 1857, acquired the universal sovereignty of India by making fair but  
deceitful promises. She alone is the real enemy of our people. Other  
white men are our enemies only in so far as they are her subjects …  
It is, however, to be deeply regretted that owing to our misfortune she  
is not here and it is not likely that she will ever come to this country. We,  
therefore, resolved to make an auspicious beginning by first dealing with  
her stone image …14 
 
Originally intending to break the statue into pieces with a hammer, the brothers 
instead decided to disfigure the statue by blackening its face with tar and stringing a necklace 
of shoes around its neck.15 Resolving not to go after any of the minor officers of the Plague 
Committee, the brothers selected Rand as their target because, as Chairman of the 
Committee, he provided the closest symbolic stand-in for the sovereignty of the Queen. On 
the 22nd of June, following celebrations in Pune for the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria’s 
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coronation, Damodar Hari Chapekar and his brother Balkrishna Hari set an ambush for 
Rand’s carriage and shot the Chairman on his way back from the celebrations. Following the 
shooting of Rand, Damodar’s brother Balkrishna shot Rand’s military escort, Lieutenant 
Ayerst, in the head, killing him on the spot. 
The assassination drew international media attention, especially given the global 
appetite for such stories driven by a recent rise in political violence across Europe.16 
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and around the turn of the twentieth 
century, the rise of anarchist thought and particularly the doctrine of ‘propaganda of the 
deed’, which encouraged individual insurrectionary violence against the state, led to a spate 
of high profile assassinations. These included the murders of Czar Alexander II of Russia in 
1881, France’s President Sadi Carnot in 1894, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the prime 
minister of Spain, in 1897, and King Umberto I of Italy in 1900. In 1901, the phenomenon of 
political murders, or so-called ‘assassinationism’, spread to the United States as well, with 
the sensationalised murder of President William McKinley.  
As evidenced by their labelling as ‘propaganda by deed’, these assassinations 
functioned as a form of communication by which their perpetrators sought to convey a clear 
political message. This is why Alex Schmid and Jany de Graaf argue that the origins of 
terrorism – more frequently referred to as ‘anarchism’ or ‘assassinationism’ in the nineteenth 
century – can only be understood with reference to the origins of mass media. According to 
Schmid and de Graaf, the community of readers fostered by the press created an expanded 
audience for certain types of communication, while simultaneously privileging certain voices 
above others in terms of what type of message could be communicated. Because the news 
dedicated itself to the actions of the powerful, ‘by affecting the lives of the powerful the 
powerless could also enter the pages of the press and thereby shape public opinion.’17  
This meant that for those like Damodar Chapekar, who lacked access to a platform 
through which to disseminate their political message, the sensational killing of a high ranking 
public official became an important alternative means by which to communicate with a broad 
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popular audience. In his autobiography, composed after the assassination of Rand, Damodar 
wrote that such a memoir would be a ‘needless waste of time’ if written by one whose 
‘righteous conduct is barren in its effect in inculcating a wholesome moral or in gratifying the 
public taste.’ For Damodar, a man could acquire fame only by either ‘committing a 
reprehensible deed or by performing a very laudable act.’ For a life to be worth writing about, 
it should succeed in accomplishing ‘such righteous deeds as would engage the pens of several 
authors in describing them.’18 This indicates that there was a clear and deliberate function 
behind the assassination of Rand beyond the act of killing itself, or the ‘personal resentment 
and religious enthusiasm’ attributed to it by Hees. Killing Rand was on the one hand a 
symbolic rejection of the sovereignty of Queen Victoria, as evidenced by the tarring of her 
statue which preceded it. But it was also a strategy of political communication through which 
Damodar ensured a readership for a memoir that would otherwise, by his own admission, not 
be worth reading.  
 Colonial officials were aware of the communicative potential of such actions, and 
took seriously the threat posed by the dissemination of political ideas to a popular audience. 
Prior to Rand’s murder, the nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak printed an article in his highly 
influential Marathi paper the Kesari, describing Rand’s actions as tyrannical and accusing the 
colonial government of the deliberate oppression of the Indian people. On the 15th of June, a 
week before the assassination of Rand, the Kesari published a series of paragraphs titled 
‘Sivaji’s utterances’, including the fictional lament of the historic Marathi warrior Sivaji upon 
waking from the sleep of death to find his country rife with oppression. In printing out the 
proceedings from a popular festival, Tilak also published a discussion from the Ganpati 
festival which justified Sivaji’s murder of the Muslim general Afzal Khan on the basis that it 
was committed for the good of others and thus should not be regarded as a sin.19  
These articles led to Tilak’s arrest and trial on charges of sedition.20 At issue was the 
question of whether the articles excited or attempted to excite disaffection against the 
government, as defined by Section 124 A of the Indian Penal Code. This law defined 
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disaffection as the absence of affection, meaning enmity or disloyalty towards the 
Government. Judge Strachey, the presiding magistrate, clarified that the offence related only 
to bad feelings and not to mutiny or rebellion or any particular overt act. In Strachey’s words, 
‘Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by these articles is absolutely immaterial,’ 
because even if Tilak did not excite or attempt to excite any act of forcible resistance to the 
Government, ‘still if he tried to excite feelings of enmity to the Government, that is sufficient 
to make him guilty under the section.’21 Although Strachey acknowledged that it was legal to 
criticize any measure of the government and even to hold it up to unfair abuse, if the same 
person were to hold the government itself ‘to the hatred or contempt of his readers … then he 
is guilty under the section, and the explanation will not save him.’22 Strachey made an 
important distinction between criticism of particular actions of a government - protected 
under British law by notions of political liberty in contrast to perceptions of European and 
Oriental despotism - and criticism of the government itself, to which the loyalty of the subject 
served as a prerequisite for the exercise of individual rights and privileges.  
Strachey did not accuse Tilak’s articles of instigating the assassination of Rand and 
Ayerst, although he did make reference to these murders during the trial. Strachey argued that 
in determining whether or not a piece of writing reflected seditious intent, it was necessary to 
understand the context in which it was written, and the intended audience. Strachey stated 
that discussing the topic of political assassination with a group of philosophers or students 
was one thing, whereas ‘to discuss it in a mixed crowd of people or to put it in a public 
newspaper is another thing altogether.’ Strachey pointed out that the murders occurred only 
one week after the articles in question appeared in the Kesari, although he quickly clarified 
that he did not wish to suggest ‘in the slightest degree that there is a relation of cause and 
effect between either of these articles and that abominable murder, or that the prisoner Tilak 
had any conception that anything published by him would lead to a result of that sort.’ 
Admitting that the Advocate-General was unable to prove any link between the articles and 
the ‘dastardly outrage’, 23 Strachey asked the jury to put the matter out of their minds, other 
than as evidence that the articles emerged within a particularly turbulent context.24  
Although later British commentators would draw a much closer causal relationship 
between political assassination and articles deemed seditious, what is most significant in the 
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judgement against Tilak is Strachey’s concern with the dissemination of such ideas to a broad 
popular audience. Although Strachey acknowledged that the question of morality addressed 
by the discussion of Professor Bhanu regarding Shivaji’s killing of Afzul Khan could rightly 
be of historical and philosophical interest, this was an ‘extremely dangerous’ topic to present 
to a popular audience. While philosophers or educated men could discuss the finer points of 
whether certain persons could be singled out as exceptions to ordinary moral norms, Strachey 
argued that when an ‘ignorant mob is told that a certain murder by Shivaji was justifiable, 
they are likely to conclude that murder may not be at all a bad thing.’25 The jury echoed 
Strachey’s concerns, and found Tilak guilty by a vote of six to three, sentencing him to 
eighteen months rigorous imprisonment.26 
Tilak was charged under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, which drew 
inspiration from an older British law called the Treasony-Felony Act, Section 3 of 1848. This 
law stated that anyone who tried to deprive the monarch of their ‘Imperial Crown’ or to wage 
war against the monarch, ‘or to move or stir any foreigner or stranger with force to invade the 
United Kingdom, or any other of Her Majesty’s dominions or countries’ should be found 
guilty of sedition. At the time of this law, Sir James Stephen, who would subsequently be 
referenced in many of the legal debates that followed, responded to criticism that this law 
violated the liberty of the press by arguing that ‘liberty extended to the point at which law 
stopped … The question was not whether the Press ought or ought not to be free, but whether 
it ought to be free to excite rebellion.’27  
This law was particularly important in responding to agitation in Ireland during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. In 1868, Alexander Sullivan and Richard Pigott were 
put on trial in Dublin for ‘seditious libels on the government.’ The definition of sedition 
provided in this trial was any word or deed designed to ‘disturb the tranquillity of the state, 
and lead ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the Government and the laws of empire.’ 
This included bringing ‘into hatred or contempt the sovereign or the Government, the laws or 
constitution of the realm, and generally all endeavours to promote public disorder.’28 During 
the trial, Judge Fitzgerald referred to sedition as ‘a crime against society nearly allied to 
treason’, as well as ‘disloyalty in action.’ Fitzgerald held up the press as the most dangerous 
means by which seditious doctrines could be disseminated, stating that through it, ‘the 
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preachers of sedition can sow widecast that poisonous seed which, if unchecked, ultimately 
must culminate in insurrection and revolution.’29 This marks a significant shift of emphasis 
from direct incitements to rebellion towards a looser definition encompassing seditious ideas 
that may one day culminate in rebellion. 
In India, the law of sedition came about because of changes to the Penal Code in 
1870. The first major trial to invoke this law was the case of Queen-Empress v. Jogendra 
Chunder Bose, known as the Bangavasi case, which was concerned with articles published in 
the Bangavasi newspaper following the Age of Consent Bill. The bill passed on the 19th of 
March, 1891, and the Bangavasi, a weekly vernacular paper published in Calcutta, printed the 
first of several articles critical of this law on the 28th of March. These articles accused the 
British of threatening Indian religion, and of interfering with local customs and traditions, as 
well as ruling through brute force. At issue was the question of whether or not the paper’s 
criticism of the bill constituted ‘legitimate’ criticism, and the jury was ultimately unable to 
reach a verdict, leading to the accused issuing an apology and the proceedings being 
dropped.30 
The trial of Tilak was the first major trial in India in which the courts secured a 
conviction for charges of sedition, and following this case the law was amended in 1898. In 
particular, legislators believed that a more clearly worded definition was required, in order to 
encompass any words or writings that would make or attempt to make others disaffected ‘or 
adversely opposed towards the sovereign or his government; or, in other words, turning the 
people against their rulers.’31 Central to this definition was also a clearer definition of the 
term ‘government’ itself. A key distinction in determining the difference between legitimate 
criticism of policy and seditious criticism of the sovereignty of the state was, according to 
Judge Batty, whether such criticism targeted particular government officials and policies, or 
the government itself as an abstract whole. Batty stated that ‘one particular set of persons 
may be open to objection, and to assail them and to attack them and excite hatred against 
them is not necessarily exciting hatred against the Government.’ While the individual was 
‘transitory’ and could be held up to critique,  
… that which is essentially and inseparably connected with the idea of  
the Government established by law cannot be attacked without coming  
within this section … In other words, Government is the abstract  
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conception of British rule in India … To attack any individual member  
of that body in his private capacity might amount to a common libel  
… but to attack the Government itself through its official representatives,  
with seditious intend, would be an offence within the meaning of section  
124 A.32 
 
 This distinction marks an important shift in the way that colonial legislators in India 
understood sovereignty. Restricted to the figure of the British monarch since the end of the 
Indian uprising in 1858, sovereignty at the turn of the twentieth century was devolving into a 
bureaucratised model in which the central sovereignty of the monarch via the Governor 
General was also distributed amongst a wider range of officials and governmental 
representatives. This meant that an attack on any such representative could constitute an 
assault on the sovereignty of the colonial state. This became an important site of political 
contestation, as revolutionaries sought to undermine the authority of the state in the eyes of 
the public through the assassination of its various representatives. 
 As Janaki Bakhle observes, it is precisely at a time when the label of sedition was 
becoming obsolete in Britain that it took on such important meaning within the Indian 
context.33 In Britain the spread of liberal ideals regarding freedom of expression and the right 
to criticize one’s government rendered the charge of sedition unpalatable to most British 
juries, with the exception of cases in which Irish revolutionaries sought to disturb the public 
peace. Despite popular hysteria surrounding the German ‘spy scares’ that preceded the 
beginning of the First World War and the resulting development of Britain’s domestic 
security service, later known as MI5, actual prosecutions for sedition were extremely rare in 
Britain in the early twentieth century. 
 This ironically transformed the metropole itself into a hub of anti-colonial literature, 
as nationalist thinkers took advantage of looser sedition laws to publish propaganda that 
would be impossible to print under Indian press laws. One of the most important of these 
thinkers was Shyamji Krishnavarma, a journalist, intellectual, and anti-imperialist who began 
publication of a monthly journal called the Indian Sociologist in 1905.34 Krishnavarma’s 
writings were highly critical of British colonial rule, referring to it as a foreign despotism and 
advocating an alliance among victims of imperialism in India, Egypt, Ireland, and South 
Africa.35 To this end, Krishnavarma also founded a hostel for Indian students at Highgate in 
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London. Called India House, this hostel became an important hub for Indian nationalists as 
diverse as V.D. Savarkar and M.K. Gandhi, but was best known for producing Madan Lal 
Dhingra, the young revolutionary who shot and killed Sir William Hutt Curzon Wyllie, the 
political aide-de-camp of the Secretary of State for India in 1909 at the Imperial Institute in 
London. This assassination in the heart of the imperial metropole attracted the panicked 
condemnation of the British press and would provide a source of inspiration to subsequent 
revolutionaries around the world. Although as a result, this assassination attracts more 
scholarly attention than many others, it and other transnational acts of violence are largely 
excluded from this chapter, which instead concerns itself with establishing a historical and 
theoretical context for acts of anti-colonial assassination carried out within the territory of 
Bengal itself.36 The rationale for this approach is that by foregrounding Bengal, the centre of 
revolutionary politics during this period, it becomes possible to better understand the local 
context from which global networks and trans-imperial connections would emerge during the 
First World War, which is the subject of the following chapter. The transnational connections 
of figures such as Savarkar, whose activities predate the war, will be revisited in Chapter 5, 
during a consideration of India’s relationship to international law. 
 
The Politics of the Bomb in Bengal, 1905-1908 
 
 Following the execution of the Chapekars and the trial of Tilak, the next major 
milestone in the evolution of political assassination within India was the decision of Lord 
Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to partition the province of Bengal in 
1905. Since 1765, Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa were grouped into a single province, with an 
estimated combined population of around seventy-eight million people at the time of 
partition. The proposed partition would divide the province into two new administrative units 
which would be divided primarily along religious lines, with a Muslim majority in East 
Bengal and a primarily Hindu population in West Bengal. British officials justified the 
decision on the grounds of administrative efficiency, but privately Curzon admitted that he 
hoped that it would undermine the power of the incipient Indian nationalist movement. In a 
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letter to John Brodrick, India’s Secretary of State, Curzon wrote that Calcutta was the centre 
of the Indian National Congress’ political power and that;  
 
… its best wire-pullers and its most frothy orators all reside there. The  
perfection of their machinery, and the tyranny which it enables them  
to exercise are truly remarkable. They dominate public opinion in  
Calcutta … the whole of their activity is directed to creating an agency  
so powerful that they may one day be able to force a weak Government  
to give them what they desire.37 
 
For this reason, the partition attracted vehement opposition from the middle class 
Bengali bhadralok, who campaigned vigorously against it by calling for mass boycotts of 
British goods. Invoking a language of Bengal as a dismembered motherland, politicians and 
intellectuals promoted swadeshi, the manufacture of locally produced goods that would 
replace British imports.38 The swadeshi campaign drew on cultural symbols and religious 
idioms, often with a Hindu component, leading some to accuse the movement of 
sectarianism.39 Although it is true that swadeshi tended to attract greater support from Hindus 
than from Muslims, Ruma Chatterjee argues that this fact should be understood in economic, 
rather than explicitly communal, terms. The western half of Bengal was predominantly Hindu 
and dominated by the urban centre of Calcutta, while the majority Muslim population of 
eastern Bengal was largely rural, with less access to capital. Chatterjee notes that although 
nationalists argued that purchasing homespun goods rather than foreign products was a 
matter of loyalty, for the indebted peasantry of eastern Bengal, the choice was ‘not between 
local and foreign fabrics as such, but between higher and lower prices.’40 Despite this issue, 
the swadeshi movement was nonetheless able to mobilize an unprecedented level of support 
throughout Bengal, creating a mass base of anti-colonial agitation for the first time in India. It 
also produced unprecedented intellectual engagement with the wider world, as Kris Manjapra 
demonstrates. Disentangling the intellectual dimensions of the swadeshi movement from its 
cultural and social dimensions, Manjapra asserts that swadeshi ideology simultaneously drew 
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heavily on international reference points and sought to transmit itself to a wider global 
audience.41 
Although the majority of this agitation was based around boycott and other methods 
of peaceful protest, it also laid the groundwork for the development of radical networks in 
Bengal that sought to undermine British authority through the use of targeted assassinations 
and revolutionary propaganda. Although numerous revolutionary organisations developed 
throughout this period, the two most significant in Bengal were the Jugantar group based out 
of Calcutta and the Dacca Anushilan Society. Both of these organisations sought to seize on 
popular discontent with the partition of Bengal in order to recruit revolutionaries, particularly 
drawn from young, discontented men of the bhadralok class. Educated under the colonial 
regime but unable to access any benefits from it, many of these revolutionaries were 
embittered by the harsh reality of oppression that undergirded colonialism’s universalising 
promises.42 
 In its earliest phase, revolutionary crime in Bengal often took the form of so-called 
‘political dacoities’, or armed robberies carried out with the intention of acquiring funds to 
support the growth and operation of radical networks. In a summary of the administration of 
the Government of India printed in 1916, the term political dacoity is defined as ‘implying 
dacoities committed by men not ordinarily of the professional criminal classes, as a part of 
the seditious campaign.’43 Despite its widespread usage, some officials such as Lord 
Hardinge viewed the term with suspicion. At a meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council at 
Simla, Hardinge announced that he failed ‘to see any difference between an ordinary dacoity 
and a political dacoity. They are both crimes of a heinous description, while the perpetrators, 
be they bhadralog (sic) or others, are all criminals of equal degree.’44 Revolutionaries 
justified such robberies as necessary steps in the pursuit of freedom, with one article 
proclaiming, ‘A nation yearning for freedom does not shrink even, if it’s necessary, to collect 
money by committing theft and dacoity … the power of discriminating between right and 
wrong is gone. Every thing (sic) is sacrificed at the feet of the goddess of liberty.’45 
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 Although these so-called political dacoities presented a challenge to colonial authority 
by undermining its claim to uphold law and order, it was the bomb attacks carried out by 
these same groups of political radicals that motivated the evolution of a new prose of counter-
insurgency. The first bomb attack occurred on the 6th of December, 1907, when 
revolutionaries connected to the Jugantar group derailed the train of Sir Andrew Fraser, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal near Midnapore by planting a bomb on the tracks. On the 11th 
of April, 1908, revolutionaries threw a bomb at the mayor of Chandernagore, a sliver of 
French territory just outside Calcutta that was a popular route for smuggled arms and 
propaganda, but failed to kill him. Weeks later, on the 30th of April, a young revolutionary 
named Khudiram Bose, along with his accomplice Prafulla Chaki, threw a bomb into a 
carriage with the intention of assassinating Douglas Kingsford, a former Chief Presidency 
Magistrate of Calcutta. The bomb instead killed two English women named Mrs. and Miss 
Kennedy by mistake.46 
This deed transformed Khudiram Bose into the first revolutionary to enter the 
pantheon of freedom fighters that would continue to expand over the course of the four 
decades that followed. In ‘The Partition of Bengal’, a poem confiscated by the colonial 
intelligence service, Khudiram is celebrated as a martyr who ‘went to the celestial region 
with a fearless heart for his own country.’ The poem implores its reader to remember 
Khudiram’s ‘smiling, lotus-like face’,47 a reference to reports that on the day of his execution, 
Khudiram climbed the scaffold with a cheerful smile on his face.48 In the same raid, police 
discovered pictures of Khudiram and Prafulla hanging at the front entrance of a samiti 
headquarters, alongside images of Swami Vivekananda, the goddess Kali, and a stylized 
image of India as mother goddess.49 Khudiram’s venerated status even gave him the power to 
strike against the British from beyond the grave, according to some revolutionaries. In a letter 
composed in August of 1908, Saraju Bala Sen Gupta wrote, ‘Brother Khudiram in his life 
time has not finished doing his duty to his country. Even from the other world he will 
exterminate them to the root for his hanging on the gallows.’50 
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 As the first ‘successful’ assassination by bomb in India, the murder of the Kennedy 
women attracted widespread media attention. The London-based Times described the deed as 
a case of ‘deliberate murder, cruelly planned’, while the Illustrated London News used the 
label of ‘anarchy’ to describe the incident.51 An article from Empire reprinted in the Calcutta 
newspaper Bande Mataram remarked on the ‘horror which the foul deed has awakened 
among the responsible members of the Indian community’ and lamented the fact that the 
‘sanctity which formerly surrounded the life of the European in this country has been 
considerably invaded of recent years, and this terrible deed is not likely to enhance it.’52 
Many commentators were particularly troubled by the fact that it was a bomb that killed the 
Kennedy women. An article in the Bengalee emphasized the shocking and spectacular 
aspects of the killing by describing how ‘a tremendous explosion startled the town.’ The 
article pointed out with concern that the deadly results of the explosion indicated that the 
‘indigenous manufacturers of these infernal machines are becoming increasingly expert.’53 
Valentine Chirol, a contributor to The Times and a close friend of Hardinge, referred to the 
killings at Muzaffarpur as the first time that ‘any Indian had used this product of modern 
science with murderous effect.’54  
In the report later drawn up by the Sedition Committee in 1918, which will be 
examined at greater length in the following chapter, assassination by bomb is singled out by 
colonial authorities as an inherently political crime. In a section detailing the definition of 
political assassination, the report states, ‘there are of course certain classes of outrage which 
by their very nature proclaim themselves as revolutionary. Murder by bomb is practically 
certain to be of this character.’55 Despite this Lord Minto, the Viceroy and Governor General 
of India at the time of Khudiram’s arrest, actively sought to deny any political motivation 
behind the attack, stating in a speech that ‘the public at home will make a fatal mistake if they 
ascribe outrages such as that at Muzaffarpur to the efforts of a people struggling to liberate 
themselves from an oppressor.’56 Although Minto referred to assassination by bomb as a 
foreign import, developed in Russia and subsequently ‘sown amongst a strangely 
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impressionable and imitative people’ in India, he refused to draw any parallels between the 
subjugation of the Russian and Indian people.57 
 By contrast, radicals saw the use of the bomb at Muzaffarpur as a symbolic victory of 
great importance. In a Yugantar leaflet written two months after the death of the Kennedy 
women, the author wrote: ‘Bombs are not the only invincible weapons for the liberation of 
the country … A few days ago you could not dream of Bengali youths using bombs.’ The 
leaflet further proclaimed that the ‘entire mechanism of British administration can be ground 
down simply with the help of bombs’ and that preparations for a great war would be made 
irrelevant ‘when we see the English struck with terror at the bursting of a bomb or two.’58 An 
article published in Yugantar in July instructed its readers not to despair at the incident at 
Muzaffarpur, as ‘The time for wielding the pen is gone. Take now shelter in Manliness. 
There are in the country plenty of places still where bombs are manufactured.’ Perhaps most 
significantly, the article further encouraged would-be revolutionaries to take their own 
initiative in taking up the politics of the bomb, proclaiming that ‘the implements and 
materials for making bombs can be obtained plentifully in the market. Do not remain silent 
and inactive.’59 
 Having returned to his place at the forefront of Indian politics following the end of his 
earlier prison sentence, Bal Gangadhar Tilak was again put on trial for sedition as a result of 
articles that he published in Kesari following the Muzaffarpur incident. The first of these 
articles, titled ‘Country’s misfortune’ detailed the harm done to India by British colonial rule 
while the second, titled ‘These remedies are not lasting’ provided an extended analysis of the 
politics of the bomb. Tilak was charged under the Indian Penal Code under Section 124A, 
which prohibited exciting or attempting to excite feelings of disaffection towards the 
Government, as well as under Section 153A, which made it unlawful to promote or attempt to 
promote feelings of hatred between different classes, and sentenced to six years in prison.60  
In ‘These remedies are not lasting’, published on the 9th of June, 1908, Tilak sought to 
explain the motivation behind bomb assassinations in India and to differentiate them from the 
anarchist bombings that had become so prevalent in Europe. Tilak wrote that contrary to the 
official report, the bombs of Bengal were not subversive of society in the same way as the 
anarchist bombs of Europe. Referring to European anarchism as stemming from a hatred for 
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‘selfish millionaires’, Tilak argued it was instead an ‘excess of patriotism that motivated the 
bombs of Bengal. According to Tilak, the revolutionaries of Bengal were not anarchists, but 
simply adopted the weapon of the anarchist because of its effectiveness in forcing change. 
Pointing to examples from places like Portugal and Russia where governments were forced to 
modify their behaviour as a result of political assassinations – or, in his words, to ‘bow down 
to the bomb’ – Tilak wrote that assassination by bomb could be patriotic if it was carried out 
for the purpose of producing political reform.61 
 The article went on to criticize the Arms Act, as having slain the ‘manhood of the 
nation’ by ensuring that the administration could conduct any action they wanted without 
having to give any consideration to how it would be received by the disarmed population.62 
Tilak wrote that the advent of the bomb removed this imbalance and reduced the importance 
of military strength, by providing the people with a means of registering their displeasure 
with governmental tyranny using the very tools of Western science that formerly oppressed 
them. According to Tilak, the bomb was an entirely new weapon and, completely unlike 
firearms, could not be taken away from the people through the Arms Act. Simple and easy to 
make, the bomb had ‘more the form of knowledge, it is a (kind of) witchcraft, it is a charm, 
an amulet.’ Although the knowledge of how to make bombs was still in India a ‘secret 
knowledge’, Tilak wrote that it would not be long before the ‘magical lore of Bengal’ spread 
throughout the rest of the country. Any attempt to prohibit the scientific knowledge that made 
bombs possible was in vain, as the knowledge was intimately connected to the edifice of 
Western science and knowledge on which colonialism supported itself, and the ingredients 
required for the production of bombs were relatively common materials used in a variety of 
industries, and thus could not be proscribed.63  
 Two more articles published in the Kesari further elaborated upon Tilak’s theory of 
the bomb. In ‘The real meaning of the bomb’, published on the 26th of May, Tilak highlighted 
the significance of the advent of the bomb in India, writing that even the news of war in 
Afghanistan paled to insignificance before the news of the bomb, which became the ‘sole 
subject of talk and writing in England.’ According to Tilak, English public opinion 
maintained that ‘if any extraordinary event has occurred in India since the year 1857, it is the 
birth of the bomb.’64 Continuing along the same vein in ‘The secret of the bomb’, published 
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on the 2nd of June, Tilak wrote that there was a considerable difference between the 1897 
assassinations and the Muzaffarpur killings, entirely due to the use of the bomb in the latter. 
While pistols and muskets were old weapons, the bomb represented the latest discovery of 
Western science, which strengthened the power of rulers around the world but now provided 
the means of their undoing. While bombs alone could not destroy the military might of the 
government, they nonetheless carried the potential to undermine its authority: 
 
When the official class begins to overawe the people without any 
reason … then the sound of the bomb is spontaneously produced to  
impart to the authorities the true knowledge that the people have  
reached a higher stage than the vapid one in which they pay regard  
to such an illiberal (policy of) repression.65 
 
For Tilak, the bomb was above all else a tool of communication, through which the oppressed 
could speak out against tyranny through the propaganda of the deed. 
 Tilak was not the first nationalist sentenced for a sedition-related offence following 
the partition of Bengal and would not be the last. In May of 1907, the prominent nationalist 
Lala Lajpat Rai was arrested and deported to Burma without trial under the provisions of 
Regulation III of 1818. This sparked controversy within the British parliament, with Rai’s 
deportation providing an opportunity for Irish politicians to criticize British policy in India.66 
In August, 1909, another nationalist, Bipin Chandra Pal, was also arrested for sedition and 
sentenced to one month’s simple imprisonment for an article that he wrote in the London 
based Swaraj, titled ‘The Aetiology of the Bomb’. Although the term aetiology can refer to 
broader processes of causation, it also carries medical connotations, often referring to the 
causes of a disease. Pal was not alone in trying to ‘diagnose’ the origins of the bomb in India, 
as the writings of both colonial sympathizers and revolutionaries alike are rife with medical 
metaphors.67 In his article, Pal used the language of disease as a way of presenting his 
analysis of the history of the bomb in Bengal in seemingly objective terms, writing that there 
was no ethical justification for the use of the bomb, but that it nonetheless had a cause, just 
like any disease.68 
																																																						
65	Kesari	(translation),	2	June	1908,	IOR:	L/P&J/6/877,	pp.	1-4.	
66	See	in	particular,	‘The	Unrest	in	India	–	Cases	of	Lala	Lajpat	Rai	and	Ajit	Singh’,	HC	Deb,	18	June	1907,	Vol.	
176	cc313-8.	See	also	Lala	Lajpat	Rai,	The	story	of	my	deportation	(New	Delhi:	Metropolitan,	1908).	
67	There	is	a	particular	concern	among	colonial	sources	regarding	the	threat	of	‘infection’posed	by	those	
‘contaminated’with	revolutionary	ideas.	See	for	example	H.	Wheeler,	29	August	1914,	NAI,	Home	Department	
Political	Branch	A.	September	1914.	211-224,	p.	5.	
68	Swaraj,	I,	no.	6-7,	31	August	1909,	IOR:	L/P&J/6/955,	File	2887,	p.	280.	
	44	
 Pal first compared the ‘bomb-disease’ to Russian nihilism, stating that even the 
‘greater inhumanities of the Russian despotism have offered no moral justification for these.’ 
Despite this, Pal argued that there was no denying the fact that Russian nihilism was an 
inevitable and necessary product of Russian autocracy. The bomb, for Pal, ‘is not an 
uncaused something, and there must, necessarily, be a similarity in its origin everywhere.’ 
Assassination, by this logic, was ultimately due to ‘a consciousness of the extreme 
helplessness of the assassin in relation to his opponent or oppressor, a strong sense of his 
utter lack of strength or moral and material resources to meet his enemy.’ According to Pal, 
assassination by bomb was the most diabolical form of murder as it endangered the lives of 
the innocent as well as the guilty. Despite this, like other forms of assassination the politics of 
the bomb implied that the perpetrator did not believe that any legal recourse was available to 
him, implying a breakdown of public trust in the legitimacy or effectiveness of the 
government and its rule of law.69 
 Pal was careful to state that analysing the psychology the bomb was not the same as 
providing a moral justification for it. Pal compared the act of resorting to political 
assassination with acts of theft undertaken by those who are hungry – the action can be 
understood, even if it cannot be condoned. Acknowledging the fact that bomb assassinations 
frightened the government and staggered the people, making it difficult to take a calm and 
critical view of the phenomenon, Pal nonetheless referred to the psychology of the bomb in 
Bengal as ‘a subject of supreme importance’ for the Indian administration.70 Pal further 
argued;  
 
However much we may condemn the fatal folly of the people  
who adopted these outlandish methods of political propaganda,  
we cannot shut our eyes to the ugly fact that the real responsibility  
of it lies far more with the quack statesmanship … than with these  
impatient and inexperienced young men, who have been the victims  
of a mad impulse … wrought upon by the repressive measures of the  
Government of Bengal.71 
 
In the state of helplessness brought on by a heavy-handed governmental response to 
the swadeshi movement, Pal claims that people in India had come to view the bomb as a 
fundamental right that could be exercised in defence of one’s person, property, honour, or 
religion, ‘whenever these were attacked by lawless hooligans.’ This appeal to violence in the 
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name of self-defence was for Pal ‘a lawful appeal’, a ‘declaration of war, not against the 
Government, but against those who attacked private rights.’72 For Pal, the politics of the 
bomb represented a reclamation of an elemental ability to kill, through which the powerless 
sought to protect themselves from the ‘lawless hooligans’ against whom the colonial state 
could not or would not intervene. The bomb was, in other words, a challenge to the authority 
of the colonial rule of law, simultaneously subverting the government’s monopoly on 
violence while also calling into question the very legitimacy of this monopoly. 
 
Legislating Against Revolutionary Politics, 1908-1913 
 
 The challenge that such bomb attacks posed to the colonial order prompted a strong 
legal response from the state. The Criminal Investigation Department (hereafter CID) had 
been watching Khudiram’s associates, based out of Manicktolla garden in Calcutta, for some 
time - although they neglected to share this information with local police. In fact, the CID 
became aware of the plot against Kingsford before it even occurred when a member of the 
conspiracy bragged about it to Rajani Sarkar, a CID informant.73 Despite despatching an 
agent to Muzaffarpur to investigate, the security service was nonetheless unable to detect 
Khudiram and Prafulla until it was too late. Following the bomb attack, the CID finally 
raided Manicktolla garden, discovering a trove of weapons and ‘seditious’ literature. 
 This resulted in a highly publicized trial in Alipore, in which 34 were accused, with 
15 convicted by the High Court on the 23rd of November, 1909, including the famous 
revolutionary Barindra Ghose. In his judgment, the Chief Justice found ‘a close and more 
than accidental correspondence between the propagandism of the Jugantar and the doctrines, 
objects and methods that were taught and practiced in the gardens.’74 In fact, the Manicktolla 
group had indeed recently branched off from the Jugantar, of which Barindra was originally 
a publisher. Over the span of a few months, circulation of the Jugantar soared from 200 to 
7000, and would soon exceed 20,000 copies. This circulation attracted the attention of the 
colonial government, and resulted in six separate prosecutions before the paper was finally 
suppressed in 1908.  
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Prior to the Muzaffarpur attack, Barindra split with other radicals such as Nikhileswar 
Roy Maulick, who saw the paper as too valuable and too profitable to abandon. Barindra and 
the others agreed that the Chhatra Bhandar group, led by Nikhileswar, would continue 
publication of the Jugantar, while Barindra would embark on overt actions designed to 
subvert the power and authority of the colonial police. Barindra announced his intentions in 
an article titled ‘Our Hope’, in which he stated that ‘if only a few determined men can, by 
their example, implant’ in the mind of the people the notion that ‘the English are not superior 
to us in strength … the diadem of the English shall roll in the dust.’75 Peter Hees argues that 
underlying Barindra’s bluster for action was the concern that the paper was attracting too 
much attention from the authorities.76 But understanding the politics of the bomb as a form of 
propaganda by deed indicates that Barindra’s goal was also to adopt an alternate method of 
political communication, one that he viewed as more effective for inspiring anti-colonial 
resistance among his fellow Indians. 
Another key figure in the trial, even more important than Barindra in terms of his 
impact on Indian nationalism, was his brother Aurobindo Ghose. A nationalist and spiritual 
thinker, Aurobindo provided important ideological inspiration to the early revolutionary 
movement through his writings and teachings, which argued that conventional political 
programs such as swadeshi, boycott, and education were only methods towards a goal and 
not the goal itself.  For Aurobindo, the goal of anti-colonial resistance was an almost 
eschatological abolition of a system of government deemed foreign and unholy.  In a speech 
given in 1908, Aurobindo stated that true nationalism was a ‘religion by which we are trying 
to realize God in the nation, in our fellow countrymen.  We are trying to realize him in the 
three hundred millions of our people.’  To rebel against the colonial state was thus a project 
that was considered metaphysical as well as material, because, 
 
…if you rely upon other forces supposing that you are a Nationalist  
in the European sense, meaning in a purely materialistic sense ... if  
you want to replace the dominion of the foreigner by the dominion  
of somebody else,  it is a purely material change; it is not a religion,  
it is not that you feel for the three hundred millions of your countrymen,  
that you want to raise them up, that you want to make them all free and  
happy.77   
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Aurobindo’s ideology carried strong appeal for disillusioned young men such as 
Khudiram Bose, who was known to have attended speeches given by Aurobindo on matters 
of Indian political and spiritual independence. In the sweeping arrests that followed the 
Muzaffarpur bomb attack, the police sought to firmly establish a more direct connection 
between Aurobindo and revolutionary conspiracy. One police informant claimed of the 
Manicktolla conspirators, ‘wherever any question arose, it was always Aurobindo to whom 
reference was made for a decision.’78 The main piece of evidence to support such a claim was 
a letter from Barindra that said, ‘now is the time.  Please try and make them meet for our 
conference.  We must have sweets all over India ready made for emergencies.  I wait here for 
your answer.’79  Despite the argument that sweets here served as an obvious code for bombs, 
the letter was ultimately dismissed as a forgery, leading the case against Aurobindo to 
unravel.80 This was partly inspired by the suspicion towards police spies exhibited by the 
Sessions Court, whose judgment read as follows: ‘Experience tells us that in cases when spies 
are employed (sic) documents do find their way into houses of suspected persons in a manner 
which cannot be explained by the accused.’81 
Nonetheless, the inspiration provided by Aurobindo to the revolutionary movement 
was indeed quite real.82 In one of his speeches, Aurobindo asked young men to ‘bear the 
crown, not of victory, but of martyrdom’ because in order to unleash the metaphysical force 
by which colonialism would ultimately be overthrown, ‘they had to learn to be the 
instruments of that force.’83  Aurobindo's influence on Khudiram is obvious if one considers 
the young man's words on the day before his execution; ‘Do not worry.  In old days Rajput 
women used to jump into the fire to accept death without any fear.  I will also accept my 
death without any fear.’84  While Khudiram's lack of concern for his own life made some 
colonial officials question his sanity, his actions can only be properly explained by 
understanding the politics that guided him.  Just weeks before Muzaffarpur, Aurobindo 
declared that foreign rule was unnatural, and that by its very nature it ‘tends to disintegrate 
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the subject body politic by destroying its proper organs and centers of life.’85  While 
Aurobindo’s exact connection to the actual plotting of revolutionary assassinations remains 
controversial, his writings helped to provide an intellectual framework within which 
revolutionary violence was made intelligible. Because colonialism was represented as a 
political structure that destroyed Indian society by its very nature, the removal of this 
structure through the raw destructive power of the bomb became the logical outgrowth of 
revolutionary interpretations of Aurobindo's philosophy.  
 Although Khudiram Bose – and Prafulla Chaki had he survived – could be tried for 
the specific crime of murder, the charge against his associates in the Manicktolla garden was 
conspiracy to wage war against the King. The central challenge for the prosecution was tying 
the overt acts committed by members of the association with an overarching conspiracy to 
deprive the King of the sovereignty of India. On the tenth day of the trial, the defence council 
put forward the argument that the attempt on the life of Kingsford, as well as the similar 
attempts made against the Mayor of Chandernagore and Sir Andrew Fraser, did not amount 
to a waging of war against the Crown. C.R. Das, the advocate for the accused, contended that 
in the overt acts in question, personal grudges against the victims as individuals motivated the 
accused, whose actions did not therefore represent a broader assault on imperial sovereignty. 
Das stated that attacks on individuals could not constitute the waging of war as,  
 The essence of waging war was that there should be opposition  
and that it should not be restricted to particular individuals …  
In proving the waging of a war, the prosecution should prove not  
only the generality with regard to the scope of the particular acts  
but there must be such a thing from which it was possible for any  
human being to think that by that act they would be subverting the  
government of the country.86 
 
According to Das, the attacks for which the accused were placed on trial did not fit these 
criteria. 
Although the charges of waging war against the Crown were in fact dropped, the High 
Court confirmed convictions under section 121A of the Indian Penal Code against a number 
of suspects, including Barindra Ghose, Ullaskar Dutt, and Upendra Nath Banerjee. In contrast 
to section 121, which had to do with the waging of war against the sovereign, section 121A 
applied to those who conspired to deprive the Crown of its sovereignty of British India, or to 
‘overawe’ the Government of India or local government by use or threat of criminal force. It 
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was thus conspiracy that provided the key legal framework through which the Alipore 
suspects were prosecuted, with the attack on Kingsford officially described as ‘an act of 
terrorism … in pursuance of the conspiracy.’87  
C.R. Das, the advocate for the accused and an important nationalist in his own right, 
sought to undermine the case of the prosecution by pointing out the inconsistencies that 
resulted from the archaic language of sections 121 and 121A of the Indian Penal Code. 
Although not denying that the accused committed individual crimes, Das argued that these 
crimes did not amount to a waging of war against the king, but should simply be prosecuted 
as individual acts of attempted murder or murder. Das contended that the attempt on the life 
of the mayor of Chandernagore was motivated by the mayor’s decision to disallow a public 
meeting by nationalists. Similarly, he called the attempt against Kingsford an act of revenge. 
He further stated that to prove that war was being waged, the prosecution had to prove both 
the general intention to wage war lying behind any individual acts, as well as evidence that 
would indicate that by carrying out the individual act, the accused truly believed that they 
were subverting the Government of India. Along this same line of argumentation, Barindra 
Ghose admitted to the distant goal of revolution but claimed that he never believed that any 
of his individual crimes would bring about national independence.88  
The prosecution rejected this argument, as well as the one put forward by Das, who 
stated that it did not matter whether the accused were preparing for a far-off revolution or one 
in the immediate future. According to section 121A, the moment that two of the accused 
‘conspired’ to wage war, ‘the offence was complete even if no overt acts were committed.’89 
In formulating his judgment, Sir Lawrence Hugh Jenkins of the High Court drew on the 
decision of an earlier conspiracy case, Mucahyv. Reg., which referred to a conspiracy as the 
agreement, rather than intention, of two or more to commit an unlawful act by unlawful 
means. Quoting this case, Jenkins stated that when two or more agreed to put it into effect, 
‘the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, 
actus contra actum’ was punishable if it was directed towards a criminal object or the use of 
criminal means.90 
The significance of this legal strategy regarding conspiracy law is noted by Partha 
Chatterjee, who argues that the political nature of revolutionaries’ crimes made them 
																																																						
87	Judgment	of	Sessions	Court,	6	May	1909,	SAAA,	p.	178.	
88	Alipore	Bomb	Trial,	Appeals	before	High	Court,	SAAA,	p.	215.	
89	Alipore	Bomb	Trial,	Appeals	before	High	Court,	SAAA,	pp.	216-83.	
90	Alipore	Bomb	Trial,	High	Court	Judgment,	1908.	SAAA,	p.	378.	
	50	
particularly challenging to prosecute through ordinary procedures. According to Chatterjee, 
using conspiracy as the key legal concept in constructing revolutionary politics as a crime 
meant that ‘distinct and diverse activities by a large number of often-unconnected 
individuals’ could be pooled together in order to constitute a ‘single criminal offence with a 
single motive shared by all the accused.’91 Since different members of a conspiracy might not 
be involved in specific overt actions, proving the existence of a conspiracy was essential for 
convicting revolutionaries who were not guilty of committing particular criminal acts. 
According to the legal standards of the time, it did not matter whether revolutionaries were 
preparing for an immediate uprising or for one in the distant future: ‘The moment that two of 
these persons conspired to wage war the offence was complete even if no overt act were 
committed.’92 In other words, by applying the legal doctrine of conspiracy to subversive 
political societies, the state shifted the onus of the prosecution from proving that an 
individual committed a crime to proving that an individual belonged to a conspiracy. 
The first new law to address these issues of conspiracy and sedition was the 
Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1907. This act empowered the government to prohibit 
political meetings convened by more than twenty individuals, ‘for the furtherance or 
discussion of any subject likely to cause disturbance or public excitement or of any political 
subject or for the exhibition or distribution of any writing or printed matter relating to any 
such subject.’93 Before its passage into law Rash Behari Ghose, a prominent politician, gave a 
speech opposing the proposed bill, stating: 
I am well aware that one of the first duties of the State is to  
preserve law and order, and if I thought that either law or  
order was menaced, or that public tranquillity could not be  
maintained unless the Government were armed with the power  
which they now propose to take, I would be the first to vote in  
favour of the Bill, and to vote for it with all my heart.94 
 
Ghose declared that unrest in India was only skin deep, making such legislation 
wholly unnecessary. Referring to the proposed bill as an indictment of the whole Indian 
nation, Ghose argued that if the unrest was not widespread, a repressive law such as the one 
proposed was unnecessary, while if there was indeed widespread unrest, this should serve as 
an indictment of the colonial administration. Ghose warned that the bill would not fix the 
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problem, but that the imposition of this bill would only make things worse by making the 
police into the ‘absolute masters of the people’ and thus deepening the divide between the 
government and its subjects.95 The bill was similarly criticized by Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a 
prominent nationalist, who questioned the colonial government’s use of the term sedition, by 
noting that different officials could define the term differently. Gokhale accused some 
officials of blaming sedition on any Indian who did not speak to them with ‘bated breath and 
whispering humbleness’, and said that others used the term to refer to any who offered 
legitimate criticism to the administration. Gokhale said that if any sedition did exist, it was a 
recent phenomenon caused by the impatience of the Indian people towards the slow progress 
being made in political reform.96 The bill attracted further rigorous criticism from the Bengali 
vernacular press.97 
In direct response to the Muzaffarpur attack, and contemporaneous with the ongoing 
Alipore trial, two new bills were introduced in the Governor General’s Council in June of 
1908 by Sir Harvey Adamson, a member of the Indian Civil Service. The first of these, which 
came into law as the Explosive Substances Act, sought to expand upon and supersede the 
Indian Explosives Act of 1884, officials deemed ineffective in dealing with the deliberate 
manufacture of ‘infernal machines’ by revolutionary secret societies. This earlier law was 
framed to prevent accidents and did not provide for sentences of imprisonment, while the 
government deemed the Indian Arms Act of 1878 to be similarly inadequate both in terms of 
the penalties permitted under it and its lack of scope for dealing with preparations to 
manufacture bombs. By contrast, the Explosive Substances Act enabled the punishment of 
any person guilty of causing, or attempting to cause, an explosion likely to endanger life or 
property, as well as any person manufacturing or possessing an explosive substance with 
similar intent.98 
 Sir Harvey Adamson introduced the bill by listing off the recent spate of bomb 
attacks, and linked these with ‘certain newspapers’ guilty of inciting assassination. Adamson 
sought to make clear to the other members of the Governor General’s Council that the 
culprits who this bill sought to address were not ordinary men ‘of the lower criminal classes,’ 
but were rather educated men bound together ‘against all the interests that keep society alive, 
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men who like pirates are the enemies of the human race.’99 The bill received little discussion 
within the Council, with Sayyid Muhammad Bahadur expressing ‘horror and indignation’ 
regarding the Muzaffarpur killings, and giving the bill his assent.100 Ripudaman Singh, a 
prominent Sikh who was ironically accused of sedition in the 1920s, similarly gave his 
support to the measure, calling the recent bomb attacks deplorable and remarking that ‘this 
sort of crime was unknown in this country till recently. It is every day happening in European 
countries, because, for good or evil, ‘democracy’ is in the air, and India could not have 
escaped the infection.’101 The bill was passed with no significant opposition. 
 Following this, Adamson put forward ‘a sequel to the Explosive Substances Bill’ 
called the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Bill. Adamson said that this bill was 
designed to meet the same emergency as the previous one, and that the current situation had 
two key aspects, both of which needed to be dealt with if the ‘evil’ was to be stopped. The 
first, the actual making of bombs, was addressed through the Explosive Substances Bill. The 
second was the public incitement to murder carried out by the press. According to Adamson, 
these two factors were ‘as inseparable as cause and effect. If you legislate for the effect 
without legislating for the cause, you do nothing.’ For this reason, the Newspapers Bill was 
said to be every bit as important as the Explosive Substances Bill.102 In the Statement of 
Objects and Reasons, Adamson declared that there was a close connection between bomb 
attacks and the incitements published by certain newspapers. The proposed bill thus restricted 
any publications that could be perceived as inciting murder, offences under the Explosive 
Substances Act, and broader acts of violence. It would empower the government to confiscate 
the printing press of an offending paper and to prohibit the lawful issue of that paper.103 
 In justifying the bill before the Governor General’s Council, Adamson made specific 
reference to the Jugantar newspaper in his speech, pointing out that despite having been 
prosecuted for sedition on five separate occasions, the newspaper still existed and continued 
to publish articles that advocated the subversion of British rule. Adamson blamed the 
Jugantar for the Muzaffarpur murders, pointing out both that Barindra Ghose was an initial 
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creator of the paper and that Khudiram Bose admitted to taking inspiration from articles 
within it. Still, Adamson was careful to clarify that the bill was not directed against sedition, 
but was rather confined to the current emergency. According to Adamson, the bill would 
target only those newspapers that persistently defied the law, and that established themselves 
as ‘schools of anarchy and outrage with the object of debauching young and immature minds 
and inciting men to murder, armed revolt, and secret and diabolical schemes of general 
assassination.’104 Adamson claimed that the bill would not in any way be directed against the 
liberty of the press, and said that the measure would curtail ‘no liberty that is legitimate’, also 
stating that no newspaper ‘in the civilized world has liberty to make such incitements.’105 
 Unlike the Explosive Substances Bill, the Newspapers Bill did receive criticism from 
other members of the Council.106 Sayid Muhammad Bahadur expressed reluctance towards 
the bill, stating that it was wide in scope and too vaguely worded for the level of precision 
that would be required to ensure it did not restrict legitimate liberties, although he did 
ultimately give it his assent. Similarly, Ripudaman Singh said that the bill was not as urgent 
as the previous one, and would affect a much larger number of potentially innocent people, 
concluding that further time would be needed to discuss its provisions. Despite these protests, 
the bill was nonetheless passed and entered into law. 
 The next major piece of legislation to target revolutionary politics was called the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, and came as a direct response to developments in the 
ongoing Alipore trial. The stated aim of this legislation was to provide for the quicker trial of 
certain offences and for the prohibition of associations deemed dangerous to the public peace. 
To this end, the first part of the act provided for the trial of certain offences by three judges of 
the High Court, circumventing the ordinary requirement of providing suspects with a trial by 
jury. The second part of the act empowered the Governor General in Council to declare 
certain associations to be unlawful, meaning that anyone belonging to or promoting any such 
criminalized association would be liable to severe punishments. Initially designed to extend 
to Bengal, Eastern Bengal, and Assam, the act could be extended to other provinces if it was 
deemed necessary by the Governor General in Council.107 
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 The act also removed the right of bail for any accused against whom there was 
reasonable ground for further inquiry. It further stipulated that the evidence of witnesses 
already examined by the magistrate was still admissible in cases where there was reason to 
believe that the death or disappearance of the witness was caused in the interests of the 
accused. This was a direct response to the murder of Narendra Nath Gossain, the approver in 
the Alipore trial whose testimony provided a key piece of evidence against the accused. 
Originally a member of the Manicktolla garden group, Narendra agreed to act as an approver 
for the prosecution, giving evidence against his co-conspirators in exchange for leniency for 
himself. On the 31st of August, 1908, two members of the conspiracy, Kanai Lal Dutt and 
Satyendra Nath Bose, lured Narendra to the infirmary of the Alipore jail on the presence that 
they wanted to work with him to provide evidence against the others. Upon seeing Narendra, 
the two men opened fire with revolvers that they smuggled into the prison. Although 
Narendra tried to flee, Kanai Lal Dutt pursued him and shot him again in the back, killing 
him.108 
 In December of 1908 Adamson introduced the Criminal Law Amendment Bill in the 
Council of the Governor General, stating that in dealing with a conspiracy seeking to subvert 
British rule it was the duty of any responsible government to close any possible avenue that 
contributed to this objective. Adamson blamed revolutionary organisations for corrupting 
young men ‘with no other criminal taint, the sons of respectable parents who do not belong to 
and have never associated with the ordinary criminal classes,’ but who were lured by 
seditious teachings into a ‘misguided fanaticism’ and led to the ‘mistaken belief that in 
committing crimes of this nature they are working for the good of their country.’ Although 
Adamson argued that the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act of 1907 impeded the 
operation of seditious orators and that the Newspapers Act produced an almost total cessation 
of incitements to assassination within newspapers, he said that India’s youth continued to be 
corrupted through secret associations that he referred to as ‘nurseries for young anarchists.’ 
Adamson quoted an unnamed elderly Indian man, who apparently called these associations, 
or samities, ‘the terror of the country’ which pressed ordinary people into sedition out of fear 
of reprisal. According to Adamson, such people were only waiting for the government to 
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demonstrate that it was strong enough to offer them reliable protection, in which case they 
would rejoice and cut off all connection with seditious agitators.109 
 Although there were some reservations, the bill acquired the support of the Council 
without much difficulty. Mr. Dadashoy concluded that although he was highly reluctant to 
see the introduction of any legal measures that would remove a person’s right to be tried 
according to the established rules of his country, he nonetheless felt that the continued 
disturbances to the public peace were ‘amply sufficient to prove the inefficiency of ordinary 
criminal procedure in times of stress and emergency, however well it may be suited to normal 
conditions.’110 Ali Muhammad Khan, the Raja of Mahmudabad, said that although there was 
a notion abroad that harsh summary measures were not in keeping with constitutional 
measures of government, throughout history political offences were always treated separately 
from ordinary crime, even in ‘civilized’ England. Referring to revolutionaries as ‘not only 
traitors to the Crown but … the worst enemies of their own country’, Khan advocated for the 
necessity of precautionary measures that would allow the government to track ‘that wild 
creature, called the anarchist, in his secret haunts.’111 Even Rash Behari Ghose largely 
accepted the need for the legislation despite cautioning that anarchism could not be killed 
through coercive acts. Ghose said that unlike in Ireland, anarchy in India was a ‘passing 
distemper’ and he warned that the proposed bill could provoke alarm among Indians 
concerned by the discretionary power it gave to the Governor General for suppressing 
associations. Still, Ghose reserved his strongest condemnation for anarchism itself, stating 
that it promoted the ‘dissolution of all that holds society together’ and was opposed to the 
laws of both God and man.112 
 The imposition of these various bills provided a strong source of tension for British 
claims of legitimacy that rested upon an ostensible commitment to a liberal rule of law.113 
Lord Morley, the secretary of state for India, retained a cautious attitude towards repressive 
legislation throughout his tenure, despite the fact that he ultimately supported the various 
measures adopted by the Government of India. Describing the difficulties of language within 
the drafting of the 1908 legislation. Morley argued that the offences covered by the 
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Newspapers Act in fact differed substantively from acts of assassination and bombing 
covered by the other laws. He also expressed his agreement with British Prime Minister 
Herbert Henry Asquith, who referred to rebellion as ‘too slippery a word’ in seeking to 
devise a label by which revolutionary crime could be consistently defined. Morley also 
warned Lord Minto not to forget the vital importance of retaining support within the 
metropole for any extraordinary measures taken. Morley warned that if either the British 
press or House of Commons came to perceive a widespread public critique within India of 
the new measures, this would provide unprecedented legitimacy to the revolutionaries and 
render them far more difficult to police.114  
For this reason, Morley cautioned against an overreliance on ‘Russian methods’ of 
repression, which risked escalating the frequency and severity of retaliatory ‘Russian 
methods’ of reprisal in the form of political assassinations and subversion. Although Morley 
wrote that he did not want to compare British rule in India with Russian autocracy, he 
nonetheless stated that whenever he received news of a printer or writer being sentenced to 
years of penal transportation as a result of sedition charges, it made him feel as though he 
was ‘an accomplice in Cossack Rule.’115 When Minto reported that one of his colleagues 
referred to the consideration of pressure from the metropole as a humiliation for the 
Government of India, Morley called this pressure the government’s only source of 
accountability, stating that without British oversight rule in India would be ‘the one 
irresponsible government in the world.’ In a scathing reply, Morley told Minto to present 
Morley’s compliments to the humiliated colleague and to beg him to ‘reconsider impertinent 
nonsense of this description.’116 Throughout his correspondence, Morley exemplified many 
of the tensions and inconsistencies of British claims to liberal government, writing that 
although he defended the use of harsh laws such as Regulation III of 1818 as needed, he was 
equally willing to fight against those who would seek to use such laws indiscriminately.117 
Further laws that sought to extend the government’s special powers against 
revolutionary politics included the Press Act of 1910, and an extension of the Seditious 
Meetings Act in 1911 and of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in 1913. These laws 
expanded the powers adopted under earlier legislation, with the Press Act further 
criminalising ‘seditious’ articles as well as incitements to murder or other ‘anarchical 
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outrages’. The extension of the Seditious Meetings Act was met with criticism in the Imperial 
Legislative Council, where Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Bhupendra Nath Bose, and other Indian 
politicians put forward a memorandum stating that the only justification for such repressive 
measures was the presence of an exceptional state of affairs, that no longer existed. 
Responding to this criticism, Hardinge said that the legislation ‘need have no terrors for the 
law-abiding citizen’ but that if the government relaxed its vigilance by allowing this law to 
lapse, ‘there is very little doubt that sedition and political crime would once more spring into 
life and would thwart … the healthy evolution of political life and material progress.’118 In 
this speech, Hardinge sought to demarcate legitimate politics from ‘illegitimate political 
agitation’, a distinction that would pursued more vigorously by subsequent officials in the 
1920s as Chapter 3 will demonstrate.  
On the 23rd of December 1912, Hardinge was the target of the bomb attack 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. This attack came in the midst of Hardinge’s 
triumphal procession into Delhi in an event meant to celebrate the transfer of British India’s 
capital from Calcutta, a decision that drew strong criticism in Bengal despite the decision to 
reunite the province in 1911. Although Hardinge later claimed to have trusted himself ‘more 
to the care of the people than to that of the police’,119 his procession was in fact been carried 
out under the watchful gaze of a security detail that included 497 Constables, 84 Head 
Constables, 34 mounted Constables, and more than a dozen Sub-Inspectors.120 The bomb, 
thrown by the Bengali revolutionary Rash Behari Bose, nearly killed Hardinge, embedding 
shrapnel in his back and fatally injuring an attendant. Hardinge originally urged the 
procession to go on but then succumbed to his injuries and had to be carried away on a 
stretcher. News of the attempted assassination ‘sent a thrill of horror and indignation through 
London’ and attracted widespread media coverage. Many papers rejected the possibility that 
the attack was politically motivated, pointing out Hardinge’s decision to cancel the partition 
of Bengal and the lull in revolutionary violence that occurred in that province surrounding the 
decision.121 Nonetheless, the Daily Telegraph, Morning Post, and Englishman were all ‘loud 
in their demand that repressive measures of a more severe kind than have hitherto been 
thought of should be resorted to’ while less reactionary outlets instead treated the attack as 
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‘the insane act of one man or a few, which has little or no political bearing and which, 
therefore, ought not to be allowed to affect the policy of Government.’122 
Hardinge himself adopted an approach somewhere between these two extremes in his 
speech at the first meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council in January 1913, his first 
public appearance following the attack. Hardinge expressed his disappointment that the type 
of men who would carry out such a ‘useless crime’ could be found in India, particularly given 
that for the whole population of India, the crime ran contrary ‘to their own precepts and 
instincts of humanity and of loyalty, as well as to their religious principles.’ Remarking that it 
was difficult to believe that the perpetrators of the attack were a class apart from society, 
Hardinge said that he hoped the storm of public outrage ‘may give Indian terrorists cause for 
sensible and humane reflection and repentance.’ Hardinge said that such crimes should not be 
dismissed as the isolated actions of fanatics, but were usually the result of organised 
conspiracies in which the actual assailant was often not necessarily the instigator of the 
crime. For this reason, the only way to combat such groups was, according to Hardinge, ‘to 
treat as enemies of society, not only those who commit crimes, but also those who offer any 
incentives to crime.’ This included every ‘intemperance of political language and methods 
which are likely to influence ill-balanced minds’, a clear reference to the nationalist press and 
other radical publications.123 
 The meaning of the bomb attack was very clear to those who were involved in it. The 
anti-colonial credentials of Rash Behari Bose were beyond dispute - born in 1886 in 
Chandernagore,124 a small strip of French territory lying just north of Calcutta, Bose tried and 
failed on several occasions to join the Indian Army before ascending to a key role within the 
Anushilan Society, ultimately becoming liaison between a number of different revolutionary 
groups across northern India. Bose would go on to mastermind an attempted all-India 
uprising during the First World War, details of which are examined in the next chapter. 
Following Bose’s bold attempt to assassinate India’s Viceroy and Governor General in a 
symbolic destruction of British sovereignty, Har Dayal, an Indian revolutionary best known 
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for founding the infamous Ghadar party in 1913,125 published the following circular from 
Yugantar Ashram in San Francisco: 
 Who can describe the moral power of the bomb? It is concentrated  
moral dynamite. When the strong and the cunning, in the pride of  
their power parade their glory before their helpless victims, when  
the rich and the haughty set themselves on a pedestal and ask their  
slaves to fall down before them and worship them, when the wicked  
ones of the earth seem exalted to the sky and nothing appears to  
withstand their might, then, in that dark hour, … comes the bomb,  
which lays the tyrant in the dust.126 
 
This pamphlet makes clear both the political motivation behind the assassination attempt as 
well as the discursive function of the bomb as a tool of political propaganda. For Har Dayal, a 
close associate of Bose, the significance of the bomb was that it pierced the illusion of 
impregnability with which the colonial regime cloaked itself, proving that even the sovereign 
figure of the Governor General was not impervious to harm. While colonialism set the 
colonisers above the colonised in a hierarchy of domination, the bomb allowed the colonised 
to cast their oppressors down into the dust, levelling and inverting this hierarchy in a way that 
constitutional politics did not. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The rise of political assassination in India from 1897 to 1913 marked a new strategy 
of political communication, through which revolutionaries and radicals disillusioned with the 
colonial order sought to undermine the sovereignty of the state by exposing the mortality of 
its representatives. Although such assassinations were often carried out with firearms and can 
be situated within a longer trajectory of anti-colonial resistance that extends back into the 
nineteenth century, the advent of the bomb marked a distinct new phase in the politics of 
assassination. Cheap, relatively easy to make, and virtually impossible to wholly prohibit, the 
bomb provided an ideal answer for revolutionaries looking to subvert the government 
through the use of violence. Such assassinations bore an intimate relationship to the Indian 
press, which was often accused of instigating or justifying instances of political violence 
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through an appeal to the nineteenth century category of sedition. In practice, however, the 
press did not simply comment on bomb attacks, but rather the bomb attacks themselves 
served a communicative function, capturing a wider audience than revolutionary literature 
could hope to reach through spectacular ‘outrages’ that sometimes made global headlines. 
From 1898 to 1913 various laws, both emergency and regular, were deployed and redrafted 
in an attempt to muffle anti-governmental criticism through both the press and the bomb. The 
introduction in 1908 of the Explosive Substances Act and the Newspaper (Incitement to 
Offences) Act as twin responses to the Muzaffarpur bomb attack illustrates the 
interconnected nature of bombs and newspapers in early twentieth century India. The 
spectacular nature of Bose’s attack on Hardinge marks the culmination of the politics of the 
bomb in this period in a highly public, and thus highly publicised, display of anti-colonial 
protest. The outbreak of war between Britain and Germany in 1914 only heightened both the 
scale of anti-colonial operations and the extremes to which imperial law would stretch itself 
in its attempt to keep up with a new, radical form of politics that challenges both the authority 
and legitimacy of the colonial rule of law, as the next chapter will demonstrate. 
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Chapter 2: 
War Measures in British India, 1914-1919 
 
Introduction 
 
On the 4th of August, 1914, England declared war on Germany following Austro-
Hungary's attack on Serbia, and Germany's attack on Belgium. Although the immediate 
catalyst for the war was the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by the 
Black Hand, a Serbian revolutionary organisation, on the 28th of June, the war was in fact the 
product of a more complicated set of factors including competing imperial rivalries and a 
changing balance of power within the European continent.1 England's declaration of war was 
followed by an outpouring of support from many Indian subjects who saw the war as an 
opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Empire and thus prove their fitness for 
greater political participation. The Indian Army came to play an important role in the 
conflict, serving on battlefields in Flanders, British East Africa, the Suez Canal, and 
Mesopotamia. As a result, Indian troops incurred 121,598 casualties over the course of the 
war.2 Despite this, the First World War was also a time of great political ferment in many 
parts of the globe, as the economic implications of the war created greater opportunities for a 
public engagement with nationalist ideologies. By 1919, wholesale food prices rose by 33% 
above the pre-war level. In fact, parts of India experienced price increases on staple 
commodities such as rice, wheat, and millets by as high as 73%, 100%, and 132%, 
respectively.3 This provided impetus for nascent strands of nationalism and political 
radicalism, which seized the opportunity of the war to internationalize their cause through the 
use of global networks and, in some cases, German funds. 
 The First World War is widely regarded as a lynchpin in European history, the 
beginning of the ‘short twentieth century’ and the end of nineteenth century positivism.4 Yet, 
as Tim Harper observes, this war needs to be recentred in Asian history as well, as its 
consequences for the development of national and transnational histories of Asia have not yet 
been adequately explored.5 The war placed a heavy strain on British imperial resources, 
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particularly in India from which 826,855 combatants and 445,582 non-combatants were 
mobilized over the course of the conflict.6 Furthermore, the war undermined the prestige and 
the moral legitimacy of a Eurocentric world order that was already undermined by Japan's 
military victory over Russia in 1905.7 Many viewed the wanton destruction of the First World 
War as an indictment of European civilization that seriously damaged the credibility of the 
British Empire. This led the ultranationalist Kokuryūkai of Japan, for example, to declare 
that, ‘the Great European War was (Europe’s) suicide as a civilisation ... (and) ... the great 
opportunity for an Asian revival.’8  
The war also stimulated the growth of global networks of imperial intelligence, as 
security services sought to keep track of fluid and highly mobile anti-colonial organisations 
in North America, Europe, and Asia, as Richard Popplewell argues.9 This leads Calder 
Walton to refer to the First World War as ‘the event that created the modern national security 
state’, with total war requiring total surveillance.10 Such an approach risks taking the official 
record too much at its word. While officials did indeed deploy an elaborate surveillance 
network against the forces of Indian nationalism during the war, this was less a response to 
the war itself than it was a seizure of opportunity on the part of a colonial regime seeking to 
justify the expansion of its imperial and oceanic corridors of legal jurisdiction. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, it was through law as much as espionage that the imperial 
government sought to clamp down on the forces of anti-colonial nationalism during the war. 
This mobilization of emergency law had less to do with protecting India and the empire from 
German military interests than it did with the cynical expansion of British executive authority 
and the stifling of anti-colonial dissent. 
 This chapter examines the impact of the First World War on attempts by the colonial 
government of India to legislate against forms of political violence that sought to undermine 
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or overthrow imperial sovereignty. Of particular interest are those emergency laws that 
sought to extend the colonial government’s right to detain suspects without trial, or what 
A.W. Brian Simpson refers to as ‘executive detention.’11 In 1914, the Government of India 
passed the Ingress into India Ordinance in an attempt to limit the transgressive potential of 
Ghadar propaganda and transnational revolutionary networks based out of North America 
and parts of East and Southeast Asia. The following year, the passage of the wartime Defence 
of India Act sought to target revolutionaries who the government deemed to be either in 
league with Britain's German enemy, or whose acts of anti-colonial violence aided and 
assisted the German war effort. Following the conclusion of the war in 1918, colonial 
officials took steps to extend the repressive measures of the Defence of India Act into 
peacetime by issuing the controversial Rowlatt Act, despite the disapproval of an increasingly 
vocal Indian public.  
By tracing the debates and discussions that surrounded the passage of these three 
pieces of 'emergency' legislation, this chapter explores the ways that executive discourses 
sought to construct and deploy particular notions of 'the enemy' as a means of justifying and 
legitimizing the use of extraordinary laws of emergency to repress the political challenge of 
anti-colonial nationalism. Moving beyond the emphasis on security reflected in the 
scholarship of Popplewell and Walton, this chapter instead regards the war as a space in 
which colonial officials sought to create a new legal ordering of empire through the 
expansion of pre-existing corridors of imperial and, indeed, global jurisdiction. This chapter 
sees the wartime expansion of emergency laws not only as a response to security concerns or 
to the threat of foreign German interference, as scholars have typically regarded them, but 
rather as the colonial state’s opportunistic answer to the more long-term political challenge 
presented by anti-colonial nationalism through the articulation of a prose of counter-
insurgency that focused on militarized discourses of enmity. 
 
'The Eye of Government is on Them’: Ghadar and the Ingress Into India Ordinance 
 
 Radicals within the Indian diaspora saw the First World War as an opportunity, and 
sought to exploit the temporary disarray of the British Empire. The outbreak of war was 
swiftly followed by a call to arms issued by Ghadar, a revolutionary newspaper based out of 
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San Francisco, with a wide readership extending through the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East. First published on the 1st of November, 1913, Ghadar presented a call for an 
armed uprising against British rule from its very first issue; ‘What is our name? Mutiny. 
What is our work? Mutiny. Where will the mutiny break out? In India ... The time is soon to 
come when rifles and blood will take the place of pen and ink.’12 Reaching a global 
readership of disaffected Indians suffering under immigration and labour restrictions that 
hampered their aspirations for work and dignity, Ghadar inspired the formation of hundreds 
of loosely affiliated cells and networks, with the central organisation led by Har Dayal in San 
Francisco retaining its role as a hub for propaganda and revolutionary plots. As the British 
Empire became embroiled in its war with Germany, officials within the Government of India 
began to view the Ghadar organisation and its transnational network of adherents as a serious 
threat to imperial security. This growing unease among the colonial authorities stimulated the 
development of an elaborate system of surveillance and an increasingly restrictive series of 
emergency laws aimed at stifling revolutionary activities.13 
 The rhetoric and imagery deployed by Ghadar made stronger use of military 
metaphors than earlier revolutionary organisations such as Jugantar or Anushilan, with an 
invocation of the mutiny of 1857 as a key symbolic rallying point. This was particularly true 
during the period of the First World War. Just before the outbreak of hostilities, the July 28th 
issue of Ghadar instructed its readers to set up a mutiny in India as soon as the war broke out 
in Europe. On the 4th of August, 1914, the day that Britain declared war, Ghadar proclaimed; 
‘The bugle of war has sounded, and the war has begun ... Now is the time for India ... if you 
set up a mutiny now, the English will come to an end; for on the one side Germany will smite 
them, and on the other side you.’14 Despite its predominantly Punjabi composition, the 
Ghadar movement actively sought to foster a pan-Indian identity capable of channeling the 
particular grievances of a diverse diasporic community into a militant brand of anti-colonial 
patriotism. As a result, the movement was particularly alarming to British officials who found 
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it difficult to police the loose collection of networks developing both throughout and beyond 
their imperial jurisdiction. This was particularly true within the context of a global war in 
which Britain's enemies actively encouraged the spread of Ghadar ideas, arms, and 
propaganda. 
 The transgressive potential of transnational Indian communities for destabilizing 
imperial notions of security and stability is best highlighted by the famous voyage of the 
Komagata Maru. Despite the supposed right of colonial subjects to circulate freely from one 
British colony to another, in practice the white settler colonies of Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, and New Zealand were deeply committed to a white supremacist agenda. In the early 
twentieth century, governments of these colonies sought to restrict the rights of indigenous 
peoples, Asians, and Africans within their borders and prevent non-white immigration from 
abroad.15 As emerging nation-states sought to reify their borders in the name of national 
homogeneity, migration laws became one of the primary means by which governments could 
assert their sovereignty by regulating the movement of people across the borders of their 
territory.  
As Radhika Singha demonstrates, this was complicated in the Indian context by local 
colonial protocols of recording identity, as well as issues of gender and class. For this reason, 
contrary to John Torpey’s argument that the emergence of the passport and other forms of 
restriction to the transnational circulation of people came about as a result of powerful states 
in the West seeking to control global migration, Singha argues that the introduction of 
compulsory passports in India during the First World War was shaped by considerations 
other than the simple binary of race and migration.16 Nevertheless, for the white Dominions 
the exclusion of certain racialized bodies became an important tool in the construction of a 
national identity and the creation of particular labour regimes.  
In May of 1908, the Canadian government took steps to unofficially limit Indian 
immigration to Canada through a new law that stipulated only those traveling a continuous 
route from their point of departure would be allowed to enter the country, thereby excluding 
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all voyages from India.17 In a deliberate challenge to this exclusionary law, Gurdit Singh, a 
wealthy contractor based out of Singapore, arranged passage for 376 Indian passengers, 
mostly male Sikhs, to Vancouver. When the ship arrived on the 23rd of May, 1914, 
immigration officials denied the passengers entry into Canada, leading to a tense standoff that 
lasted for weeks and finally culminated with the embittered passengers forced to return to 
India.18  
The return of these passengers alarmed officials within the Government of India, who 
expressed concern that over the course of their voyage these passengers must have ‘heard 
much bitterness of language against England and her colonies.’ While officials admitted that 
perhaps only a minority of the passengers were ‘undesirables’, their actions at Vancouver 
were nonetheless ‘scarcely conciliatory’, meaning that their return should be closely 
controlled.19 This incident is particularly interesting in light of Lauren Benton's work 
regarding the relationship between sovereignty, geography, and law. Although oceans are 
typically regarded as backdrops for movement with an association with lawlessness, Benton 
argues that oceans were, in fact, transected by jurisdictional corridors of law through which 
imperial sovereignty asserted itself.20 In the case of the voyage of the Komagata Maru and of 
other ships that sought in various ways to challenge the sovereignty of the Government of 
India by transgressing its borders, such as the Annie Larsen and the Maverick discussed later 
in this chapter, imperial officials devised new legal strategies that sought to extend imperial 
sovereignty through the adoption of new legal strategies. 
 In order to deal with the perceived threat posed by the return of the Komagata Maru, 
representative as it was of the larger fear of the return of potentially radicalised expatriate 
Indians, the colonial government passed the Ingress into India Ordinance in 1914. Because it 
was impossible to Indian subjects from returning to India, this ordinance sought instead to 
police the subcontinent’s porous borders by giving officials the authority to investigate 
Indians returning from abroad in order to determine any perceived threat they may pose to 
imperial security and decide accordingly whether to either detain them or place them under 
restrictions within their home village. With no way to prevent the transgressive potential of 
mobile subjects operating within an imperial context in which a fixed territoriality was 
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impossible to enforce due to both the high volume of shipping routes in the Indian Ocean and 
Pacific worlds and particularly the challenge posed to territorial integrity by the French 
possessions of Pondicherry and Chandernagore, colonial officials instead sought to 
compensate through an extensive program of surveillance, so that returning expatriates could 
be ‘made to realize that the eye of Government is on them.’21 Although government officials 
initially claimed that in ‘the practical application of this power, we shall proceed quite 
leniently’,22 in Punjab alone more than 2,000 Indians returning home from abroad faced 
internment or temporary confinement within their home villages over the course of the war.23 
 Justification for these strong measures required careful consideration on the part of 
the colonial government. According to Sir Reginald Craddock, Home Member in the 
Governor General's Council, concern with Indian and British parliamentary opinion meant 
that the ordinary policy of the Government of India was to limit more drastic action only to 
cases where evidence of disaffection could be clearly demonstrated. Craddock wrote that 
although there were many in India who were hostile to the colonial regime, ‘we watch them 
and see how they behave and the moment it seems necessary we take action against them.’ 
According to Craddock, the onset of war with Germany triggered ‘a warm wave of loyalty, 
carrying even the disaffected on its crest, which we do not wish to chill by any measure that 
involves asperity.’ Despite this, Craddock felt that it was necessary to respond to the strong 
request of the government of Punjab for steps to be taken to deal with returning Sikhs, 
particularly from North America and the Far East, who were ‘quite recently in a state of 
ferment, that the revolutionary paper the Ghadar has been circulating among them, ... that 
(these Sikhs) were planning to come back and fight with their brothers to expel the British.’24 
 In order to articulate these repressive measures in a way that would not alienate 
moderate opinion, the Ingress into India Ordinance sought to label expatriate Indians 
returning from abroad as inherently different than subjects residing within India. Sir Charles 
Cleveland, the Director of Criminal Investigation, acknowledged that, ‘Objections to dealing 
with returning Indians as 'foreigners' are obvious’, but argued that ‘these people have brought 
punitive treatment on themselves by complicity of a great many of them in the villainous 
'Ghadar' campaign.’25 This argument appears to have been fairly successful in dampening 
popular criticism of the ordinance, as Sir Michael O'Dwyer observed; 
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 One of the most striking facts connected with the administration  
of this Ordinance is the entire absence of any complaint levelled  
against the internments and restrictions imposed ... although these  
have in fact been more numerous, and of a more rigorous nature  
in the Punjab than those enforced under the Defence Act. This may,  
perhaps, be attributed partly to the character of the persons dealt  
with under the Ordinance. They are nearly all men who have spent  
several years abroad, after severing all close connection with their  
homes. In many instances they were ne'er-do-wells who had become  
estranged from their relatives, and on their return to their native  
villages their free and independent manners ... have won them no  
sympathy.26 
 
While O'Dwyer attributed the unpopularity of returning expatriates to their foreign and 
alienated character, he argued that the main reason for the relative public indifference 
towards their fate in comparison to popular reactions to legislation such as Regulation III of 
1818 and the Defence of India Act was ‘the recognition that they have been engaged in 
intriguing against their own country with the enemy or with revolutionary organisations 
abroad.’27  
 The Ingress into India Ordinance thus provides a useful entry point into understanding 
the prevailing conceptions of 'the enemy' deployed by imperial officials in India during the 
First World War. It is significant that the first piece of exceptional legislation to target 
suspected revolutionaries after the outbreak of war targeted those colonial subjects that could 
most easily be disassociated from Indian society writ large, despite the fact that in a separate 
note, Sir Charles Cleveland called the radicals returning from North America ‘boastful but 
not very effective.’28 In describing the desirability of the ordinance, Alexander Muddiman 
stated clearly that the reason for its necessity was the volatility of the political situation in 
India, but observed that ‘it is desirable not to draw undue attention to the actual reason that is 
behind the Ordinance. I venture to suggest that it should be as broad as possible so that it may 
be defended on other grounds than those actually of the moment.’ According to Muddiman, 
what was most important was ensuring that the ordinance be made water-tight, but also kept 
‘short but extremely wide’ so as to allow for it to be portrayed in a way that masked its true 
purpose by framing it as a war measure aimed at securing the safety of the state at a moment 
of crisis. This meant that it could ‘as is unhappily not impossible’ theoretically be applied to 
someone of British nationality if they were determined to be working as a German spy, ‘as 
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well as those persons who are specially aimed at.’29 The ordinance was only tangentially 
connected to potential German plots, and was rather primarily concerned with the subversive 
potential of the returning revolutionaries themselves, a fact further reiterated in a subsequent 
note; ‘Being widely drawn, the Ordinance can be justified on general grounds appertaining to 
a state of war rather than of internal sedition.’30 
 By publicly representing the ordinance as a necessity of the war, aimed solely against 
those who conspired with Germany, colonial officials constructed a very particular enemy, 
against whom public opinion could be more readily rallied. Here portraying the returning 
suspects as foreigners facilitated the process of conflating them with India's foreign German 
enemy. To this end, the Government of India issued a press communiqué explaining the 
supposed purpose behind the ordinance as being,  
… to ensure that the public peace is not endangered by the action  
of any persons who, in the interests of hostile Powers, might seek  
to return to India with the object of creating disturbances or of  
ascertaining facts likely to be of assistance to our enemies ... The  
situation is one of emergency, and exceptional action is justified  
by the present state of war.31  
 
In this sense, war provided an opportunity not only for Ghadar and other anti-colonial 
revolutionaries, but also for the imperial government, which used the language of war as 
justification for new laws that would have required an entirely different strategy of 
legitimization if the authorities issued them in peacetime.  
 
Mutiny, Germany, and the Defence of India Act, 1915 
 
 Over the first fifteen years of the twentieth century, revolutionary groups in Bengal 
such as Jugantar and the Anushilan Samiti achieved varying degrees of success in expanding 
their operations and in staging attacks against colonial informants and imperial officials, most 
notably in the highly publicized bomb attack against Hardinge by Rash Behari Bose in 1912. 
With the onset of war, these plans became more ambitious and organisations in Punjab, 
Bengal, and central India sought to combine their resources to stage an all India uprising, 
with Bose as a key organiser. Beginning on the 12th of February, Bose and his associates 
began making arrangements for a general rising on the 21st of that month, that was to be 
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modelled after the mutiny of 1857. The Indian Army was the key element of the conspiracy, 
and revolutionaries attempted to disseminate revolutionary propaganda to troops stationed in 
Lahore, Rawalpindi, Ferozepore, and Meerut. Furthermore, the revolutionaries prepared 
bombs, arms and ammunition, as well as flags, equipment for destroying railways and 
telegraph wires, and even a formal declaration of war.32 
 The police foiled the conspiracy by planting a spy named Kripal Singh into the inner 
circle of the revolutionaries. On the 15th of February, Singh overheard a conversation 
regarding the plans for the rising and informed the police. Although Bose realised that Singh 
was an informant and had the date of the rising moved up to the 19th of February, Singh was 
able to escape for long enough to signal his contacts in the CID, leading to a massive 
crackdown on revolutionary operations across India.33 Following the failure of the 
conspiracy, Bose's lieutenant Sachindranath Sanyal attempted to carry on the fight, printing a 
new Liberty leaflet that implored its readers to honour the sacrifice of those captured by the 
police. ‘You may die any day of plague, cholera or malaria,’ Sanyal wrote in the Liberty 
leaflets confiscated at the time of his arrest, ‘Why not die like a man in a noble cause? Look 
at the Germans who are dying in lakhs for their country. Dwellers in India, you must also die 
in lakhs.’34 By juxtaposing Indian patriotism with that of the Germans, Sanyal framed the 
revolutionary cause in the language of war prevalent at this time. He also sought to reframe 
the defeat of his revolutionary companions as a kind of victory through sacrifice that he 
hoped would inspire others to join the anti-colonial cause. 
 Although Rash Behari Bose escaped the widespread crackdown, his co-conspirators 
including V.G. Pingle were prosecuted by Special Tribunal in the Lahore conspiracy trial, 
where the evidence provided by Kripal Singh played a key role in securing convictions. 
Singh's role as a paid police spy initially raised questions about the reliability of his 
testimony, but it was ultimately concluded that the government were ‘no doubt justified in 
employing spies; and ... a person so employed (does not) deserve to be blamed if he instigates 
an offence no further than by pretending to concur with the perpetrators.’35 Out of 291 
conspirators arrested, 42 were executed, another 114 given life sentences, and the rest either 
acquitted or given sentences of varying degrees. Following the failure of the plot, Bose 
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decided to flee India.36 The experience of the failed uprising led him to conclude that soldiers 
alone would not be enough to stage a successful revolution against imperial authorities. Bose 
believed that if the civil population in Lahore were armed, overthrowing the government 
would have still been possible even with the arrest of mutinying troops, noting ‘we had man-
powers and a disciplined organisation, but no arms.’ Bose’s solution was to go abroad in 
search of arms and ammunition, which he could then distribute to people all over the country 
before a second attempt occurred. Bose also hoped that in going abroad it would be easier to 
acquire financial support from Germany, which was lacking in his earlier plot.37  
 Bose booked a ticket to Japan, as Rabindranath Tagore's highly publicized upcoming 
visit allowed him to deceive travel authorities by posing under the alias of P.N. Tagore and 
claiming that he was a relative traveling on ahead of the famed poet. At first glance, Japan 
may seem an odd choice for an exiled Indian revolutionary, given that Japan and Britain 
established an alliance in 1902 as a means of stalling Russian expansion in Asia and 
safeguarding their own interests in China and Korea. In 1915, this alliance was still in effect, 
and was one of the reasons for Japan's involvement in the First World War on the side of the 
British. But despite its relationship to Britain, Japan was also an emerging center of Asianist 
thought, and the country's rapid industrialization and victory against Russia in 1905 cemented 
its reputation as a leader among Asian nations with the potential to challenge the hegemony 
of the West.38  
 On his way to Japan, Bose's ship docked at Singapore, which was in the grip of 
martial law following the mutiny of the Indian 5th Light Infantry at Alexandra Barracks. The 
mutineers seized control of the island fortress for two full days before being crushed by a 
makeshift force composed of French, Russian, and Japanese troops. The 5th Light Infantry 
was previously the most important source of British imperial security on the island, and the 
surprise and scope of the mutiny dealt a severe blow to imperial confidence in the region, 
particular given its close timing to the failed uprising in India.39 The British responded by 
declaring martial law on the 8th of March, asserting that ‘no male person of the Indian race 
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over 18 years of age must leave Singapore ... without the sanction of the police.’40 Colonial 
authorities also placed restrictions on Indians coming into Singapore, who were forced to 
obtain a police permit if they wished to enter the island. Despite providing a finger 
impression to the local authorities, Bose was able to keep up his disguise and continue on to 
Hong Kong and Japan unhindered, but immigration officials refused entry to twelve Sikhs 
traveling on the same ship.41 
 What made the Singapore mutiny and the attempted uprising in India particularly 
unsettling to imperial officials was the very concept of 'mutiny' itself and its relationship to 
the nature of Britain's imperial project during the First World War.42 Ever since the events of 
1857, where mutiny by British Indian troops sparked a series of connected uprisings that 
swept across northern and central India and shook the stability and confidence of the empire, 
the threat of mutiny retained a profound hold over the minds of British officials. This led to a 
reorganization of the Indian Army, that sought to increase the proportion of European 
soldiers and discourage recruitment from groups deemed disloyal or seditious, particularly 
the literate middle-class of Bengal.43 After the outbreak of war in 1914, these ratios became 
increasingly difficult to maintain, as the strain of war and reverses in the Mesopotamia 
campaign led to a heavy demand of Indian troops. The British particularly relied on troops 
drawn from the 'martial races' deemed historically loyal, with 446,976 of the 1,097,642 total 
troops of the Indian Army during the war drawn from the Punjab alone, of which less than 
one quarter were non-combatants. By contrast, only 59,052 Bengalis were recruited for the 
war effort and 51,935 of these were non-combatants.44 These numbers meant that not only 
imperial security, but the European war effort itself rested precariously on the continued 
loyalty of Indian, and particularly Punjabi, soldiers. In its judgment on the attempted 
February uprising, the Special Tribunal at Lahore declared that the most important and 
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‘undoubtedly the most dangerous’ aspect of the plot was ‘the seduction and attempted 
seduction of troops from their allegiance to His Majesty.’45 
 The colonial fear of mutiny expressed itself in a gendered and racialized language of 
loyalty and disloyalty, as Heather Streets-Salter argues. According to Streets-Salter, growing 
distrust towards Indian and Irish nationalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
contributed to the popularity of a racial typology that attributed desirable masculine 
characteristics to colonial groups on whom the imperial military relied, such as Highland 
Scots, Gurkhas, and Sikhs. These attributes of loyalty, courage, and dependability contrasted 
with the supposedly effeminate characteristics of Irish Catholics and members of the Bengali 
middle class, who the British depicted as weak, cowardly, and treacherous.46 This meant the 
planned uprising of 1915 elicited a particularly strong reaction from colonial authorities not 
only because of its potential to destabilize imperial security, as Richard Popplewell argues,47 
but also because it risked undermining the racial hierarchy on which colonial rule in India 
rested its legitimacy. As Sir Charles Cleveland, the Director of Criminal Intelligence, noted at 
the time, ‘the appeal of Sikhs was specially obnoxious, because most of the Sikh immigrants 
served as sepoys, and on their return to India were likely to sow disaffection among the very 
classes from which Sikh regiments are recruited.’48  
Beyond its impact on India, the possibility of subversion among Sikh troops 
threatened to destabilize Britain’s entire Indian Ocean empire. Deployment overseas was a 
regular feature of Indian Army life ever since the reorganization of the army following the 
transfer from Company rule in 1858. Indian, and particularly Sikh, troops played a crucial 
rule in both extending and maintaining British imperial power in regions as diverse as East 
Africa, Malaya, and Mesopotamia from the late nineteenth century up until the First World 
War, as Thomas Metcalf demonstrates.49 Furthermore, the Punjab historically provided an 
important recruiting base for imperial policing. For example, the Malay States Guides, 
originally constituted as the Perak Armed Police and then the Perak Sikhs, were recruited 
from the Punjab in 1873 and remained the leading police force in Malaya up until 1919. This 
was not limited to Malaya – Punjabi Sikh police were prominent in colonies ranging from 
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Hong Kong to Uganda to Somaliland.50 Aside from their presence within imperial military 
and police forces, Punjabi Sikhs were deeply embedded in a wide range of colonial societies, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, further enhancing the paranoia of imperial officials regarding 
the potentially destabilizing impact of this transnational community. While revolutionary 
unrest prior to the war was mainly centred out of Bengal, thus fitting colonial conceptions of 
the disloyal and effeminate Bengali,51 the predominantly Sikh composition of returning 
Ghadar revolutionaries and the February uprising's focus on instigating mutiny among 
supposedly 'loyal' troops in the Punjab thus posed a particularly strong threat to the racial 
underpinnings of Britain’s Indian Ocean empire.  
 The predominance of Punjabi Sikhs within the Ghadar movement also required a 
different notion of enmity than the one on which previous anti-revolutionary discourses 
relied. Colonial officials described the revolutionary violence that followed the swadeshi 
movement in Bengal primarily through a language of sedition that rested on late nineteenth 
century notions of sovereignty, race, and politics, and was the subject of Chapter 1. By 
contrast, the outbreak of a world war and the new challenge posed by Ghadar to the stability 
of imperial martial race narratives of loyalty and disloyalty meant that subversive threats over 
the course of the war came to be reframed in the language of mutiny and conspiracy. This is 
not to say that the notion of sedition did not retain relevance throughout the period in 
question. The report drawn up by the committee assigned with assessing the nature and scope 
of the revolutionary movement in India and abroad, of which more will be discussed later in 
this chapter, was even named the Sedition Committee Report of 1918. But the idea of mutiny, 
and of conspiracy with a fixed German enemy, came to supplement, and at times even 
replace, the category of sedition in a number of important ways. 
 This process is most clearly illustrated in the discussions that surrounded the passage 
of the Defence of India Act, an important piece of wartime legislation that the Government of 
India issued on the 19th of March, 1915. The Defence of India Act was modelled closely 
after the Defence of the Realm Act, which the British parliament passed on the 8th of August, 
1914, four days after the war with Germany began. This gave the British government powers 
similar to those of martial law, and aimed primarily at preventing persons from 
‘communicating with the enemy or obtaining information for that purpose or any purpose 
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calculated to jeopardise the success of the operations of any of His Majesty's Forces or to 
assist the enemy.’52 The importance placed on hostile association with a fixed foreign enemy 
had a strong precedent in Regulation III of 1818, which specifically stipulated in its preamble 
that the law sought to preserve British colonies from ‘foreign hostility and from internal 
commotion.’53 Originally drafted with Russia and post-Napoleonic France in mind, the 
Regulation’s concern with a combination of internal dissent and foreign interference took on 
new significance during the global war with Germany and found a more fixed manifestation 
within the drafting of the Defence of India Act. 
Within the British context, officials justified the Defence of the Realm Act based on 
the threat posed by German spies and informants, but it attracted a great deal of criticism 
from Irish nationalists, who viewed it as ‘an instrument of terrorism, of petty persecution and 
bullying’ through which ‘free speech has been abolished, (and) freedom of the Press utterly 
destroyed’, creating a ‘state of tyranny that Russia would find difficult to equal.’54 Despite 
this controversy, when Lord Hardinge introduced the Defence of India Act in a speech to the 
Imperial Legislative Council, he claimed that because ‘law-abiding England accepted this 
measure without a murmur,’ there should be no issue accepting similar measures in India, 
particularly because it would be up to the Indian people themselves ‘to decide how far it may 
be necessary to put those clauses into force.’55 Although the act gave wide rule-making 
powers to the Governor General in Council, its provisions were only to be applied on a case 
by case basis in regions where it was deemed necessary. However, just three days after being 
issued the Defence of India Act was implemented within certain districts in Punjab to deal 
with unrest, before being extended to Bengal in April and June, and then to Balasore, 
Benares, and parts of Burma thereafter.56 
 The decision to implement the Defence of India Act was not immediate following the 
outbreak of war, as it was for the Defence of the Realm Act in Britain, but rather required 
careful consideration on the part of the Government of India. Just before the war began, 
Reginald Craddock expressed concern that the commencement of hostilities with Germany 
had the potential to seriously destabilize an already delicate political situation in India. 
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Referring to anti-colonial revolutionaries as ‘irresponsible enemies ... with a violent race 
hatred of the Englishmen’, Craddock warned that a state of war would embolden anti-
governmental violence and outlined the steps he viewed necessary for ensuring stability 
during the war.57 The most important public discourse that Craddock insisted on maintaining 
was an affirmation of the government's belief in the people of India ‘as loyal and patriotic 
subjects of His Imperial Majesty, to whom His Majesty looks ... for their help and support 
against the enemies of Great Britain’. This was to be achieved through a careful deployment 
of repressive measures only in cases where they could be justified on the basis of specific 
occurrences. Nonetheless, Craddock made it clear that Regulation III of 1818 should be used 
‘unhesitatingly as need arises’, but that the government ‘must not show our teeth or display 
our various weapons until the temper of the people shows them to be necessary.’58 This 
strategy sought to maintain a semblance of normalcy in which officials should emphasize the 
loyalty of the Indian people, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of the British imperial 
government, while at the same time the spectre of government repression would hang over 
this status quo, ready to be called up at a moment's notice whenever this legitimacy or 
security came under challenge. 
 For the first few months of the war, the Government of India was reluctant to adopt 
new measures to deal with the revolutionary movement, for fear of unnecessarily 
antagonizing public and parliamentary opinion. Nonetheless, this should not be read as 
evidence of a particular leniency or of a genuine concern for the infringement of the rights of 
Indian subjects, but rather as a strategic decision based on a pragmatic desire to retain the 
semblance of popular legitimacy. For this reason, Hardinge opposed a surveillance bill put 
forward by Lord Carmichael, the Governor of Bengal, out of a desire to ‘avoid all legislation 
of a controversial nature and to keep everything as quiet as possible.’ In a telegram to the 
Secretary of State, Hardinge wrote that although he viewed the situation as dire, he 
nonetheless preferred to ‘rely upon the powers that we already possess, even if I have to 
make use of Regulation III of 1818, ... in spite of what some of our Parliamentary friends at 
home might think. But I am determined to maintain order at all costs; and if I make use of the 
regulation ... it must be regarded at home as a war measure.’59 The Secretary of State wrote 
back, assuring Hardinge that he was ‘prepared to place (his) blind eye to the telescope, and to 
regard any possible ... employment of it as a war incident; relying, of course, on your not 
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using it unless in respect of some necessity for which that reason can be definitely 
explained.’60 
 After the discovery and disruption of the February uprising, Hardinge sent a telegram 
to the Earl of Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, informing him that the situation in India 
was becoming desperate and stressing the need for stronger measures.61 Following the 
passage of the Defence of India Act in March, Crewe wrote to Hardinge expressing the hope 
that ‘your Defence of the Realm provisions will do all you want’ in curbing the revolutionary 
movement and restoring order.62 As details regarding the scope of the February uprising 
came out in the Lahore conspiracy case, Hardinge wrote that the efficiency of the Special 
Tribunals vindicated the government's request for extraordinary legislation and proven the 
necessity for drastic measures.63 By the 20th of June, 4000 people had already been put on 
trial, with 538 convicted and 622 still under trial, demonstrating to Hardinge the ‘astonishing 
efficiency’ of the Tribunals.64 Despite this supposed efficacy, Hardinge later admitted in a 
private letter to King George that the reason he decided to commute 16 out of the 23 death 
sentences ordered by the Special Tribunal in the Lahore trial was that his own legal advisor 
pointed out that the sentence given was ‘absolutely illegal’. Fearing that a public awareness 
of this fact would cast doubts on the reliability and legitimacy of the Tribunals, Hardinge 
decided to grant clemency for political, rather than moral reasons.65  
 Although many revolutionaries throughout the early twentieth century were executed 
by the colonial government, most of those convicted were instead sentenced to various terms 
of penal transportation.66 The numbers initially charged under emergency legislation during 
the war, as opposed to the number convicted and still further the number executed, indicates 
both the wide net cast by colonial security forces as well as the intrusive nature of 
surveillance on the lives of many Indians. As it became increasingly difficult to prove 
revolutionary conspiracies without disclosing information that would jeopardize intelligence 
sources or leave informants open to violent retribution, the expansion of emergency laws 
such as the Defence of India Act provided the means through which the government could 
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throw a broad dragnet against potential conspirators. The Lahore trial is not at all unusual in 
significantly reducing the total number of death sentences originally decided upon, and seems 
to reflect the desire to prove sovereign power to both take and grant life to the colonized.67  
 Despite the public enthusiasm with which Hardinge welcomed the Defence of India 
Act, it received a mixed reaction within the Indian press. The day before the passage of the 
act, an article in the Bengalee, a Calcutta based newspaper with links to the nationalist 
movement, acknowledged that the ‘growing complexity of the international situation ... fully 
justifies our Government in being forearmed for whatever contingency might happen ... And 
all offences that are likely to endanger the safety of the realm in a time like this, naturally 
demand summary and drastic treatment.’ Nonetheless, the author expressed concern that the 
term public safety could also be applied to ordinary crimes, ‘which the Indian police are so 
prone to characterise as political.’ Quickly clarifying that this concern was not due to any 
desire to protect the perpetrators of these crimes from justice, the author went on to argue that 
special measures applied in such a way would not only fail to cure, but would actually 
‘immensely aggravate the very evil against which they may be directed.’68 Here the Bengalee 
article drew an important distinction between acts genuinely directed against the public safety 
through collaboration with British India's German enemies, as opposed to internal political 
agitation in India. In the latter case, the article presented emergency legislation as an 
unnecessary and unwanted infringement on the liberty of Indian subjects.  
 On the 19th of March, 1915, government officials in India made a series of 
pronouncements explaining the need for exceptional legislation and seeking to win over 
public support for the Defence Act. As mentioned above, Hardinge sought to justify the act 
on the basis of its similarities to the Defence of the Realm Act in Britain, thus implying that 
nothing exceptional was being required of the Indian people other than the measures 
necessary for protecting their security in a time of war. Hardinge placed emphasis on India's 
‘striking reputation for loyalty’, and argued that the ‘criminal acts of a few ill-balanced 
minds’ should not be allowed to tarnish India's reputation at a time when Indian soldiers were 
‘shedding their blood on the battlefield for the King Emperor and country.’69 This speech 
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very deliberately invokes the idea of patriotism as service to king and country, in an attempt 
to counter Ghadar publications that located patriotism in the rejection of colonial rule.70 
Hardinge's focus was on portraying the act as a burden of war that was to be shared between 
Indian and British people in common purpose for the defence of their respective homelands, 
rather than a repressive law meant to target political dissidents with nationalist aspirations.  
 The same tactic can be found in Craddock’s speech, which carefully constructed the 
enemy against whom the Defence Act was directed as coming from abroad. In justifying the 
need for the act, Craddock referred to ‘certain people’ who were taking advantage of the 
outbreak of the war in order to break the peace. He went on to say that there ‘has existed on 
the Pacific coast of America and in Far East a revolutionary organisation that endeavoured to 
create trouble in India’, carefully refraining from explicitly referring to the members of this 
organisation as Indians themselves.71 As with the Ingress into India Ordinance, a clear 
attempt was made to draw a division between the loyal subjects of India and the dangerous 
enemies coming from abroad to threaten public safety. 
 These assurances received a mixed reaction from Indian politicians and the press. 
Surendranath Banerjea, a prominent moderate politician, remarked that he remained 
unconvinced regarding several provisions of the act, which in his opinion could not be 
justified by the emergency of the war. Banerjea was willing to give ‘whole hearted support’ 
to the aspects of the act that pertained to military and naval considerations, but expressed 
concern regarding elements absent from the British version of the act. These included the 
prohibition of promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes, as well as 
the creation of tribunals capable of trying offences under the Penal Code which were 
punishable with death or transportation. The Indian Association similarly protested the fact 
that the new law was issued by the government without any opportunity for public discussion 
beforehand. The Leader in Allahabad, which served as a platform for figures as influential as 
Motilal Nehru and Gandhi, worried about the act's ‘needlessly and undesirably extended 
scope.’ While the widely-circulated Lahore Tribune admitted the necessity for drastic 
wartime measures it nonetheless expressed concern that the government rejected ‘even the 
most necessary’ amendments that some politicians proposed to prevent abuses of power.72  
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 By contrast, the reactionary Englishman wrote that the only problem with the Defence 
of India Act was that it had not been introduced sooner, as conciliation and repression could 
not ‘soothe the savage beast of the 'bhadralog' (sic) dacoit and Terrorist ... To speak of 
'conciliatory statesmanship' - which is merely a euphemism for weakness - as a means of 
dealing with these disorders is contemptible rubbish.’73 In softer language, the prominent 
Gujarati Muslim businessman, Fazalbhoy Currimbhoy Ebrahim, supported the act despite his 
distaste for ‘drastic enactments and retrograde laws’ because he felt convinced that ‘in a 
moment of grave national crisis like the present one the political rights of the individual must 
give way. The one desire of every Indian was to help the Government to the fullest extent to 
prosecute this war to a victorious termination.’74 
 Although the act provoked a range of different reactions from disparate Indian and 
British newspapers and political figures, there was nonetheless a reasonably widespread 
consensus that special measures designed to meet the emergency of the war with Germany 
were not necessarily distasteful in and of themselves. The Germans did in fact hope to exploit 
anti-British sentiment in India and other parts of the empire as a means of destabilizing the 
war effort of Britain and its allies. This tactic was first put forward in the widely read 
Germany and the Next War by Friedrich von Bernhardi, published in 1911.75 Following the 
outbreak of war, German officials embarked on a number of plots for destabilizing British 
rule in Ireland, India, and parts of the Middle East.76  
 Although the Singapore mutiny and the Lahore conspiracy both ended in failure, both 
seriously destabilized British confidence, while emboldening other revolutionaries by 
highlighting the precariousness of colonial rule. These also occurred within the context of a 
wider global outbreak of anti-colonial insurgency that would achieve its strongest 
culmination in the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin, when Irish Republicans mounted a 
bloody revolt against British colonial authorities with German support.77 While a small group 
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of Indian students studying in Dublin at the time formed an ambulance corps to assist those 
injured in the rebellion, others such as future President of India V.V. Giri held close links 
with Irish revolutionaries and saw the war as an opportunity for anti-colonial nationalists 
from both Ireland and India.78 
A year before the Easter Rising, however, Indian revolutionaries in North America 
and Southeast Asia planned a less well known but equally ambitious insurgency. In it, 
revolutionaries connected to the Ghadar movement sought to smuggle a large shipment of 
arms into Calcutta, with the aid German intelligence services.79 In March of 1915, Ghadar 
revolutionaries in America in cooperation with German agents acquired two ships, the Annie 
Larsen and the Maverick, with the intention of transporting some 30, 000 rifles and revolvers 
to the island of Java in the neutral Dutch East Indies. From there, they would be sent on to 
Calcutta on a number of small fishing boats in time for a large scale uprising on Christmas 
Day. This would coincide with a second uprising in Burma, at the time still a part of British 
India, that would be instigated using weapons brought in from neighbouring Thailand. The 
final element to this bold plan would be a raid on the infamous Andaman Islands, where the 
numerous veteran revolutionaries under detention would be liberated to join the uprising 
against the Government of India.80  
 Despite its ambitions, this conspiracy fell apart due to a combination of the extensive 
scope of British intelligence operations in North America and Southeast Asia, as well as poor 
coordination on the part of both the Indian revolutionaries and their German accomplices.81 
Despite waiting for a month at the agreed meeting point, the schooner Annie Larsen was 
unable to meet up with the larger ocean-going Maverick in time to transfer the firearms that 
the revolutionaries loaded into the Annie Larsen's cargo hold. Unable to find the Annie 
Larsen and the promised shipment of arms, the Maverick sailed across the Pacific only to 
arrive empty-handed in the Dutch East Indies. At the same time, some 5,000 rifles and 500 
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revolvers intended for the Burmese portion of the uprising were loaded on board the Henry S. 
in the Philippines, to be shipped across the South China Sea to a remote area of neutral 
Thailand. The discovery of a German spy named Vincent Craft, in Singapore by British 
intelligence services resulted in the full details of the plot becoming known to imperial 
authorities, resulting in the confiscation of the cargo of the Henry S. by cooperative Dutch 
authorities. Hardinge expressed his relief in a telegram to Austen Chamberlain, the new 
Secretary of State, stating, ‘the German plot for a merry Xmas in India has been scotched.’82 
 Despite these very real and tangible links between German intelligence services and 
the Annie Larsen affair, proving a German connection in the case of other revolutionary 
conspiracies was sometimes more difficult. As Rash Behari Bose and the other Lahore 
conspirators chose to place their trust in the Indian Army rather than in the German Foreign 
Office, colonial officials were unable to prove that the Germans provided any material 
assistance in the commission of the conspiracy. At issue was the so-called ‘hostile association 
clause’, or Rule 12-A(1) of the Defence of India Act, which stipulated that the act applied to 
those who acted ‘with intent to assist the King's enemies.’83 Although the Special Tribunal 
admitted an inability to determine whether any communication occurred between the 
revolutionaries and a foreign enemy, the conclusion was nonetheless that the revolutionaries 
‘considered themselves as in league with the German enemies of the King Emperor.’ Despite 
the fact that only ‘suggestive indications’ existed pointing towards the possibility of an 
understanding between Germany and the Lahore conspirators, the Tribunal determined that 
this provided sufficient legal grounds for the plot to fall under the purview of the Defence of 
India Act.84  
 The Tribunal justified this decision primarily on the basis of Ghadar publications that 
made reference to the war with Germany as an opportunity for revolution in India. These 
publications explicitly referred to the Germans as potential allies and emphasized the role of 
Britain as the shared enemy of India and Germany. On the 4th of August, 1914, the day that 
Britain and Germany went to war, a Ghadar article entitled ‘Bugle of War’ exhorted Indian 
subjects to assist Germany, who could not win the war single-handed. In another issue 
published in November, Ghadar informed its readers that the Germans felt great sympathy 
for their movement due to their common enemy, and for this reason ‘Germany can draw 
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assistance from us, and they can render us great assistance also.’85 A later issue declared, 
‘Our enemy is hemmed in by the German Lion ... our enemy ... is engaged with Germany ... 
this is not an opportunity to let slip ... let us start a rebellion.’86 As indicated by these 
examples and corroborated by the details of the Annie Larsen affair, there is no doubt that 
many Indian revolutionaries looked to Germany during the war as a potential ally in their 
struggle for independence. Nonetheless, prosecuting these conspirators under legislation 
publically justified as a war measure directed specifically at German agents, or those in 
league with German agents, raised difficult questions regarding the nature of war and enmity.  
 In order to prosecute the Lahore conspirators under war measures, the Special 
Tribunal needed to determine that the failed uprising constituted an act of war. Referring to 
handwritten notes by Rash Behari Bose detailing plans drawn up for the uprising, the 
Tribunal concluded, ‘That they were badly armed and generalled, that they were out on a 
hopeless and ridiculous task, makes no difference: they formed an actual array waging war.’87 
In the supplementary case that followed, the counsel for the defence put forward the 
argument that the facts under review, even if proven true, did not amount to a waging of war 
but rather would need to fall under the category of a lesser offence such as conspiracy. 
Accepting that in many cases it may be difficult to draw a line between an insurrection for a 
general purpose as opposed to an insurrection directed against the sovereignty of the king, the 
Tribunal claimed that the details of the Lahore conspiracy indicated that because it was 
directed against substituting imperial with swaraj rule, it could not be considered to be 
directed towards a general purpose. According to the Tribunal, this made it an act of war, 
which under Indian law meant that any conspirator who could be demonstrated to have been 
party to the agreement to wage war would be considered guilty of having waged war himself, 
regardless of his participation or lack thereof in any particular overt act of war. Based on this 
definition, there was thus no question that the revolutionaries had waged war against the 
king, ‘and that every person who has committed any act in pursuance and furtherance of that 
war ... is guilty of abetting the waging of war.’88  
 Despite the verdict obtained in the Lahore conspiracy case, some officials viewed the 
specificity with which the Defence of India Act defined the enemy as overly restrictive. On 
the 10th of March, 1916, the Chief secretary to Lord Carmichael, the Governor of Bengal, 
																																																						
85	Ibid,	p.	75.	
86	Ibid,	p.	336.	
87	Ibid,	p.	321.	
88	Ibid,	pp.	355.	
	84	
sent a letter to the Government of India, providing details of a raid in which police arrested 
around forty revolutionary suspects in Calcutta. Carmichael was concerned that rule 12-A(1) 
of the act, which specified that arrested persons had ‘intent to assist the King's enemies’, 
limited his ability to hold the suspected revolutionaries in custody, as there was no evidence 
that these men were involved in a conspiracy with foreign enemies. Carmichael wrote that the 
Intelligence Branch elicited valuable information from the prisoners and were confident of 
being able to learn more, but that under the current law doing so would be impossible. 
Carmichael thus requested ‘whether those seven words could not be omitted from the rule.’ 
In reply, the Government of India referred to Carmichael's reading of the rule as 
‘unnecessarily narrow’, stating that not all individual cases would provide evidence of a 
precise connection with German intrigue. Because a close connection existed between the 
Indian revolutionary movement and German agents, and because the revolutionaries looked 
to the war as an opportunity for subversion, ‘any attempt in this direction is direct assistance 
to the King's enemies.’89  
 Various officials proposed a number of other changes for the Defence of India Act at 
different points during the war, most of which sought to expand the powers provided under 
the act. In July of 1916, the Government of Bengal proposed that the act be extended so as to 
make punishable the possession of seditious literature. J.H. Kerr referred to the dissemination 
of seditious leaflets as an important aspect of the revolutionary movement, which facilitated 
and incited the spread of violence. Referring to the existing legal safeguards as insufficient, 
Kerr likened the proposed amendment to the Explosive Substances Act of 1908, which 
penalised the possession of explosives, and suggested that there was ‘no apparent reason why 
the possession of the revolutionary literature ... should not be treated in the same manner.’90 
Some officials viewed this proposal with suspicion, such as G.R. Lowndes who argued that 
rules under the Defence of India Act must be directly tied to the existing state of war. 
Because sedition and revolutionary violence in Bengal were not a product of the war and 
existed long before the war began, Lowndes wrote that measures for their repression could 
only be regarded as war measures ‘in so far as internal sedition is more dangerous in war time 
and handicaps us in the prosecution of the war.’91 Reginald Craddock believed that the 
amendment could be acceptable if it was proposed in a more restricted form that 
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differentiated revolutionary propaganda from 'ordinary' sedition. For Craddock, the ‘relative 
degree of mischief likely to follow is the justification for discrimination between incitements 
to revolutionary crime, and mere seditious writings.’92 Nonetheless, Hardinge ultimately 
concluded that the proposal was open to too many potential legal and political objections, and 
rejected it at the last minute. 
 Another proposal put forward for modification of the Defence of India Act was the 
suggestion that British subjects born in Europe, and their descendants, should be made 
exempt from trial by Special Tribunal under the act. Although officials in the Legislative 
Department wrote that such a clause was ‘intentionally omitted from the Act for political 
reasons’, Henry Wheeler issued confidential instructions to ensure that in practice no 
European British subject should be tried for any offence by a Special Tribunal, ‘as otherwise 
the defence might be tempted to raise the question of the validity of the Act.’93 Annie Besant, 
a prominent British theosophist and advocate of Indian and Irish self-rule, who was detained 
under the act in June of 1917, did indeed challenge the validity of this law. Besant sent a 
petition to the king on the 31st of July, in which she stated that her arrest constituted an 
‘invasion of the liberty of your petitioner for which there is absolutely no justification in 
fact.’ Denying that the Defence of India Act fit the stringent requirements of the Defence of 
the Realm Act in targeting only those involved in definitive operations calculated to prejudice 
the safety of the realm in a time of war, Besant called the Defence of India Act 
unconstitutional and illegal.94 
 Attempts were also made to enhance the Defence of India Act's provisions with 
regard to transporting those detained under it. Because police information regarding 
revolutionary conspiracies relied so heavily on the testimony of detainees, one official 
pointed out that the examination of these people should be conducted as soon as possible 
following their arrest, and that the examination should be carried out by officers ‘with an 
intimate and complete knowledge of all developments.’95 This meant that in cases where 
revolutionaries travelled from one province to another, government officials sought a means 
of transferring suspects back to their home province as expediently as possible, so as to 
ensure that a thorough questioning could be conducted by intelligence officers familiar with 
the language and local context of the suspect. The Government of India approved this 
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measure and added it as an amendment after Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 12-A under section two of 
the Defence of India Act on the 10th of April, 1917.96 In June of the same year, officials 
sought a further amendment to empower local governments to deport a person out of British 
India, should it be deemed necessary for public security as defined under the Defence of 
India Act. This amendment was ultimately agreed to and the Government of India notified 
local authorities on the 12th of July, 1918.97 The central government viewed these attempts to 
amend the act as going too far, however, when the Government of Burma requested that the 
Defence of India Act be extended to empower local governments to deport from military 
stations any women believed to be infected with venereal disease. The Government of India 
replied that such an amendment would ‘involve a most unjustifiable and undesirable’ 
straining of the act, and did ‘not consider it desirable to pursue the matter any further.’98 This 
incident indicates both the malleability of the concept of public security, as well as the way 
that this concept could be strained to its limit under the expansive interpretability of war 
measures. 
 
The Sedition Committee and War Measures in Peacetime 
 
 Despite astonishing advances early in 1918, the German war effort collapsed 
following renewed offensives in the summer by Britain, France, and the United States of 
America, leading to the defeat of the Central Powers and the end of the First World War on 
the 11th of November. The end of the war in Europe raised questions regarding the fate of the 
Defence of India Act, which was justified all along as an explicit war measure, as this chapter 
argues. Government officials in India were always aware that the provisions of the act only 
extended up to six months following the end of the war, meaning that the question of how to 
proceed in peacetime provided an object of concern ever since the act was first introduced. 
On taking over the Governorship of Bengal from Lord Carmichael in 1917, Lord Ronaldshay 
announced in a speech that it could not be emphasized enough that ‘sedition in Bengal began 
long before the war and that it will not end with the return of peace. It has to some extent 
been checked by the special measures adopted during the war, but if Government is no longer 
able to rely on such measures ... there can be little doubt that outrages again become 
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frequent.’99 Despite initially insisting that the emergency measures adopted were required 
because of the exceptional circumstances of the war, the prospect of peace led officials to 
reframe the war measures as having done little more than to plaster over the cracks of a 
problem that would re-emerge the moment that the repressive laws expired.  
 To determine the value and effectiveness of this wartime legislation, two judges were 
assigned the job of assessing the arrests made under the Defence of India Act, Regulation III 
of 1818, and the Ingress into India Ordinance. The primary goal in appointing these judges 
was not to test the fairness of the war measures, but rather to diminish popular suspicion 
towards the provisions of the emergency laws, and to ‘remove from the hands of certain 
politicians a weapon which they use against Government’, according to Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. According to O'Dwyer, the Defence of 
India Act was designed to help the executive government cope with exceptional conditions, 
meaning that the conclusions of the judges should not serve to undermine the act. For this 
reason, O'Dwyer proposed that the executive should have the freedom to decide which cases 
were to be reviewed, and when.100 The idea for the secret tribunal, consisting of two judges 
elligible for promotion to the High Court, one of whom should be Indian, was first introduced 
by Sir William Vincent, who pointed out that the average person in India viewed the Defence 
of India Act as leaving power in the hands of the hated Criminal Investigation Department. 
Lord Willingdon agreed, arguing that it was not enough ‘that a Government should be 
satisfied in its own mind that it is acting justly and fairly in each case’, but was equally or 
even more important ‘that the public at large should feel and appreciate that it is so acting.’ 
Willingdon thus hoped that appointing a tribunal to review the work of the emergency laws 
would help remove public distrust for these measures, as well as removing the ‘'Star 
Chamber' character of the orders’ and give the actions taken under them ‘some sort of judicial 
guarantee.’101 
 The two judges selected for the review of the evidence were Sir Narayan 
Chandavarkar, a well respected politician and Hindu reformer who served on the Bombay 
High Court, and C.P. Beachcroft, who presided over the famous Alipore bomb case from 
1908 to 1909. In total, the judges examined 806 cases, including 702 prisoners interned under 
the Defence of India Act, as well as 100 being held under Regulation III, and the remainder 
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under the Ingress into India Ordinance. Of all of these cases the judges determined only six in 
which they found insufficient evidence to warrant charging the accused with acting ‘in a 
manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of British India’, but it is important to 
note that only 167 of the prisoners were willing or able to produce written testimony in their 
own defence. Aside from weighing the evidence collected against the suspected 
revolutionaries and assessing the efficacy of wartime legislation, the report prepared by 
Chandavarkar and Beachcroft also made an important argument regarding the difference 
between ordinary and revolutionary crime. According to the judges, ordinary crime was not 
concerned with ‘upsetting the Government and striking at its very foundations and authority’, 
whereas revolutionary crime was ‘collective and continuous in its operation.’102 This set 
revolutionary violence apart as a special kind of crime, containing within it an endless 
potential for violence that could only be met by indefinitely extended emergency measures. 
 Alongside the judgment drawn up by Chandavarkar and Beachcroft, officials also 
determined that it was necessary to produce a comprehensive report to assess the full scope of 
the revolutionary movement in India and its global connections. As with the work of the 
judges' tribunal, this committee would be tasked with justifying the extension of war 
measures in peacetime and pre-empting public criticism by lending judicial authority to the 
actions of the executive.103 The committee was hand-picked through careful selection by the 
Secretary of State and the Government of India, with Sir Sidney Rowlatt, who previously sat 
on the King's Bench Division of the High Court, chosen as committee President. Other 
members appointed to the committee included: Sir Basil Scott, the Chief Justice of Bombay; 
C.V. Kumaraswami Sastri, a judge from the High Court of Madras; Sir Verney Lovett, a 
member of the Board of Revenue; and P.C. Mitter, an additional member of the Bengal 
Legislative Council. The committee secretary was J.D.V. Hodge of the Indian Civil Service. 
Initially some officials recommended S.R. Das as a member of the committee, but others 
pointed out that despite his qualifications, his role as officiating standing council could 
‘detract from any weight which might otherwise be attached to his report.’ Given that the 
goal of the report was to ‘convince the sober-minded majority of the public of the gravity of 
the danger from the revolutionary conspiracy in Bengal’, it was desirable to ‘avoid any 
possibility of an insinuation that the Committee (had) been packed.’ For this reason, Provash 
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Chandra Mitter was viewed as a safer choice.104 The Bombay Government expressed some 
concern that this selection may not be suitable for the task at hand due to its overly judicial 
character and asked whether the committee might be strengthened by the addition of a 
government official with experience on the executive side. S.R. Hignell of the Government of 
India dismissed this argument, pointing out that maintaining the judicial appearance of the 
committee would provide greater weight to its conclusions.105 
 The official purpose of the committee, as described in the official resolution published 
in the Gazette of India, was to ‘investigate and report on the nature and extent of the criminal 
conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in India’ and to ‘examine and 
consider the difficulties that have arisen in dealing with such conspiracies and to advise as to 
the legislation, if any, necessary to enable Government to deal effectively with them.’106 To 
this end, the committee published a comprehensive examination and analysis of the 
revolutionary movement, beginning with the assassination of two British officials at Poona in 
1897, and continuing through to describe the swadeshi agitation in Bengal, and the 
transnational scope of revolutionary operations during the war. In the Sedition Committee 
Report, published in 1918, Rowlatt and his committee identified the ‘terrorism of witnesses’ 
as one of the main factors necessitating emergency legislation. The intimidation of witnesses, 
approvers, informants, and other members of the Indian criminal justice system was viewed 
as hampering the ability of the law to successfully prosecute revolutionaries. By emphasizing 
the longer history of political violence in India from 1897 to the time of writing, the Sedition 
Committee also sought to distance themselves from justifications made during the war for the 
Defence of India Act, which described it as a direct response to the state of war against the 
German enemy and their collaborators. Instead, the report described revolutionary violence as 
a fixed feature of current Indian politics that imperiled the rule of the law and the safety and 
security of the Indian people.107 
 In this report, the category of ‘terrorism’ appeared, albeit briefly, as a means of 
justifying the necessity of extending the war measures of the Defence of India Act into 
peacetime. Appearing in some sporadic references before this point, the term ‘terrorism’ 
within the Committee’s report connoted a very particular meaning – the use of violence to 
‘terrorise’ witnesses, informants, juries, and other cogs in the apparatus of the imperial legal 
																																																						
104	H.L.	Stephenson	to	S.R.	Hignell,	31	October	1917,	Home	Department	Political	A,	NAI,	472-503,	p.	10.	
105	S.R.	Hignell	to	L.	Robertson,	22	November	1917,	Home	Department	Political	A,	NAI,	472-503,	pp.	13-14.	
106	Sedition	Committee	Report,	p.	i.	
107	See	Sedition	Committee	Report,	particularly	pages	181-212.	
	90	
regime. The term ‘terrorism’ appears only eight times in the 226-page report, always with a 
very particular meaning. In the first usage, the report refers to a ‘program of violence and 
terrorism’, referencing a state of affairs generated by revolutionary activity, rather than a 
particular act of political violence. In the remaining references, however, the report refers to 
terrorism as underlying the difficulty of obtaining legal evidence due to the murder or 
intimidation of witnesses and juries. The length of Indian trials is further provided as an 
explanation for the proliferation of this ‘terrorism’, as it is said to provide greater opportunity 
for revolutionaries to target members of the prosecution in order to ensure a favourable 
outcome for their co-conspirators.108  
 Through this rationalization, the legislation proposed by the Sedition Committee 
effectively sought to extend into peacetime the core principles of the Defence of India Act, 
such as the possibility for political offenders to be tried without a jury, as well as the 
detention of suspects without trial. This emergency law, called the Anarchical and 
Revolutionary Crimes Act of 1919 but popularly referred to as the Rowlatt Act, was warmly 
welcomed by British officials, as well as a number of Indian legal experts, who saw it as a 
necessary weapon in the continuing war against the Indian revolutionary organisations. 
Justice Mullick, an Indian judge, wrote of the revolutionary movement and the legislation 
proposed to counter it, ‘the disease being now chronic, I have no hesitation in recommending 
that the remedies should be such as to be capable of permanent application.’ Mullick worried 
that temporary legislation would be ‘worse than useless’, as it would provide a ‘source of 
weakness’ and provide ‘the enemies of government a weapon for creating ill-will and 
suspicion at periodic intervals.’109 Similarly, government official W.F. Rice argued that ‘war 
legislation proper’ did not need to remain permanently on the Statute Book because ‘the 
emergency of the great European war will be recognised by all if it should ever recur ... The 
existence of a state of war is a solid concrete fact that cannot be denied.’ By contrast, the 
existence and potential danger of a renewal of revolutionary violence in India was, according 
to Rice, something that would be hotly debated by large sections of the Indian public, thus 
slowing the ability of government to immediately implement new emergency laws.110 
 This question of public recognition was central to the goals of the Sedition 
Committee, which sought to publicize the activities of the Indian revolutionaries as a way of 
																																																						
108	Ibid,	pp.	151,	182,	188,	190,	201.	
109	Mr.	Justice	Mullick,	24	September	1918,	Home	Political	A,	NAI,	Nos.	45-72	&	Appx.	&	K.-W.,	p.	16.	
110	W.F.	Rice	to	Secretary	to	the	Government	of	India	Home	Department,	12	September	1918,	Home	Political	
A,	NAI,	Nos.	45-72	&	Appx.	&	K.-W.,	p.	51.	
	91	
winning over support for emergency legislation. One suggestion made for communicating the 
findings of the Sedition Committee Report to a broader audience was the recommendation 
that the report be published in vernacular newspapers. Given that vernacular papers were 
likely to quote parts of the report one way or the other, some officials asserted that at least an 
official translation would ensure authenticity. Sir Michael O'Dwyer was strongly in favour of 
this idea, stating that it would help allay the danger of the public being misled or misinformed 
by coverage of the report in Indian newspapers. O'Dwyer believed that the wider the 
readership of the actual text, the greater the likelihood of people accepting the 
recommendations of the Committee with regard to emergency legislation.111 Sir Charles 
Cleveland suggested issuing a recommendation for local governments to publish vernacular 
translations of the report in order to disseminate the ideas contained within it to as wide a 
readership as possible, but also noted that translations also shouldn't be pushed onto an 
unwilling or indifferent public in parts of India where revolutionary violence was less 
prominent. Ultimately, the governments of Punjab and the United Provinces decided to issue 
official vernacular translations, but all other local governments refrained.112 
 The Sedition Committee Report and the accompanying Rowlatt Act attracted strong 
criticism from Indian politicians, lawyers, and nationalists. On the 23rd of September, 1918, 
Ganesh Srikrishna Khaparde, a well-known lawyer, political activist, and scholar, proposed a 
resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council recommending that the proposals of the 
Sedition Committee be held in abeyance until a ‘thorough and searching’ enquiry could be 
undertaken by a mixed committee of official and non-official Indians into the working of the 
Criminal Investigation Department. Khaparde raised concerns about the methods by which 
intelligence officers collected the information on which the report based its findings, and 
argued that a review of its work was a necessary first step towards accepting its 
recommendations. Concerns over the report were also raised by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who 
argued forcefully that ‘no civilized Government will accept, no civilized Government will 
ever dream of putting those recommendations in the form of laws.’113 For many Indian 
lawyers and politicians, the proposed Rowlatt Act could too easily be deployed as a method 
of suppressing 'legitimate' political dissent, despite the insistence of government officials that 
it was intended only towards the eradication of violent criminal conspiracies. As the Indian 
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politician and freedom fighter Madan Mohan Malaviya pointed out in March of 1919, the act 
made reference to the word 'revolutionary' but did not provide a clear definition for this word, 
creating the potential for ambiguity and misuse. Sir William Vincent dismissed these 
concerns out of hand, arguing that ‘to an ordinary man in the street the meaning of the word 
revolutionary was clear ... It could not be applied to any but a criminal movement.’ Vincent 
said that although the word ‘might be used loosely by partisan newspapers ... it did not follow 
that responsible authorities would place any but the accurate definition upon the word.’114 
 Even Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, held concerns regarding the 
provisions of the Sedition Committee Report, calling them ‘most repugnant to my mind.’ 
Despite a desire to stamp out revolution, Montagu confided to the Governor General and 
Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, that he despised the suggestion of preserving the Defence 
of India Act in peace time.115 Chelmsford wrote back to say that he found Montagu's attitude 
troubling, as before the war, the inadequacy of the ordinary law created endless difficulties 
for the India Office, the Bengal Government, and the Government of India. Chelmsford 
maintained that only the outbreak of war and the passing of the Defence of India Act allowed 
a temporary reprieve from revolutionary violence, and that only the maintenance of similar 
measures would keep Bengal secure following the end of the war.116 Montagu clarified that 
he did not dispute the necessity for action to be taken, but simply that he was unhappy with 
the methods proposed in the Report. Montagu wrote that he would like to introduce a process 
of law that would help ameliorate the situation, while what he would dislike would be the 
preservation of an act comparable to one issued in a time of war, pointing out that such an act 
would never be accepted in Britain during a time of peace.117  
 The concern that the Rowlatt Act could be used to stifle non-violent forms of political 
protest gained greater impetus following the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar. Protest 
against the act was not confined to the Imperial Legislative Council, but provided the catalyst 
for widespread disaffection and protest throughout India, as nationalists felt that the 
repressive measures were a complete betrayal of the Indian people following the heavy losses 
incurred by Indian troops during the war. When thousands of protesters gathered in the 
garden of Jallianwala Bagh in the centre of Amritsar on the 13th of April, 1919, to condemn 
the provisions of the Rowlatt Act, General Dyer ordered his soldiers to fire hundreds of 
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rounds of ammunition into the unarmed crowd, killing an estimated 379 civilians.118 This 
atrocity attracted widespread disgust and condemnation, despite the efforts of the government 
to control coverage of the massacre within the metropolitan press.119 It was within this 
context that Mohandas Gandhi's mass politics of non-violent non-cooperation emerged as the 
locus of popular anti-colonial nationalism. Although Montagu and Chelmsford implemented 
a series of reforms six months later which transferred some executive responsibility to the 
provinces of colonial India and expanded the franchise, these reforms came too late and 
provided too little to assuage public opinion. To make matters worse, under the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms sovereign authority remained consolidated in the office of the Viceroy, 
who remained accountable to only London. Despite the repeal of the Rowlatt Act and the 
promise of further constitutional reforms, the controversy surrounding the colonial 
government's attempt to extend war measures into a time of peace seriously undermined the 
legitimacy of British rule and fundamentally transformed the political landscape of colonial 
India. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 While the occasion of the First World War provided an unprecedented opportunity for 
Indian revolutionaries to challenge imperial sovereignty through a series of ambitious plots, 
the conflict similarly provided the occasion for the Government of India to deploy emergency 
powers that were legitimized through a language of war and the construction of particular 
forms of enmity. By erasing the longer anti-colonial pre-history of revolutionary 
organisations such as Ghadar, and instead portraying them as collaborators with the German 
enemy, imperial officials sought to legitimize the extension of extraordinary legislation that 
would otherwise have been much more difficult to justify. Despite their claim to be nothing 
more than war measures necessitated by a particular state of emergency, these laws retained a 
degree of malleability that allowed them to strain the limits of executive authority under the 
expansive category of public security. Towards the end of the war, officials returned to 
earlier arguments regarding the supposed dangers posed by 'political criminals', but in the 
increasingly politically charged context of the interwar these arguments were given far less 
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credence. This is apparent in the comparatively mild reaction to actions taken under the 
Ingress into India Ordinance, as opposed to the mass agitation that followed the passage of 
the Rowlatt Act following the end of the war. In fuelling the expansion of both anti-colonial 
revolutionary networks and imperial laws of emergency, the First World War marks an 
important bridge between the pre-war language of sedition discussed in Chapter 1 and the 
construction of the new legal categories of 'terrorism' and 'the terrorist' that came to dominate 
interwar understandings of political violence. 
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Chapter 3: 
Constructing ‘The Terrorist’ in Bengal, 1919-1935 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the First World War saw an unprecedented expansion of imperial networks 
of surveillance, it was during the period from 1919 to 1947 that, as Patrick French 
demonstrates, ‘British authorities in India operated a surveillance and intelligence operation 
of great skill against the forces of nationalism.’1 Contrary to Richard Popplewell’s assertion 
that British surveillance was primarily concerned with violent revolutionaries and paid little 
attention to more mainstream non-violent nationalists,2 the release of the records of the 
Indian Political Intelligence department demonstrates the scale of surveillance to which these 
politicians were subjected during the interwar.3 During the war’s immediate aftermath, India 
was rocked by inflation, an influenza epidemic, and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Many 
Indians saw the introduction of the repressive Rowlatt Act as a betrayal, particularly in light 
of the role of Indian troops in helping to secure Britain’s victory during the war. Although 
never intended for non-European colonial possessions, the promise of self-determination 
raised by the American President Woodrow Wilson encouraged nationalist aspirations around 
the world.4 
As a concession to public and political opinion following India’s massive 
contributions to the war, liberal Secretary of State Edwin Montagu introduced a small 
measure of constitutional reform meant to produce ‘the increasing association of Indians in 
every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions 
with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral 
part of the British Empire.’5 Montagu negotiated his proposals with the far more conservative 
Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and became known as the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, an 
important stepping stone in the constitutional history of India. These reforms promised 
Indians a degree of self-governance through shifting certain responsibilities such as 
agriculture, education, and health to provincial administrators responsible to an Indian 
electorate, while matters such as finance, law and order, and policing remained the 
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jurisdiction of the colonial administration. Although these reforms, enshrined in the 
Government of India Act of 1919, expanded the number of Indians in administrative roles, 
many Indian politicians criticised the two-tiered provincial delegation of duties known as 
diarchy for retaining for the colonial government full executive powers, including the 
discretionary ability to circumvent the Indian legislature through the promulgation of 
ordinances.  
In seeking to expand the role of Indians in government to a limited degree, the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms also reorganized the Indian legislature. The reforms also 
expanded the number of Indians within provincial Legislative Councils, and the government 
created the Indian Legislative Assembly as the lower house of the Indian legislature. The 
Assembly consisted of 144 members – 103 elected and 41 nominated – with voting based on 
a heavily restricted franchise determined by income and land ownership. Although the 
Assembly had authorization to pass laws for all of British India, other than in matters falling 
under provincial jurisdiction, in practice the executive powers of the Governor General could 
render the legislature impotent, particularly in any matters relating to the ‘safety or tranquility 
of British India’. The Governor General could veto any bill put forward by the Assembly, and 
could similarly certify any bill for which the Assembly denied legislative approval.6 
The Council of State replaced the Imperial Legislative Council as the upper house of 
the Indian legislature following the 1919 reforms. It consisted of 60 members, one of whom 
was chosen by the Governor General to act as President, with the remainder divided between 
34 elected members, 19 nominated officials, and 6 nominated non-officials. Franchise for the 
Council of State was even more restricted than that of the Legislative Assembly, with less 
than 15,000 voters throughout British India in 1925. Women could not vote and the 
extremely high property qualifications required ensured that in practice the Council remained 
‘a citadel of vested interests.’7 Although the creation of two levels of legislative authority fell 
in line with most democratic countries of the time, historians such as Manik Lal Gupta argue 
that alongside the establishment of a relatively democratic Assembly with an elected 
majority, the government sought to create an oligarchic Upper House that could be used as 
‘an organ of Government legislation.’8  
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This critique was equally prevalent among politicians of the time, who saw the 
reforms as an empty gesture that retained real executive power within the hands of the British 
imperial government. As a result, the interwar period in India was a time of great political 
upheaval, with the development of unprecedented mass support for the politics of anti-
colonial nationalism. This period also marked the climax of the revolutionary movement in 
Bengal, as radicals disenchanted by the failure of the non-cooperation campaign soon 
returned to the tactics of assassination and political violence that they adopted before and 
during the war. In 1925, the return of revolutionary organizations prompted the Government 
of India to introduce the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, despite vigorous opposition 
from within the newly expanded Indian legislatures. Deliberately labelling revolutionaries as 
‘terrorists’ out of a desire to ensure that repressive measures would be acceptable to the 
British Parliament and to Indian moderates, colonial officials succeeded in temporarily 
suppressing the movement, only to see it return in 1930 in a daring raid on armouries in 
Chittagong. With political violence reaching unprecedented levels in the early 1930s, colonial 
officials became increasingly reliant on repressive emergency laws that for the first time 
began to target ‘terrorism’ as a distinct category of crime. Despite a decline in revolutionary 
violence after 1934, the concept of terrorism had by then become enshrined as a durable 
category of colonial discourse. 
 
Violence and Non-Violence, 1919-1923 
 
Following the end of the First World War, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi emerged 
as the pre-eminent figure in the anti-colonial politics of India.9 Gandhi is the subject of more 
scholarship than any other figure in South Asian history, with his own writings, 
correspondence, and speeches comprising some thirty million words.10 Born in 1869 in the 
fishing town of Porbandar in Gujarat, then part of the Bombay Presidency, Gandhi obtained 
his education in London before going on to make a name for himself as a lawyer and political 
organiser in South Africa.11 Gandhi became best known for his work on behalf of the Indian 
diaporic community, and particularly his campaign over the Transvaal Government’s Asiatic 
Registration Bill. Returning to India in 1915, Gandhi supported the war effort and even 
welcomed a resolution by the Viceroy and Governor General Lord Chelmsford encouraging 
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Indians to join the army.12 Following the massacre of 379 Indian civilians at Jallianwala Bagh 
and the controversial Rowlatt Act, however, Gandhi became convinced of the repressive and 
destructive nature of colonial rule. 
From the beginning, Gandhi was critical of revolutionary violence, viewing it as both 
an ineffective and an immoral strategy that could never produce true independence. 
Condemning the assassination of Mr. Willouby, a Deputy Commissioner, Gandhi sought to 
distinguish his program of non-co-operation from movements in Ireland and Egypt that used 
violence as a political tactic.13 Commenting on the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that followed a 
bloody civil war between British police and Irish Republicans, Gandhi refused to accept the 
idea that the Irish won freedom through violence. Gandhi argued that it was not the British 
blood shed by Irish revolutionaries that forced the British to negotiate a truce, but rather the 
‘gallons of blood’ willingly shed by the Irish themselves. According to Gandhi, it was ‘not 
the fear of losing more lives that has compelled a reluctant offer from England but it is the 
shame of any further imposition of agony upon a people that loves its liberty above 
everything else.’14 
Gandhi’s philosophy was thus not so much a wholesale rejection of violence, but 
rather a strategy that sought to expose the underlying violence of the colonial regime through 
a willingness for self-sacrifice. Non-violence for Gandhi was not about cowardice, and in fact 
Gandhi asserted that ‘where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would 
advise violence.’ Gandhi wrote that he would rather have India resort to violence than to see 
the country dishonoured through cowardice. This meant that non-violence was to consist of 
‘conscious suffering. It does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it 
means the putting of one’s whole soul against the will of the tyrant.’ Such a stance did not 
come from a place of weakness, but rather of strength, what Gandhi referred to as the 
‘strength of the spirit’ through which brute physical violence could be overcome and resisted 
through the application of satyagraha, or soul-force. Arguing that adopting violent methods 
for the overthrow of the colonial government amounted to blindly copying Europe’s flaws, 
Gandhi wrote that although taking up the doctrine of the sword may grant India momentary 
victory, it would also mean forsaking India’s true essence and would provide no true 
independence.15 
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Following Gandhi’s arrest and the collapse of his political program of non-violent 
non-co-operation, revolutionary ideas began to once again gain traction in some political 
circles in India, particularly in Bengal. In an article titled ‘What Became of the Bombs?’ 
published in Young India following Gandhi’s arrest, the author pointed out that revolutionary 
crimes vanished throughout the duration of Gandhi’s political campaign, and attributed this to 
the non-violent philosophy of the Mahatma.16 Many saw the government’s repression of 
Gandhi’s campaign as evidence that only violent methods could successfully combat the 
autocratic authority of the colonial regime. Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, justified the 
repressive measures taken against nationalist protesters by stating that anywhere where 
breaches of the law took place and disorder was fomented, it was an ‘elementary duty’ of 
Government to suppress such agitation.17 As revolutionary conspiracies once more began to 
be reported in 1923 following the dwindling of Gandhi’s movement after Chauri Chaura, 
Young India lamented the fact that ‘secret conspiracies for political violence have once again 
become a moral possibility. Such a situation was impossible in 1921.’18  
In fact, some revolutionaries never gave up on the hope of instigating an armed rising 
against British rule, but simply required some breathing space to rebuild networks and 
stockpiles of arms decimated during the war. In 1920, immediately after the release of 
political prisoners initiated by the King’s proclamation of amnesty in 1919, Pulin Behari Das 
of the Anushilan Samiti formed the Bharat Sevak Sangha, although this revolutionary society 
quickly disintegrated. Other revolutionaries from Jugantar still maintained the belief that only 
an armed revolution would bring about independence, but decided that it would be 
impossible to attract public sympathy due to the popularity of Gandhi’s non-violent 
philosophy at that time.19 In 1920, Anil Chandra Ray founded the Dacca Sri Sangha, a new 
revolutionary organisation that successfully acquired a few revolvers by 1923 and reached a 
membership of around 50 by the end of 1924. Ray’s goal was to slowly build up a strong, 
secret party that would not provide the government with easy opportunities to crush it by 
refraining from overt acts of political assassination or robbery. Instead, the Sri Sangha used 
open activity and social welfare to recruit members, focusing particularly on acquiring young 
members from well to do families capable of providing funds to the organisation and thus 
																																																						
16	Young	India,	25	May	1922,	p.	7.	
17	Lord	Lytton,	Reply	to	addresses	presented	at	Khulna,	13	July	1922,	NLI,	G.P.3209415B436gov,	p.	155.	
18	Young	India,	4	October	1923,pp.		3-4.	
19	Special	Superintendent	of	Police,	CID,	6	March	1924,	Home	Political,	NAI,	File	no.	61,	pp.	2-3.	
	100	
avoid unpopular acts of brigandage, or so-called ‘political dacoity’.20 Although Gandhi’s 
famous program of non-violence vastly overshadowed such groups, a new genre of prison 
memoir began to emerge in this period as the accounts of Barindra Ghose, Sachindra Nath 
Sanyal, and later V.D. Savarkar began to romanticize revolutionary politics for public 
consumption, renewing interest in the politics of anti-colonial violence.21 
During this period, the Dacca Anushilan Samiti was under the control of Narendra 
Mohan Sen, who strongly opposed dacoity and overt acts of violence due to the fear that it 
alienated public sympathy that would be necessary for a mass uprising. Sachindra Nath 
Sanyal, a young lieutenant of Rash Behari Bose, disagreed with Narendra’s caution and from 
the early 1920s sought to establish a ‘New Violence’ party that would amalgamate the more 
radical elements from various revolutionary groups and orchestrate sensational acts of 
violence. This led to a schism within Anushilan between older members more sympathetic to 
the leftist goal of mass revolution and younger radicals who preferred methods that would 
come to be defined as specifically ‘terrorist’.22 
Another important factor in the development of anti-colonial violence during this 
period is the global impact of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. In 1917, leftist 
revolutionaries led by Vladimir Lenin overthrew the provisional government that temporarily 
took power following an uprising against Czar Nicholas II earlier in the year. This revolution 
sparked international fears regarding the threat posed to national governments by leftist 
groups within their own borders. As Anthony Read argues, the Bolshevik revolution 
internationalised revolution in a way that previous uprisings had not done, despite some of 
the universalizing claims of 19th century revolutionary movements. Events in Russia cast a 
shadow over the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, and influenced the way the 
British government sought to police labour activists and other so-called ‘subversives’.23 
These events also affected the priorities of imperial intelligence services during the interwar 
period. Indian Political Intelligence files reveal that the primary targets of colonial security 
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forces right up until independence in 1947 included left-wing revolutionaries, politicians, and 
activists.24 
There is a huge degree of slippage and overlap between the revolutionary 
organisations covered in this chapter and the spread of communism in India, with the Dacca 
Anushilan Samiti for example transitioning to a leftist organisation by the 1930s. 
Nonetheless, this chapter focuses exclusively on the language of terrorism as it emerged in 
Bengal. In H.W. Hale’s Terrorism in India, 1917-1936, the key study of the revolutionary 
movement produced by the Intelligence Bureau, Hale makes a sharp distinction between 
terrorism and communism, omitting communism entirely from his narrative. Hale remarks 
that terrorism, ‘as distinct from other revolutionary methods such as Communism or the 
Ghadr (sic) Movement, may be said to denote the commission of outrages of a comparatively 
‘individual’ nature.’25  
A similar distinction is made by the renowned Indian communist M.N. Roy, who 
criticised ‘sporadic terrorism’ as being just as useless as constitutional nationalism. In his 
1924 article ‘Appeal to the Nationalists’, Roy wrote, ‘it is no more possible to win National 
Independence by killing a number of officials than by a series of Reform Acts passed by the 
British Parliament.’26 In reality, the line between communists and ‘terrorists’ was often not so 
clear cut, with Roy himself being involved in various plots to smuggle arms into India to be 
used by those designated as terrorists by the colonial government.27 For the purposes of this 
chapter, however, Indian communism is largely excluded from the narrative in favour of an 
in-depth examination of the origins of the colonial language of terrorism.28 
Following Gandhi’s decision to call off his non-co-operation campaign after the 
events of Chauri Chaura, Congress was split between the ‘No-Changers’, who supported his 
decision, and the Swaraj Party who criticised Gandhi for calling off the entire campaign due 
to a single violent incident. The Swaraj party, led by Chittaranjan Das – or C.R. Das – and 
Motilal Nehru, did not advocate violence – contrary to the claims of some British officials – 
but was unwilling to take such a dogmatic approach towards the ideal of non-violence at the 
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expense of Indian independence. Although the Swaraj party adopted ‘legitimate’ political 
methods for its goals, with many elected to the central legislative assembly and provincial 
legislative councils in the 1923 elections, some members did have direct links to 
revolutionary secret societies.  
At a conference at Allahabad in February of 1923, for example, representatives from 
the Swaraj party chosen to discuss the recent Congress split included renowned 
revolutionaries such as Pulin Behari Das and Sachindra Nath Sanyal.29 This should not be 
taken as evidence that Swaraj politicians necessarily endorsed the adoption of violent means, 
or were in any way synonymous with the revolutionary movement. Following an alleged plot 
to assassinate colonial police officers, security forces arrested a number of suspected 
revolutionaries under the provisions of Regulation III of 1818. Although seven of the ten 
accused revolutionaries had links to the Bengal Swaraj party led by Das, radicals accused him 
of failing to protest strongly enough to these arrests, despite resolutions passed at a meeting 
in Cocanada in which Das and the Swaraj party demanded the immediate and unconditional 
release of political prisoners and the repeal of repressive laws.30 
On the 12th of January, 1924, a young Bengali man named Gopi Nath Saha shot and 
killed Ernest Day, an Englishman who Saha mistook for Charles Tegart, the notorious 
Calcutta police commissioner known as a scourge to the revolutionary movement.31 Put on 
trial for murder, Saha expressed regret at having killed an innocent man, stating to Justice 
Pearson in the High Court, ‘I am extremely sorry for the innocent sahib that I have killed and 
for those who have been wounded. For the soul of the sahib I am praying to God. I do not 
consider a man my enemy because he is a sahib.’ The next day, on the 15th of February, when 
Pearson sentenced Saha to execution, the revolutionary exclaimed, ‘May every drop of blood 
of mine sow the seed of liberty in every Indian home.’32  
These words were widely compared with those of Madan Lal Dhingra, the young 
revolutionary who assassinated Sir William Curzon Wyllie, the Political Aide-de-Camp to 
the Secretary of State for India in London in 1909. Following his death sentence, Dhingra 
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famously stated that his only prayer was to be reborn and die again and again until India 
achieved its freedom. At the time, even the arch-imperialist Winston Churchill, while 
supporting the death sentence against Dhingra, called these words ‘the finest ever made in the 
name of patriotism.’ In a letter to the editor of Forward following Saha’s execution in 1924, 
the anonymous author pointed out that it was entirely possible to separate motive from action 
and to applaud the patriotism of Saha while condemning his actions, just as Churchill did in 
the case of Dhingra.33 Despite this, the political climate of 1920s India made Saha’s action 
considerably more controversial. 
The execution of Saha instigated a storm of coverage in the press. On the 28th of 
February, the Calcutta-based Sarathi published an article criticising Saha’s use of violence, 
while simultaneously celebrating the brave resolve with which the revolutionary accepted his 
death sentence. The article went on to state that just as ‘the heart of Gopi Nath’s half-frantic 
mother is wailing out in lamentation, so the heart of all Bengal is wailing for this fearless 
youth … vowed to truth.’34 The author went on to write that as long as acts of government 
terrorism such as the Jallianwallah Bagh massacre continued, acts of violence like the murder 
of Day would escalate until India, like Ireland, was engulfed in a ‘terrible Kurukshetra’, a 
reference to the apocalyptic civil war described in the epic Mahabharata.35 The Pravartak in 
Chandernagore wrote that Day’s murder was proof that revolution in Bengal was back, but 
that it was ‘quite natural for human beings to adopt such terrible methods if all other ways of 
achieving freedom are closed.’36 While the assassination received the expected condemnation 
of the English press, many vernacular papers took the opportunity to heap criticism on the 
repressive nature of colonial rule, celebrating the courage of Saha while distancing 
themselves from his methods. 
Some prominent politicians adopted a similar approach, particularly in Bengal. At its 
annual conference held at Sirajganj on the 1st of June, the Bengal Provincial Congress 
Committee passed a resolution acknowledging the sacrifice of Saha, while denouncing the 
violence of his actions. Gandhi opposed this resolution, and in turn moved a resolution at the 
Ahmedabad session of the All India Congress Committee, condemning Saha’s murder of 
Day. In response, C.R. Das moved a counter-resolution at the same meeting where he 
reproduced the text of the Sirajganj resolution. Das was narrowly outvoted by 78 to 70, and 
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the Committee backed Gandhi’s resolution, reflecting the AICC’s continued insistence on 
non-violence but also the thin margin of support by which it maintained this stance.37 
Following the murder of Day, an attempt was made on Mr. Bruce, a member of 
Saha’s jury, although this seems to have been another case of mistaken identity in which the 
intended target was again Charles Tegart. In March, police discovered a bomb factory in 
Calcutta, causing further panic. At the end of July, revolutionaries distributed propaganda 
pamphlets known as the ‘Red Bengal’ leaflets, announcing a campaign of police 
assassination and calling on Indians to rebel against their colonial oppressors. On the 22nd of 
August, revolutionaries threw a bomb into a cloth shop on Mirzapur Street in Calcutta, killing 
one man and wounding another.38  
Of these developments, the distribution of the Red Bengal leaflets marked the most 
coherent articulation of anti-colonial politics. Written by Sachindra Nath Sanyal, the leaflets 
proclaimed the failure of constitutional agitation and advocated instead the adoption of 
assassination and sabotage. These pamphlets are typically ignored within the historiography 
of Indian nationalism, as is the role of Sanyal, yet both are worthy of careful study. 
Revolutionaries circulated the first pamphlet to four High Court Judges, the Public Prosecutor 
who represented the Crown in the Alipore conspiracy case, and the judge who convicted the 
accused in the Manicktolla Bomb Case, among others. The pamphlet informed the public that 
the Bengal Revolutionary Council passed a resolution for a ‘campaign of ruthless 
assassination of police officers.’ The text warned that anyone who obstructed the work of the 
revolutionaries in this endeavour or aided the Government in the prosecution of the 
movement would be ‘considered as doing acts highly prejudicial to the best interests of our 
country’ and would thus be ‘despatched forthwith.’ The leaflet was signed ‘President-in-
Council, Red Bengal’ and was surmounted by a picture of the goddess Kali.39 
In a subsequent leaflet, Sanyal outlined the goals of the revolutionary movement, 
acknowledging that ‘a few revolvers and bombs and police murders or a little white man's 
blood spilt here and there’ would not be enough to bring independence. Instead, Sanyal and 
his compatriots pledged their commitment to acting as ‘a standing menace to irresponsible 
tyranny, an abiding retaliation of flagrant misrule, and we mean to stay and work till these 
lawless laws are in fact wiped out, till government becomes responsible to the will of the 
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people ...’40 The goal was to wake up the ‘sleeping leviathan of potentiality of India’ and 
provide inspiration for an awakening of national consciousness that would render colonial 
rule impossible. To this end, the leaflet sought to rouse its readers with a stirring call to arms.  
The alien tyrant mad with power and pride, riding roughshod over law  
and justice proclaims there is need of us … Your Judiciary, who are  
hushing up dark crimes like these, proclaim from their seat of Justice,  
there is need of us … Your own women have come out before the world  
and in the story they repeat from the witness booth, in the story of their  
shame they proclaim there is need of us in this land, where the Executive  
ravish the women, the Judiciary condones them, and the representative of  
the King, the man at the head of the government insults them.41 
 
In November, a new pamphlet titled ‘Arise! Awake!’ asked how long the people of 
Bengal would remain asleep and argued that all obstacles to independence must be removed. 
The pamphlet also pointed to examples in world history to demonstrate the need for violence 
and sacrifice in achieving national independence.42 Following the mass arrests that resulted 
from the declaration of Lytton’s ordinance, revolutionaries and radical sympathizers 
distributed this leaflet widely throughout Bengal, in an attempt to counteract the demoralising 
effect of the governmental crackdown.43 Unsurprisingly, the pamphlets attracted scathing 
criticism from much of the English-language press, with The Statesman contemptuously 
opining that the ‘impression left is that the leaflet is the work of a dangerous lunatic who … 
deserves not death but a skilled mental treatment till he recovers his balance and sees the 
world as it is.’44 
 
From ‘Revolutionaries’ to ‘Terrorists’, 1924 
 
 The polarized political context of the mid-1920s posed a serious challenge to British 
authorities seeking to suppress the re-emergence of revolutionary violence through a renewal 
of extraordinary legislation of the type deployed before and during the First World War. 
While emergency laws always provoked a certain level of protest and opposition from within 
Indian political circles and the vernacular press, the events of 1919 to 1923 created an 
unprecedented level of mass support for the notion that colonialism’s promise of a just rule of 
law was nothing but a disguise for violent tyranny. As it became clear that revolutionary 
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crime was once more on the rise due to a string of ‘outrages’ and foiled plots in Bengal Lord 
Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, asked Viceroy and Governor General of India Lord Reading 
for new emergency powers to deal with suspected conspirators. Initially reluctant to sanction 
any new measures, Reading told Lytton to make use of the existing powers of arrest provided 
by Regulation III of 1818. Reading’s concern was that the lack of robberies connected to the 
latest manifestation of the movement would make it more difficult to convince the public of 
the necessity of the emergency measures proposed. The removal of the war conditions that 
stifled opposition to the Defence of India Act meant that draconian measures would find a 
much more critical reception within an increasingly vocal and politically engaged public. 
According to J. Crerar, the Home Secretary, the political atmosphere during the war was 
more favourable, and the additional justification of the ‘special peril to a state at war’ of 
revolutionary conspiracies helped minimize opposition to extraordinary measures that would 
have attracted heavy criticism during peacetime. Crerar worried that if war conditions 
enabled the success of the emergency powers, the logical conclusion was that during a time 
of peace such measures would require stronger and more careful reinforcement.45 
Based on this assessment, Lytton replied that Regulation III did not provide an 
adequate solution, as although it allowed for the detention of suspects without trial, it lacked 
the preventative measures necessary for arresting revolutionaries before they could execute 
their plots.46 Regulation III required an application to the local government and the 
Government of India, slowing down the ability of the authorities to act quickly and decisively 
in carrying out certain arrests. According to Alexander Muddiman, the Home Member of the 
Government of India and Leader of the Legislative Assembly, the other problem with the 
regulation was that it was not conducive to the mass arrests required for crippling a 
widespread conspiracy. Regulation III provided drastic measures for dealing with the leaders 
of a conspiracy, but Muddiman asserted that the burden of evidence required by this law was 
too extensive. Muddiman stated that the case against a revolutionary might rest upon 
information that would be insufficient for taking action under the Regulation, but that when 
widespread arrests were carried out against a large number of potential conspirators, the 
wider net provided ‘a mass of information which threw a floor of light on the persons who 
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took part in the movement and the part which each had played.’47 It was thus the ability to 
conduct mass arrests based on less information that made a new law desirable. 
 Officials were also concerned about the relationship between revolutionaries and 
more mainstream political leaders. Muddiman wrote that C.R. Das ‘joining hands’ with the 
revolutionaries gave a ‘character and importance’ to the movement that was beyond what it 
achieved throughout the long history of revolutionary agitation in Bengal. Muddiman viewed 
the endorsement of the Sirajganj resolution by Das and such a large section of Congress as 
evidence that, contrary to the repeated public insistence of the government, the 
revolutionaries enjoyed broad political support. In the eyes of Muddiman and other colonial 
officials, this indicated that for the first time, the revolutionary movement was ‘able to find 
support in the political world and to command voices in the legislature and the public 
bodies.’ Acting through the legislature in passing a new emergency law was out of the 
question, as it was necessary ‘to strike swiftly and without opportunity for the escape of the 
enemy.’ According to Muddiman, this could only be done through the promulgation of an 
ordinance, an act that must come directly through the sovereign authority of the Viceroy. In 
Muddiman’s words, ‘the authority which makes the ordinance must also be the authority 
which must judge of the existence of the emergency which would justify it.’48 This is a 
succinct, though unintentional, invocation of the German jurist Carl Schmitt’s dictum that the 
sovereign is he who decides upon the exception.49 
In late July of 1924, Lytton visited Reading at Simla and argued that Regulation III 
was indeed proving ineffective at suppressing the growing revolutionary movement, and that 
such ‘ineffective coercion … was the worst of all policies.’50 In September, the Bengal 
Government laid out its three key justifications to the Government of India detailing why the 
ordinance was necessary. The first was the increase in assassination plots in 1923 and 1924, 
including particularly the murder of Day. The second was the volatility of the political 
situation in Bengal that resulted from the growing influence of the Swaraj party and the 
increasingly hardline nationalist stance taken by many politicians. The third, and perhaps the 
most significant of all, was the fear that revolutionaries outside of India would succeed at 
smuggling a large supply of weapons into Indian territory.  
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In September, it came to the attention of the colonial authorities that Rash Behari 
Bose, the notorious revolutionary involved in both the attempted assassination of Lord 
Hardinge and the aborted uprising of 1915, was planning to smuggle a large shipment of 
arms into India to be used by Sachindra Nath Sanyal and other radicals in Bengal.51 Lytton 
worried that existing controls on smuggling were insufficient to prevent arms from arriving 
from other parts of Asia and could see,  
no method whatever of defeating this part of the revolutionary  
programme other than that of dislocating the organisation entirely  
... Unless steps are taken to deal with the revolutionaries in this  
country and to shut down the supplies of funds for the purpose of  
such importation, it will not be possible to keep out consignments  
of arms and ammunition, small or great.52  
 
Lytton reminded the Government of India that the theft of 50 Mauser pistols from 
Messrs. Rodda & Co. in 1914 initiated a wave of violence that rendered Bengal almost 
impossible to govern during the war, and warned ominously, ‘If only one consignment were 
to reach Bengal, it would produce a situation with which Government would be powerless to 
deal even by martial law.’53 Lytton insisted that all of this provided evidence that an 
exceptional state of affairs existed in Bengal and that only exceptional measures would 
permit him to deal with it. 
Defining the exact limits of the exception, however, was not an easy task.  In a letter 
responding to Lytton's request for emergency legislation, Reading indicated the difficulties of 
establishing exactly when an emergency began and, more importantly, when it could be said 
to be over.  Reading's initial assumption was that an emergency would be a short and 
specified period of time, lasting less than six months, but on further reflection, he concluded 
that this would give,  
… an unnecessarily restricted meaning to the word and that the  
'emergency' may continue for a longer period, but obviously  
not for an indefinitely prolonged period ... The meaning of the  
word is clear enough. The duration of the period must largely  
be a question of degree. It cannot be a given period in all  
conditions; indeed the use of the word 'emergency' in itself  
presupposes an indefinite period of time.54   
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Reading’s main argument was that the parameters of an emergency would always be 
discretionary, and that by definition an emergency was finite in duration, despite the fact that 
this finite duration could have no previously decided limitations.  
Lytton rejected these conclusions, arguing that, ‘if every time you have forged an 
effective weapon you throw it away again after you have used it, you will find the evil 
constantly returning, and you will always have to forge your weapon anew.’ Reading 
objected that emergency powers could not be permanent, just as war-time legislation could 
not operate in times of peace. Lytton's proposed solution was emergency legislation which 
would remain permanently on the statute books, but could lie dormant during ordinary times, 
to be ‘called into operation ... at a moment's notice if the need arose.’ Reading initially 
conceded to a two-year limit for the proposed ordinance but after Lytton’s rebuttal that such a 
limit would leave his successor defenceless against a recurrence of revolutionary crime, 
Reading agreed to an ordinance lasting for five years, to which Lytton concurred.55  
Reading’s condition for this measure was that formal legislation would be submitted as a bill 
to the Legislative Council of Bengal, following the promulgation of the ordinance, which 
would remain a secret until its issuance on the night of October 24th. The issue of the 
ordinance was to occur in tandem with the sweeping arrests of a number of suspected 
revolutionaries including Subhas Chandra Bose, the chief executive officer of the Calcutta 
Corporation and one of C.R. Das’ most significant lieutenants.56 
Cognisant of the fact that such a display of executive authority would draw substantial 
criticism, the statement given by Reading in justifying the ordinance was drawn up with a 
great deal of care. While earlier repressive laws directed against the revolutionary movement 
explicitly targeted sedition, mostly notably in the Sedition Committee Report of 1918, 
Reading was careful to specify that the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance would 
not give the government ‘any extraordinary powers to deal with sedition, with industrial 
movements or with communal disturbances, even though they may menace the maintenance 
of order … It is aimed solely at the secret criminal conspiracy, which has terrorism as its 
object or method.’57 The proclamation that the government ultimately circulated in the 
Gazette of India on the 25th of October, 1924, made repeated reference to the ‘terrorist 
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movement’ of Bengal, deploying a vocabulary that emphasised ‘terrorism’ more than any 
previous legal proclamation had done thus far. This was not the case in earlier drafts of the 
proclamation, however, in which the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ were not used once.58 
The original draft referred exclusively to ‘revolutionaries’ but in editing the draft, Secretary 
of State Sydney Olivier bracketed and underlined Reading’s use of the word revolutionary, 
replacing it with the word ‘terrorist’ in red ink.59 Writing back to Reading, Olivier 
recommended making these changes throughout the document, to which Reading replied,  
I quite appreciate that they made it slightly easier for you to defend in  
Parliament in England, although the words ‘revolutionary’ and  
‘revolutionaries’ used by me are perhaps more appropriate in India.  
But I understand the difficulties you would have in any event to meet and  
did not attach sufficient importance to adhering to my own language and  
therefore changed these terms throughout as you desired.60 
 
The emergence of ‘terrorism’ as the defining category to be used in subsequent legal 
and political pronouncements on the Indian revolutionary movement should thus be 
understood as a deliberate and calculated attempt on the part of colonial officials to make 
emergency measures more palatable both to the British Parliament back home and moderate 
opinion within India. 
Still, this linguistic manoeuvre did little to convince Indian nationalist politicians and 
newspapers, many of whom interpreted the ordinance as a direct assault on anti-colonial 
politics. Although apologists for government action maintained that the ordinance could not 
target nationalist politicians as it clearly stated that the law was directed against terrorism and 
terrorism alone,61 C.R Das referred to the ordinance as an obvious attack on the Swaraj party 
due to their growing strength which he claimed was becoming unbearable for the 
government.62 From the 26th to the 31st of October, public meetings were held throughout 
Calcutta criticising the government’s action in promulgating the ordinance.63 On the 8th of 
November, Gandhi, Das, and Motilal Nehru issued a statement arguing that the ordinance 
was directed not at criminals but at the Swaraj party in Bengal, and appealing for the 
cooperation of all political parties against the government’s policy of repression.64  On the 
15th of November, various groups in India held more meetings accusing the government of 
																																																						
58	Reading	to	Olivier,	4	October	1924,	Reading	Papers,	MSS	Eur	E	238/13,	pp.	361-363.	
59	Olivier	to	Reading,	6	October	1924,	IOR:	L/PJ/6/1886,	156.	
60	Reading	to	Olivier,	9	October	1924,	Reading	Papers,	MSS	Eur	E	238/13,	p.	194.	
61	The	Statesman,	30	October	1924,	p.	8.	
62	The	Statesman,	28	October	1924,	p.	7.	
63	Report	on	Activities	of	Revolutionaries	in	Bengal,	1925,	IOR:	L/PJ/12/253,	p.	5.	
64	Reading	to	Olivier,	6	December	1924,	IOR:	L/PJ/6/1886,	p.	1.	
	111	
stifling legitimate politics. These protesters did not stop there, but gave eulogies for dead 
revolutionaries like Khudiram Bose, Kanai Lal Datta, and Gopi Nath Saha.65 
Sachindra Nath Sanyal, having evaded capture during the October arrests, 
anonymously produced a pamphlet called ‘The Revolutionary’ in January of 1925 in which 
he condemned the repressive measures taken against the revolutionary movement. The 
pamphlet circulated widely throughout northern India, with over 300 copies received in 18 
districts of the United Provinces alone.66 Responding to the proclamations of some politicians 
that the revolutionary movement was a figment of the colonial government’s imagination, 
Sanyal wrote,  
Let no Indian deny the existence of this revolutionary party in order to  
denounce the repressive measures of the foreign rulers. The foreigners  
have no right to rule over India and therefore they must be denounced  
and driven out, not that they have committed any particular act of  
violence or crime. These are the natural consequences of a foreign rule.67 
 
Responding to the language of terrorism deployed by Indian officials in promulgating 
the ordinance, Sanyal wrote that this word – as well as the term ‘anarchism’ – were 
‘invariably misapplied whenever any reference to the revolutionaries is to be made because it 
is so very convenient to denounce the revolutionaries under that name. The Indian 
revolutionaries are neither terrorists nor anarchists.’ Sanyal pointed out that the goal of the 
revolutionaries was not spreading anarchy and that therefore the popular label of ‘anarchism’ 
was a clear misnomer. Furthermore, he argued that because terrorism was not the object of 
the revolutionaries, they should not be called terrorists either. According to Sanyal, the 
revolutionaries ‘do not believe that terrorism alone can bring independence and they do not 
want terrorism for terrorism’s sake, although they may at times resort to this method as a very 
effective means of retaliation.’68 
Sanyal then turned the tables on the British with the accusation that the colonial 
government existed only because it succeeded at terrorising the people of India. According to 
Sanyal, ‘This official terrorism is surely to be met by counter-terrorism. A spirit of utter 
helplessness pervades every strata of our society and terrorism is an effective means of 
restoring the proper spirits in the society without which progress will be difficult.’ He further 
asserted that terrorism also carried an international significance because such acts would 
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draw the attention of England’s enemies towards India and therefore promote the cause of 
Indian independence. Sanyal promised that the revolutionary party was not defeated, but had 
yet to embark upon its greatest and most deadly campaign of assassination thus far.69 
In February, Sanyal submitted a letter for publication in Young India that was printed 
under the title ‘A Revolutionary’s Defence’. Although this text received little attention in 
wider histories of the Indian independence movement, it provides a critically important 
rebuttal to Gandhi’s political strategy of non-violence and a coherent defence of 
revolutionary tactics. In this letter, Sanyal began by reminding Gandhi that the year initially 
requested by the Mahatma for his experiment turned into more than four, with still no 
independence in sight. Sanyal argued that the response to Gandhi’s programme was 
overwhelming and that its failure could not be blamed on the people of India, who mobilized 
by the thousands to engage in non-violent action against the colonial government. In response 
to those that claimed that non-violent non-cooperation failed because the people were not 
sufficiently non-violent, Sanyal wrote such a claim was to ‘argue like a lawyer and not like a 
prophet.’ He asserted that the people could not have been more non-violent, and that they 
were in fact ‘non-violent to a degree which smelled of cowardice.’70 Sanyal asserted that it 
was time for non-violent activists to retire from the political field in order to leave room for 
the return of the revolutionaries, who would no longer remain silent. 
Sanyal addressed the accusation that revolutionaries were retarding India’s progress, 
with the riposte that every small political concession made thus far came about on the heels 
of revolutionary agitation. He further asserted that the true progress made by the 
revolutionary movement was the ‘moral advancement’ of India.  According to Sanyal, 
Indians were previously ‘miserably afraid’ of death, but the revolutionary movement had 
‘once more made the Indians realise the grandeur and the beauty that lie in dying for a noble 
cause.’ Through their martyrdom, revolutionaries demonstrated that death was not always a 
bad thing, but could in fact serve as the highest ideal of patriotism. Sanyal asked, ‘To die for 
one’s own beliefs and convictions, to die in the consciousness that by so dying one is serving 
God in the nation … is this no moral progress?’71  
Gandhi responded in the same issue of Young India, stating that the world was sick of 
armed rebellions and that a bloody revolution could not succeed in India because the masses 
would not respond. He went on to write that he did not deny the heroism and sacrifice of the 
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revolutionary. However, according to Gandhi, ‘heroism and sacrifice in a bad cause are so 
much waste of splendid energy and hurt the good cause by drawing away attention from it by 
the glamour of the misused heroism and sacrifice in a bad cause.’ Gandhi wrote that the self-
sacrifice of one innocent man was a million times more powerful than the sacrifice of a 
million men ‘who die in the act of killing others.’ The willing sacrifice of the innocent was, 
for Gandhi, ‘the most powerful retort to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God 
or man.’ Still, Gandhi insisted that his criticism of the revolutionary did not imply intolerance 
towards him, but rather towards his methods.72 The authorities arrested Sanyal in 
Bhowanipur on the 25th of February and ultimately sentenced him to transportation for life 
following evidence that came out against him in the Kakori conspiracy trial following a train 
robbery near Lucknow. It is interesting that Sanyal, despite his leading role in the 
revolutionary movement, escaped capital punishment, a sentence that seems to have been 
reserved for those that physically carried out assassinations themselves, such as Madan Lal 
Dhingra or Gopi Nath Saha. 
 
The Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act and its Renewal, 1925-1930 
 
Despite Reading’s insistence that the Bengal Ordinance would only be granted on the 
condition that it would subsequently be passed in the Bengal Legislative Council, he 
expected all along that the Indian representatives would reject the bill and that it would in 
turn need to be certified by the government.73 An article in The Bengalee, a Calcutta based 
newspaper edited by Bipin Chandra Pal, attacked this process of certification, arguing that a 
certified bill was every bit as autocratic as an ordinance and lacked the moral sanction of 
ordinary law. The writer went on to declare that governing by ordinances and certified 
legislation was government by ‘legalised brute force’ and would never be acceptable to 
Indian opinion.74 
The Bengal Legislative Council did indeed reject the proposed bill on the 7th of 
January, by a vote of 66 to 57. Reading pointed out that the strength of the vote against the 
bill was all the more impressive when the number of officials and nominated and European 
members in the House was taken into account.75 Most Indian members of the Council 
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criticized the bill, including Sir P.C. Mitter, a former architect of the infamous Rowlatt Act. 
Mitter argued that the proposed legislation departed from the recommendations of the 
Rowlatt Report and instead proceeded along the lines of the Defence of India Act which, 
although similar, contained some features unsuitable for peacetime legislation. Perhaps most 
significant was the removal of the right of Habeus Corpus under the ordinance, as opposed to 
the Rowlatt Act which banned this right under Part I but not under other conditions. The 
stipulations provided under the Criminal Law Amendment Bill for the investigation or 
scrutiny of steps taken under it were also more draconian than even those provided under the 
Rowlatt Act. On the other hand, the Criminal Law Amendment provided for allowances to 
the dependents of those held under it while Rowlatt had not, perhaps indicating a growing 
recognition of the political status of revolutionary detainees.76 Mitter referred to the proposed 
bill as ‘a quack’s remedy and not a physician’s treatment’ and argued that if the bill were 
passed or certified, it would ‘not only fail in its object but will perhaps be, quite 
unintentionally, helpful towards it.’77  
Following its failure in the Legislative Council, the bill was certified by Lord Lytton 
‘as being essential for the discharge of his duty in the administration of justice’, after which it 
was signed by the King in Council on the 17th of March.78 Two clauses from the original 
ordinance were introduced as a separate bill, one of which stipulated that those detained 
under the law possessed the right to appeal to High Court, while the other deprived the High 
Court of the power of issuing a writ of habeus corpus for those under detention. This bill was 
introduced in the Indian Legislative Assembly but attracted the criticism of opponents such as 
Motilal Nehru, who referred to it as a ‘well-prepared trap’ which, ‘while pretending to 
concede a right … really strikes at the very foundation upon which that right rests.’79  
Indian politicians greeted the proposed Bengal Criminal Law Amendment 
Supplementary Bill with heavy disdain. Nehru pointed out that the Assembly was given no 
opportunity to comment upon the original act, but that by agreeing to the Supplementary Bill, 
which granted the right of appeal for accused terrorists, the Assembly would be seen as 
giving their assent to the act in its entirety. Nehru referred to the right of appeal as bait that 
was being dangled before the Assembly to trick them into swallowing the whole thing.80 
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Muhammad Ali Jinnah and C. Duraiswami Aiyangar opposed the Supplementary Bill on the 
same grounds, stating that they would not support it out of concern that doing so would give 
legitimacy to the original ‘illegal Act.’81 Jinnah also disputed the claim that the bill was a 
matter of either national or public safety and pointed out that India was also not in a state of 
war.82 The Legislative Assembly rejected the bill by a vote of 72 to 41. 
Stating his opinion that the passage of the bill in its entirety was ‘essential for the 
tranquility of the Presidency of Bengal’, Reading certified the bill in the Council of State.83 
Even within this oligarchic institution, however, there was strong criticism to the proposed 
bill. G.A. Natesan, a nominated non-official from Madras, said that although he condemned 
the anarchist as an ‘enemy of mankind’, he implored the government to adopt alternate 
methods for policing anarchy, asking that India not be converted into ‘another Ireland.’84 
Sevasila Vedamurti, an elected member of the Council pointed out that there was an 
impression throughout India that the Council of State was nothing more than the ‘handmaid’ 
of the colonial government, and that the only reason for its existence was to ‘register the 
decrees of the Government of India.’ Vedamurti said that by being offered a bill already 
certified by the Viceroy and Governor General, the Council was being asked to pass the bill 
‘at the point of a bayonet.’ He further declared that he regarded it an insult to the House to be 
called upon to pass the bill and called any discussion of it a waste of time, given that no 
amount of discussion or adverse voting would cause the Government of India to deviate 
‘even by a hair’s breadth’ from their predetermined course of action. Referring to the whole 
procedure as a farce, Vedamurti withdrew from the House.85 
V. Ramadas Pantulu, an elected member from Madras, pointed out that the 
representatives of Bengal and of India already rejected the ‘Black Bill’ in no uncertain terms. 
Pantulu said that the government demanded that the bill be passed in its present form or 
rejected but that, ‘Reject it you dare not, nor are you allowed to amend it.’ For this reason, he 
said any further discussion of the bill was pointless. Pantulu said it was obviously impossible 
to convince the Viceroy, who was influenced by the advice of ‘the bureaucracy who are the 
steel frame of the Indian constitution.’ For this reason, Pantulu similarly withdrew from the 
vote.86 Although the Council of State nonetheless passed the measure by a comfortable 
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margin of 29 votes to 3, this represented a vote of only about half of the eligible electorate. 
Once the 26 official and non-official nominated votes are discounted, it becomes clear that 
even within the oligarchic limitations of the Council, the bill attracted negligible support 
from the elected members of the House, many of whom, like Vedamurti and Pantulu, 
abstained from casting a vote. 
The bill attracted minimal opposition within the British parliament, a fact no doubt 
impacted by the role of Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour government in introducing the original 
ordinance in 1924. Shortly after the Labour government approved the Bengal Criminal Law 
Amendment Ordinance, the Conservatives defeated them in a general election on the 29th of 
October. By the time the Amendment Act came up for discussion under the Conservatives, 
Labour had no moral basis on which to oppose the measure, even if they wanted to, a fact 
that the Conservatives were happy to exploit. Writing to Lord Birkenhead, the new Secretary 
of State, Lytton expressed his delight at the electoral success of the Conservatives, stating 
that he felt ‘bottled up’ under Labour. Lytton called it ‘extraordinary fortunate that the so-
called ‘policy of repression’ in Bengal was inaugurated while the Labour Government was 
still in power in England and cannot therefore be criticised as the first fruits of a Conservative 
reaction.’ Because of this, Lytton wrote, ‘the mouths of the Labour Party in opposition will 
be closed and they cannot accuse you of having inaugurated or sanctioned a reign of 
persecution in Bengal.’87 This assumption proved broadly true, and aside from some 
opposition by individual members of parliament, Labour mounted no sustained opposition to 
the passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act the following year.88 
By 1926, 48 revolutionaries were arrested under Regulation III of 1818 and another 
125 under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act. The detainees were classified into four 
different categories of criminality. The first were simply called criminals, defined as ‘those 
who have committed crime and who would, it is believed, revert to crime if released.’ After 
this came anarchists, ‘those who are not addicted to crime but who are prepared to commit 
crime for revolutionary purposes’, followed by revolutionary politicians who were designated 
as ‘persons of violent revolutionary ideas who are, however, not themselves prepared to 
commit crime.’ Finally, Bolsheviks like Rash Behari Bose’s gun-runner Hugo Espinoza were 
classified as ‘irreconcilables.’ Despite its prevalence in the political discourse that surrounded 
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the passage of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the category of ‘terrorist’ had not yet been 
assigned a distinct legal classification.89 
In 1930, the five year duration of the act was due to expire. The intervening years saw 
a lull in overt revolutionary activity in Bengal, although organisations like the Anushilan 
Samiti and Jugantar still actively recruited. This does not mean that the political situation 
throughout India was either quiet or stable. In 1928, colonial officials appointed the Simon 
Commission for a fact-finding mission that drew intense criticism across the Indian political 
spectrum due to its failure to include a single Indian within its ranks. Leading a protest 
against the Commission during its visit to Lahore, police injured the celebrated nationalist 
politician Lala Lajpat Rai during a lathi charge. Many Indians viewed Rai’s death from a 
heart attack on the 17th of November as a direct result of the injuries he sustained during the 
protest. Following this, members of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association in 
Punjab sought revenge against James Scott, the police superintendent that ordered the lathi 
charge. Intending to kill Scott, a group of revolutionaries including Sanyal’s disciple Bhagat 
Singh instead assassinated a different policeman by mistake. In 1929, Singh and an 
accomplice named Batukeshwar Dutt threw two bombs into the Central Legislative Assembly 
and scattered radical leaflets while shouting ‘Inquilab Zindabad!’, or ‘Long Live 
Revolution!’90 
Writing in Young India, Gandhi argued that the bomb attack belonged to a philosophy 
of ‘mad revenge and impotent rage.’91 In January of 1930, following an attempt by 
revolutionaries to bomb the train of Viceroy and Governor General Lord Irwin, Gandhi wrote 
an article titled ‘The Cult of the Bomb’ in which he rebutted the philosophy of revolutionary 
violence at greater length. Gandhi once more defended the necessity of non-violence, and 
stated that if the Indian people would only realise ‘that it is not by terrorising the foreigner 
that we shall gain freedom, but by ourselves shedding fear and teaching the villager to shed 
his own fear that we shall gain true freedom, we would at once perceive that violence is 
suicidal.’ Gandhi pointed out that in 1920 it was the principle of non-violence that aroused 
the participation of the Indian masses, ‘as if by magic.’ He wrote that India was entering a 
new era where the immediate objective was complete independence, and claimed that it was 
not enough to drive out the British through fear, but rather that mass civil disobedience was 
																																																						
89	Arrests	under	Bengal	Criminal	Law	Amendment	Act	and	Ordinance	and	Regulation	III	from	1923-1926,	BL,	
Mss	Eur	F160/37,	p.	1.	
90	For	the	most	interesting	recent	examination	of	Bhagat	Singh	and	his	significance,	see	Chris	Moffat,	‘Bhagat	
Singh’s	Corpse’,	South	Asia:	Journal	of	South	Asian	Studies	39,	3	(2016),	pp.	644-61.	
91	Young	India,	18	April	1929,	p.	4.	
	118	
required to convert the colonial rulers and foster discipline among the masses.92 Finally, 
Gandhi implored those ‘who are not past reason’ to stop endorsing bomb throwing but rather 
to condemn such actions as inimical to the goal of Indian independence.93 
On the 26th of January, 1930, Congress declared a national Independence Day and 
unfurled the tricolour flag of independent India with shouts of ‘Inquilab Zindabad!’ On the 
12th of March Gandhi launched the famous Salt March that became one of the most iconic 
moments of the Indian freedom struggle. Proposing a boycott of the tax levied against the 
Indian population on salt, a basic and necessary commodity, Gandhi undertook a symbolic 
march from his Sabarmati Ashram near Ahmedabad to a beach at Dandi, some 240 miles 
away. Accompanied by 78 hand-picked followers, Gandhi marched to the coast to boil his 
own salt in contravention of colonial law.94 His actions marked the start of a new phase of 
satyagraha against colonial rule, in which thousands of non-violent protesters were 
ultimately incarcerated, including Gandhi himself. 
This is the context in which the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act came up for 
review. It was due to expire on the 23rd of April, which marked the end of the five-year 
period of operation initially agreed to by Reading. The government introduced and passed the 
Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Part Continuance) Bill on the 1st of April, dropping the 
powers of preventative detention allowed under the previous act but retaining the other 
features of the law intact. Sir Francis Stanley Jackson, the Governor of Bengal, promoted the 
bill through an appeal to the inherently non-political and nefarious nature of the figure of the 
terrorist. According to Jackson, ‘The terrorist has no belief, or faith, in constitutional 
agitation or in the efficacy of political leaders … As a class the terrorist now, as always, pins 
his faith on violence as being the only method which will crown his efforts with success.’95 In 
response, Jitendra Lal Bannerjee referred to the Amendment Bill as ‘an abuse of the powers 
of administration.’96 Keshab Chandra Banerjee stated that although the bill was purged of 
objectionable features regarding detention without trial, the Indian people should nonetheless 
view it with suspicion. Banerjee said he appreciated the need for the maintenance of law and 
order at a time when ‘violence and terrorist activities reign supreme.’ According to Banerjee, 
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however, the emergency measures enshrined in the bill could only be justified as a weapon to 
meet an abnormal situation, and would otherwise represent ‘a direct negation of the 
principles of democracy.’97 
Banerjee, however, noted that the preamble to the legislation indicated that it was 
meant to supplement the ordinary criminal laws of Bengal. This led Banerjee to argue that 
such emergency measures could only be justified if the government first proved that the 
ordinary law was not adequate to meet the situation. Banerjee said, ‘If sufficient reasons 
could be brought forward to show an abnormal situation in the country, my clear duty would 
be to support the bill as one who is a lover of peace, order and constitution.’ He argued that 
there was no clear indication of an immediate danger to public peace and therefore the 
criminal law should be sufficient to deal with any situations that may emerge, with the 
understanding that should any ‘extraordinary situation’ develop, the bill could be considered 
in a special session of the Legislative Council.98 
A.N. Moberly of the Bengal Government responded that the authorities would never 
have dreamed of introducing the measure if they did not consider it ‘absolutely essential’ to 
the maintenance of law and order in Bengal. The bill, according to Moberly, was not aimed at 
the ordinary lawful citizen, but was instead aimed at ‘the secret terrorist conspiracy, and our 
information is that secret terrorist conspiracy is still alive.’ Moberly implored the Legislative 
Council to pass the proposed bill, stating that he was sure no member of the House would 
‘countenance the policy of these terrorists’ by voting against the renewal of emergency 
powers.99 An Indian member of the Council, Munindra Deb Rai Mohasai, referred to 
terrorism as being of ‘exotic origin’, incompatible with the adherence to ahimsa practiced by 
the people of India and accused the government of targeting the Civil Disobedience 
movement that was developing under Gandhi. Moberly denied this claim, stating that the law 
had no bearing on the Civil Disobedience campaign, as this was an open movement and the 
government had ‘no objection whatever to any open movement.’100 His claim of course 
stands in stark contrast to the tens of thousands of non-violent protesters ultimately arrested 
over the course of the Civil Disobedience campaign. Despite the objections raised by some 
Indian members of the Legislative Council, the Criminal Law Amendment Act was 
successfully renewed, though with the preventative detention portions removed. 
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Less than a month later, on the 18th of April, revolutionaries calling themselves the 
Indian Republican Army launched a daring raid against police and auxiliary armouries in 
Chittagong, Bengal. The name of the revolutionary organisation and the timing of the raid, 
which occurred on Good Friday, indicate the strong inspiration provided by the revolutionary 
history of Ireland. Members of the Indian Republican Army drew inspiration from Irish 
nationalists who staged a dramatic insurrection in the heart of Dublin on Easter Sunday, 
1916. This uprising ultimately sparked a civil war in which the Irish Republican Army and 
other Irish revolutionary forces succeeded in defeating British colonial rule and achieved 
independence under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. As one of the Chittagong raiders later 
wrote, ‘The blood-stained memory of the Easter Revolution of the IRA touched our young 
minds with fiery enthusiasm!’101 A number of the revolutionaries avidly read the Irish 
nationalist Dan Breen’s My Fight for Irish Freedom, leading colonial officials to refer to it as 
a ‘terrorist textbook.’102 After capturing the armouries and cutting telephone and telegraph 
wires, the raiders retreated into the hill country surrounding Chittagong to wage an ongoing 
insurgency against British rule. 
On the 19th, Secretary of State William Wedgwood Benn wrote to Lord Irwin 
promising that he would give his full support to any course of action taken by the Viceroy.103 
That day, Irwin promulgated Ordinance No. I of 1930, an emergency law designed to 
‘suppress terrorist outrages.’104 This ordinance allowed preventative detention, effectively 
bringing back into force the aspects of the Criminal Law Amendment Act that were just 
removed under the new Supplementary Bill. Irwin announced that the emergency created by 
the armoury raid demonstrated that revolutionaries had ‘revived their methods of terrorism.’ 
Irwin declared that the ordinance was meant to demonstrate the resolve of the government in 
preventing revolutionary outrages and taking all necessary measures to bring the terrorist 
movement under control.105 Gandhi immediately spoke out against both the Chittagong raid 
and the government’s response to it, stating that although it was sad to see violence resorted 
to, the Viceroy’s exercise of his extraordinary powers demonstrated that, ‘So long as the 
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British people are determined to impose their rule upon the unwilling people, so long must 
they rule in reality without law.’ Gandhi argued that the executive action of the colonial 
authorities proved the hollowness of constitutional reforms by shattering the illusion that 
elected Indians constituted the legislatures. He identified both the violence of government 
and the violence of revolutionary terrorists as twin opponents to be overcome through the 
non-violence of the Civil Disobedience movement.106 
Colonial forces surrounded and defeated the bulk of the Chittagong raiders on the 22nd 
of April the daring attack. Described by historian Sumit Sarkar as ‘the most spectacular coup 
in the entire history of terrorism’107, this incident marked the beginning of a new and 
particularly deadly phase of revolutionary violence in Bengal. Many of the leaders of the raid 
managed to evade capture and remained a thorn in the side of the Bengal Government for up 
to three years. In August, revolutionaries conducted another assassination attempt against 
Charles Tegart through a brazen daytime attack in Dalhousie Square. 
Accordingly, the Bengal Government had no intention of allowing the ordinance to 
lapse at the date of its expiry on the 19th of October. In August, the government asked the 
Legislative Council to pass an act embodying the necessary elements of the ordinance. Just 
like the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1925, the legislation would be limited to a period 
of five years, in the hope that by the time this period elapsed, ‘conditions will have so altered 
that they can afford to take the risk of doing without this special preventive procedure.’ 
Speaking on behalf of the official position, W.D.R. Prentice asked the Council to ‘support 
Government in its fight against terrorism by giving us the minimum powers which we are 
convinced are essential.’108 Prentice promised that the powers would not be used 
indiscriminately and would only be used against the loosely defined ‘terrorist movement’, 
meaning that ‘civil disobedience or political agitation are entirely outside its sphere.’109 
The politician and novelist Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta suggested that if this was 
indeed the case, the law should be subjected to public scrutiny. He argued that this legislation 
was in fact a ‘negation of law’ that would take away ‘the elementary rights of the people’ and 
that therefore the people had a right to scrutinize the proposed measures before they entered 
into force. Acknowledging that even in civilised societies, emergencies sometimes demanded 
that the government arm itself with special powers, Sen Gupta pointed out that the previous 
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Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act was still in force during the time of the planning of 
the Chittagong raid, and therefore clearly did not provide the authorities with any particularly 
useful tools in preventing this attack. Sen Gupta asserted that the problem with this 
emergency legislation was that evidence used against an accused terrorist was based on secret 
information provided by anonymous informants and therefore could not be tested through 
cross-examination.110 Prentice opposed the proposal to solicit public opinion with regards to 
the bill, stating that because the bill followed the exact measures provided under the Act of 
1925, public discussion was unnecessary. The motion to circulate the bill for public feedback 
was defeated by 69 votes to 29.111 
Following this, Sen Gupta proposed that the bill be at least referred to a Select 
Committee, but this motion was similarly defeated by 65 votes to 25. Next, he proposed 
amending the duration of the proposed bill from five years to one, noting that in England the 
suspension of the Habeus Corpus Act was only ever carried out in intervals of one year at a 
time. He argued that even during the ‘darkest days’ of the Irish troubles, Habeus Corpus was 
suspended from year to year and that there was no reason why the same process should not be 
adopted in Bengal. Narendra Kumar Basu proposed a compromise of two years’ duration, 
expressing the hope that the Simon Commission and Round Table Conference might increase 
the proportion of Indian elected representatives and that the proposed reforms may alleviate 
the motivations prompting revolutionary crimes. Prentice retorted that this argument was 
based on the proposition that political changes could stop the revolutionary movement, an 
idea that he soundly rejected, stating that ‘the movement is entirely different from political 
agitation.’ The proposal to reduce the duration of the bill from five years to two was rejected 
by 56 votes to 35.112 
Sen Gupta continued to lead the opposition to the bill, declaring ‘we are not advocates 
for the terrorist; if we are attempting to obstruct the passage of the Bill … it is because the 
Bill is going to affect the subjects of the province in general and for the sake of giving 
adequate protection … from the attention of the more zealous officers of the police.’113 
Jatindra Nath Basu remarked that the inability of the government to provide a safe trial 
without resorting to emergency measures served as evidence that the government was unable 
to fulfil its own basic responsibilities. He went on to say,  
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The fact that after 175 years of Britain’s connection with India …  
a measure like the one which we have been considering should be  
sought to be placed on the statute book … shows the failure of  
British policy in India and the bankruptcy of British statesmanship  
in dealing with Indian affairs.114 
 
Another Indian member, Shanti Shekhareswar Roy, declared that as followers of non-
violence, the Indian National Congress condemned the ‘cult of the bomb’ and said ‘we all 
want to get rid of the terrorist.’ Roy stated that real statesmanship would dictate that the 
feelings of despair underlying these acts of violence must be addressed, rather than a resort to 
panicked measures of repression that would only succeed in further alienating public opinion. 
Despite these protests, the bill was passed by a vote of 61 to 15.115 
 
A New Kind of Revolution: The ‘Reign of Terrorism’, 1930-1934 
 
 The re-introduction of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act did not spell an end 
to the latest outbreak of revolutionary violence in Bengal. In August of 1930, two 
revolutionaries named Anuja Sen Gupta and Dinesh Chandra Majumdar threw bombs at 
Charles Tegart’s vehicle in Dalhousie Square but failed to assassinate him. The next day a 
revolutionary bombed the Jorabagan police station, with another bomb thrown at the Eden 
Gardens police station the day after that. The same month, members of the Sri Sangha 
organisation assassinated Lowman, the Inspector General of Police in Dacca. The following 
December, three revolutionaries dressed as Europeans shot and killed Lieutenant-Colonel 
Simpson, the Inspector General of Prisons. Following this escalation of violence, guards were 
provided to all District Officers to protect them from assassination attempts, although D.R. 
Prentice, the Home Member to the Bengal Government remarked that they would provide 
only a partial protection ‘against the rabid kind of terrorist who is prepared to be killed 
provided he kills first.’116 
 These events occurred within the global context of growing anti-imperial insurgency 
in places such as Palestine, Ireland, Burma, and Cyprus. In 1934, Charles Gwynn published 
Imperial Policing, a manual that remains a classic among counter-insurgency specialists to 
this day. The book details British operations against a wide range of anti-colonial rebellions, 
with an emphasis on asymmetrical warfare and the pacification of restive populations. In this 
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manual, Gwynn argued that despite public suspicion regarding the deployment of military 
forces in support of the civil administration, the Army should in fact be used in a preventative 
capacity, rather than being called in only after the escalation of a disturbance. For Gwynn, 
policing and pacification were useful and necessary functions of the military and his 
approach would come to be shape Anglo approaches to counter-insurgency operations from 
Malaya in the late 1940s to the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 
twenty-first century.117 
 The militarization of imperial policing was evident in the Amritsar massacre, where 
imperial troops opened fire on a crowd of non-violent protesters, killing 379. Beyond India, 
the rise of anti-colonial nationalisms around the world produced a number of sites of 
agitation that imperial officials sought to crush with the use of military force and emergency 
counter-insurgency legislation. A few key examples from the period include the British 
occupation of Iraq as a mandated territory under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,118 
communal disturbances resulting from Jewish immigration to Palestine in 1929 and from 
1936-39,119 and the Saya San rebellion in Burma from 1930 to 1932.120 This context provided 
the framework within which colonial officials in India sought to understand and police the 
outbreak of violence triggered by the Chittagong raid. 
 In India, the situation in Chittagong remained particularly volatile, as a number of 
absconding raiders managed to avoid arrest and waged an ongoing insurgency from the hills. 
In April of 1931, exactly one year after the initial raid, H.W. Emerson of the Bengal 
Government reported the existence of ‘a serious state of affairs both as regards the 
demoralisation of the official and non-official residents of Chittagong and the wide-spread 
sympathy in the district with the revolutionary party.’ In response to this situation, the 
government imposed a curfew that forbade anyone, whether Indian or European, from being 
out between the hours of 10pm to 4am without a permit. Security forces established three 
patrols of two men each to look in on the wives of railway employees who would be home 
alone while their husbands went off to work and military authorities blocked all roads to the 
																																																						
117	Charles	Gwynn,	Imperial	Policing,	Second	Edition	(London:	Macmillan,	1939).	
118	Toby	Dodge,	Inventing	Iraq:	The	Failure	of	Nation	Building	and	a	History	Denied	(New	York:	Columbia	
University	Press,	2003),	pp.	131-56.	
119	Robert	Johnson,	‘Command	of	the	Army,	Charles	Gwynn	and	Imperial	Policing:	The	British	Doctrinal	
Approach	to	Internal	Security	in	Palestine	1919-29’,	Journal	of	Imperial	and	Commonwealth	History	43,	4	
(2015),	pp.	570-589,	and	Jacob	Norris,	‘Repression	and	Rebellion:	Britain’s	Response	to	the	Arab	Revolt	in	
Palestine	of	1936-39’,	The	Journal	of	Imperial	and	Commonwealth	History	36,	1	(2008),	pp.	25-45.	
120	Maitrii	Aung	Thwin,	The	Return	of	the	Galon	King:	History,	Law,	and	Rebellion	in	Colonial	Burma	(Athens,	
Ohio:	Ohio	University	Press,	2011).	
	125	
European area, with a 24-hour guard placed. All vehicles entering this area were stopped and 
searched, although this surveillance did not apply to Europeans.121 
 In October, Emerson reported that a large part of the district of Chittagong was still 
out of hand and that, ‘officials and a considerable portion of the civil population is under a 
reign of terrorism; the initiative is with the terrorists and the prestige of Government is very 
low indeed.’ The Government of Bengal requested new emergency powers under the 
proposed Emergency Powers Ordinance, including unprecedented measures such as the 
power to take possession of buildings, to prohibit or limit traffic and regulate the use of 
transport and railways, as well as imposing collective fines on the inhabitants of particularly 
turbulent areas. Emerson wrote that even the introduction of these extreme measures did not 
go far enough and that he would prefer the imposition of Martial Law, as military support 
would improve moral and reduce the opposition of the civil population.122 
 The Bengal Government’s appeal for an extension of its special powers in this period 
was markedly more dire in tone than even the alarmist appeals of 1925. This stemmed from a 
belief that ‘terrorism’ was no longer the result of a small group of irreconcilables, but now 
enjoyed the support of a growing proportion of the population.  Many believed that ‘the 
authority of Government has practically ceased to function’ and that ‘the majority of the 
Hindu population are definitely hostile.’ The growing hysteria was the result of an 
information panic within the rural mofussil, where intelligence operatives reported a 
complete breakdown of the information order. The CID found itself completely incapable of 
acquiring relevant intelligence on Surya Sen, the leader of the Armoury Raid, and his close 
followers who remained at large, and officials believed that even where information was 
available informants suffered from a loss of morale that rendered them unwilling to seek it 
out. By contrast, the CID reported, ‘The gang of revolutionaries are fully informed of all 
movements against them and … they find it a simple matter to defeat any half-hearted 
attempts that are made.’123 
 Widespread among officials was the perception that the government’s inability to 
detect and arrest the phantom ‘terrorists’ was fatally undermining the authority and 
legitimacy of the state. Such a perception was heightened by the belief that ‘if the morale of 
the local administration were satisfactory and the prestige of Government normal, necessary 
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operations could be carried out without additional powers.’ Taking strong action against the 
revolutionary movement required information, but the CID believed that such information 
would not be forthcoming ‘until the population realise beyond any doubt that Government are 
masters of the situation.’ To achieve this, officials proposed strong measures for controlling 
the movement of people, goods, and information within the affected areas, as a way of 
displaying to the people ‘that Government are in earnest.’124 
 In this context, the language of terrorism took on an enhanced and particularly urgent 
meaning. In a letter to R.N. Reid, the Chief Secretary to the Governor of Bengal, W.H. 
Nelson stated that terrorists ‘should be treated as persons who have been exposed to infection 
from plague and should be isolated till the danger of their spreading it is over.’ He further 
argued that police needed unlimited authority to keep an eye on anyone under suspicion, to 
demand proof of identity when desired, and to control the movement of individuals within 
designated areas. According to Nelson, police ‘should not hesitate to shoot a man who 
attempted to run away when called on to halt.’125 A government report on the topic likewise 
adopted the language of infectious disease, noting that ‘if this plague spot is not dealt with 
summarily it will continue to contaminate the rest of the Province.’126  
 The question of how best to reassert governmental authority also prompted 
considerable discussion regarding whether counter-insurgency operations should be carried 
out by the police, the military, or by a joint operation between the two. In past, the military 
was unwilling ‘to undertake what they regard as police duties’ and this was complicated by 
the fact that it was ‘extremely difficult to define exactly what police duties are, (and) the civil 
authorities were afraid lest the military assistance might not give the relief to the police that 
was desirable.’ The possibility of military deployment in Chittagong also raised the question 
of whether the province or the Government of India would be liable to cover the expenses.127 
The official stance of the Bengal Government was a desire for the best of both worlds; ‘You 
can be perfectly certain that we shall welcome the use of troops to show the flag, and that 
difficulties will only arise, if we are called upon to agree to pay for them.’128 
 Aside from the use of force and surveillance, the new Secretary of State Sir Samuel 
Hoare suggested that the mass support of students should be enlisted by appealing to their 
self-interest. Hoare recommended adopting a policy by which the commission of terrorist 
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crimes in precincts of educational institutions or by students belonging to any particular 
college or school would render all students from the relevant institution ineligible for 
government employment. Hoare saw it as inconsistent for the government to employ youths 
who allowed crime against government officials to be organised amongst them.129 After 
consulting Governors in Madras, Bombay, Burma, and elsewhere, Lord Irwin wrote back to 
inform Hoare that the idea was universally rejected by all local governments. As numerous 
officials pointed out, the plan would not act as a deterrent to revolutionaries, who advocated 
the boycott of government services anyway, and would therefore accomplish nothing other 
than to enhance public resentment and increase sympathy for the revolutionary movement. 
Irwin suggested that a better approach would be to crack down on discipline within schools, 
but worried that the situation was likely to escalate significantly ‘before there is anything like 
a general revolt against terrorists.’130 
 The repressive measures adopted by the colonial government did indeed attract 
widespread criticism, particularly given the broader context of the repression of the 
Congress-led Civil Disobedience campaign. In the Bengal Legislative Council, Munindra 
Deb Rai Mahasai criticised what he referred to as ‘police terrorism’, stating that the 
imposition of these ‘lawless laws gave the police a splendid opportunity for the exhibition of 
their autocratic powers.’ Mahasai asserted that the existing laws did not justify indiscriminate 
use of the lathi or the baton in breaking the heads of unarmed civil resisters, and said that it 
was ‘a standing disgrace to any civilised Government to encourage the revival of this relic of 
the barbaric age in the twentieth century.’ Mahasai went on to implore the government ‘in the 
name of civilisation and humanity’ to ‘save the people from police terrorism.’131 
 As revolutionary attacks continued unabated into 1932, the Bengal Government 
introduced the Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act, the first piece of legislation in Bengal 
to explicitly name terrorism within its title. The government intended this act to replace the 
powers granted under the Emergency Powers Ordinance, which were due to lapse. These 
included the power to detain and question anyone ‘behaving suspiciously’, to take possession 
of property, imposition of collective fines in ‘turbulent’ areas, as well as general powers of 
search. The provisions were specifically targeted against the ongoing troubled situation in 
Chittagong, although they could be extended to any part of Bengal by the Governor General 
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in Council. The other part of the bill, which provided for the use of Special Magistrates in 
trying ‘terrorist’ crimes, extended to the whole of Bengal immediately.132 
 Again, Narendra Kumar Basu spearheaded opposition to the bill, and argued that if 
repressive laws were actually effective at suppressing terrorism, they would have succeeded 
by now. He referred to the Government of India’s reliance on ruling through ordinances as 
evidence of the bankruptcy of its statesmanship, and said that the reliance upon emergency 
laws demonstrated that the colonial administration had in fact ceased to function. Basu 
contended that the true underlying causes of revolutionary violence were political and 
economic in nature, and that reducing unemployment would be a far more effective strategy 
of counter-insurgency than the continued imposition of repressive laws.133 Despite these and 
other objections, the bill was passed by a vote of 58 to 12.134 
 The government was not wholly blind to the economic argument put forward by 
Basu, however. At a speech given to the European Association in January of 1934, Viceroy 
and Governor General Lord Willingdon declared that although the terrorist movement had 
existed for some time, it was fuelled in the past few years by the massive economic instability 
caused by the Great Depression that followed the Wall Street stock market crash of 1929. 
Although Willingdon referred to terrorists as ‘the greatest enemies of their own country’, he 
acknowledged that support for the movement was exacerbated by unemployment and a lack 
of career prospects for an increasingly educated youth.135 
 Although revolutionary attacks were in marked decline from 1934 onwards and never 
ultimately resurfaced to such devastating effect for the duration of British rule, this does not 
mean that ‘terrorism’ ceased to be a concern for Europeans or for colonial officials in India. 
By 1935, revolutionary crime was substantially reduced, with only a few sporadic incidents 
in comparison to regular murders that occurred throughout the period from 1930 to 1934. 
H.W. Hale attributed this in part to the mass conversion of many revolutionaries to 
communist methods during this period, necessitating the building up of a mass base rather 
than individual acts of violence or political assassination.136 Regardless, officials continued to 
view terrorism as an active and ongoing threat to imperial security.   
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At a speech given at a police parade in Dacca in 1935, Sir John Anderson, the 
Governor of Bengal, said that although ‘outrages’ had declined, ‘yet the terrorist virus is still 
active and malignant.’ Anderson said that the persistence of conspiracies, even after the arrest 
of so many revolutionary leaders, revealed how deep-seated the ‘poison’ of terrorism had 
become. Arguing that the apparent decline in revolutionary crimes was only a result of the 
secret measures being undertaken for the good of the public by colonial intelligence services, 
Anderson argued that counter-insurgency measures could not be relaxed for even a 
moment.137 Speaking at an Armistice Day dinner later in the year, Anderson expressed his 
appreciation for the soldiers of Bengal before going on to say that the conflict with terrorism 
could not be ended at any predetermined hour. He further declared, ‘There can be no 
armistice with terrorism so long as there remain organisations that possess the will and may 
acquire the means to do mischief.’ Claiming that the initiative had now passed into the hands 
of the government, Anderson cautioned that they should not ‘win the war merely in order to 
lose the peace. We shall not relax our vigilance or neglect our front.’138 
This ongoing obsession with terrorism as an ongoing ‘menace’ was also reflected in 
the press. In 1936, The Statesman published an article titled ‘How war is waged on 
terrorism’, which referred to terrorism as an ongoing menace that was never fully eradicated. 
The article declared that terrorism was not simply a matter of ‘periodic outbursts of violence 
which attract public attention’, but argued rather that in dealing with terrorism, the 
government was dealing with organizations that were in continuous operation for 30 years. 
According to the article,  
Terrorism is never ‘over now.’ The army withdraws from the field  
of battle, perhaps to plan another attack or perhaps to develop some  
new strategical scheme or perhaps to form fresh alliances … On  
previous occasions Government has disbanded its ‘army’ immediately  
after a battle was over. This merely gave the enemy a chance to  
reorganize its scattered forces and prepare for a fresh attack.139 
 
The article went on to say that while the majority of Bengalis were not necessarily disloyal, 
they were ‘helpless against organized terrorism.’ The author expressed with certainty the 
belief that, ‘Another fresh attack is being planned … So-called ‘public opinion cannot be 
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reached … as long as the public see that the revolutionary forces are gathering strength day 
by day.’140 
 Reports submitted by colonial intelligence officials during this period also reflected 
this belief. By the late 1930s, the CID were operating in a state of almost perpetual 
emergency.  In a report submitted in 1938, C. Fairweather warned that ‘the next wave of 
revolution is being planned on a scale much greater than Bengal has ever known’ and ‘the 
ordinary civil or police powers will be unable to deal effectively with the numbers 
involved.’141  Two months later, Fairweather warned that the widespread disaffection being 
promoted by nationalist agitators was ‘a new form of sedition with which our penal code was 
never intended to deal.’142 Although labour unrest, communism, and the widespread 
nationalism promoted by Congress absorbed much of the attention of colonial authorities, 
terrorism remained a constant concern right up until independence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the existing historiography regards the terms ‘revolutionary’ and ‘terrorism’ 
as largely interchangeable, the shift in governmental labelling of political radicals from 
revolutionaries to terrorists in fact marked a deliberate strategy of counter-insurgency. 
Following the rise of Gandhi’s non-cooperation campaign in the early 1920s, British officials 
began to consciously adopt the term ‘terrorism’ in 1925 in order to render the Bengal 
Criminal Law Amendment Act more palatable to the British Parliament. By the 1930s, the 
term terrorism became the standard label applied to revolutionary nationalists, despite the 
relatively infrequent usages of this term during the period before and during the First World 
War. Within the context of an increasingly assertive nationalist movement with a broadening 
base of popular support, the label of terrorism became a useful way of delegitimizing the 
tactics of revolutionaries while simultaneously justifying the creeping expansion of executive 
rule, during precisely the same period in which colonial authorities were ostensibly devolving 
a share of power to elected Indian legislatures. Through this process, the figure of the 
‘terrorist’ came to be constructed as an intangible threat that could be held up against the 
prospect of reform, even after terrorist crimes underwent a drastic decline after 1934. 
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 The proliferation of emergency legislation that emerged in the 1930s and its 
heightened focus on the category of the ‘terrorist’ highlights the empty nature of the Morley-
Minto reforms by indicating the limits that executive discretion placed on the practical power 
of the elected legislatures. Although the Legislative Council in Bengal and the Indian 
Legislative Assembly provided important sites of debate and resistance within which Indian 
politicians could express their opposition to new emergency laws, the ultimate ability of the 
Governor General to bypass the assemblies and certify these laws using his executive power 
indicate the truth behind Carl Schmitt’s dictum that the sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception. By carefully deploying the vocabulary of terrorism in criminalizing the politics of 
Indian revolutionaries, the colonial state demonstrated the core of executive sovereignty that 
lay beneath the thin veneer of its legislative reforms. By deploying the category of ‘terrorism’ 
as the exception to the rule of law, colonial officials constructed an enemy wholly outside of 
the law, against which only extralegal solutions would suffice. 
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Chapter 4: 
Empire and the International in India, 1919-1946 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Just as the end of the First World War ushered in important changes within India, it 
was also a crucial moment for the reshaping of international society. Following the global 
carnage of the war, the victorious powers sought to establish a new order that would replace 
nineteenth century balance of power politics with an international system grounded in moral 
terms. The American president Woodrow Wilson was the guiding influence behind this 
transformation. His ability to frame his decisions as not only necessary but also morally right 
led him to embrace a post-war vision in which the world would be ruled according to moral 
principles rather than the necessities of realpolitik.1 Wilson's promise during the war of a 
‘peace without victors’, as well as the issuing of his Fourteen Points that included the famous 
promise of self-determination led - according to Erez Manela - to the ‘Wilsonian moment’. 
This marked a period when people throughout Europe and the colonised world embraced the 
hope that the end of the war would also signal the end of empire. With the establishment of 
the League of Nations in 1919 and the preservation and expansion of British and French 
imperial interests under the League's system of mandates, these anti-colonial hopes were 
dashed, but the reification of nationhood as the underlying principle of the international 
system of the interwar would nonetheless play a profound role in stoking nationalist 
aspirations around the world.2  
Although Manela is correct to draw disparate nationalist movements in Korea, Egypt, 
and India into a single global framework of analysis, his account misses some of the 
complexities of the deeper history of nationalism in India and its relationship to 
internationalism. According to Manela, by 1914 ‘the rulers of the Raj, through a combination 
of co-optation and coercion, largely managed to quell dissent.’ He goes on to write that 
although a ‘scattering of revolutionary groups made sporadic efforts to attack British targets’, 
a lack of arms and organization on the part of the revolutionaries meant that ‘the British 
security forces suppressed them without much trouble.’3 This account underestimates the 
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scope and severity of Indian revolutionary networks during the war. As Chapter 2 indicated, 
attempts by revolutionaries to subvert imperial authority posed not only the strategic or 
security threat described by Richard Popplewell, but also challenged the racial underpinnings 
of colonial rule through their heavy recruitment among Punjabi Sikhs spread out throughout 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific basin. This challenge represented a sustained and ongoing 
source of pressure that necessitated the imposition of increasingly drastic laws of emergency 
from 1905 onwards. There was indeed a shift in the rhetoric and tactics deployed by Indian 
nationalists following the end of the war and the massacre at Amritsar, as Chapter 3 showed, 
and this was influenced in some cases by a language of self-determination with international 
reference points fueled by Wilsonian internationalism. However, this Wilsonian juncture was 
more process than moment, and does not fit the neat chronology to which it is consigned in 
the current literature. 
 Nonetheless, this so-called ‘Wilsonian moment’ of 1919 and the emergence of the 
League of Nations and other international organisations in the interwar period have attracted 
a great deal of scholarly interest, particularly in recent years.4 As Glenda Sluga argues, what 
attracts comparatively little attention is ‘the range of ideas and ambitions associated with 
these organisations or abandoned at their creation, especially beyond the metropolitan 
cultures of Western Europe and North America.’5 As Sluga points out, the same rail, steam, 
and telegraph networks credited with connecting domestic landscapes and forging national 
'imagined communities' were simultaneously connecting larger communities at the level of 
the international as well.6 Despite this, the international is largely neglected from narratives 
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that seek to account for the origins of the nation, as theorists such as Benedict Anderson and 
Eric Hobsbawm ‘hardly glanced sideways at how ... international communities were 
imagined in relation to national communities.’ Sluga traces the overlap between 
internationally and nationally imagined communities, arguing that the history of 
internationalism ‘maps profoundly onto the genealogy of nations and nationalism, that in the 
twentieth century the international and the national shadowed each other as the object or 
method of political ambitions.’7 
 Given the amount of scholarly interest in the emergence of nationalism in India, it is 
surprising that very little is written on the relationship between this nationalism and the 
international in the early twentieth century. In particular, the subject of India's role as the 
only non-self-governing member of the League of Nations is almost entirely neglected from 
the existing scholarship, with the exception of Stephen Legg's recent article on the topic. In 
this article, Legg examines the scales of sovereignty operating in India at the national and 
international level, and interrogates both India's relationship with Geneva as well as the 
internal relationship between India's League membership and the political geography of its 
princely states.8 Although an interesting and important topic in its own right, India's 
relationship to the League of Nations carries particular significance for understanding the 
international context of domestic terrorism legislation in the early twentieth century, given 
that India was the only country to ratify the first international law that targeted terrorism as a 
discrete category of crime. While this law is the subject of the next and final chapter, it is first 
important to better understand India's relationship to the international in the interwar period, 
as this relationship played an important role in shaping the nature of imperial sovereignty 
after 1919, as well as providing a key site of contestation through which revolutionaries 
hoped to legitimize their program of anti-colonial violence. 
 This chapter surveys the history of India and the League of Nations, situating India's 
anomalous inclusion in this international organisation within the context of a series of 
decisions made by imperial authorities and Indian political figures during the First World 
War and in its immediate aftermath. Examining the tensions between empire and the 
international that this inclusion brought to the fore, the chapter moves on to examine imperial 
propaganda in America in comparison to the active publicity work undertaken by the Indian 
office of the League of Nations. Demonstrating the ways that the League sought to raise 
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Indian awareness regarding its purpose and activities, the chapter then examines a range of 
petitions and letters sent to the Secretariat by various private individuals and groups both 
within India and on its behalf. These petitions help to illustrate how the binary relationship 
between colonisers and colonised was triangulated in the interwar period, as various interests 
sought to appeal to the League as a potential third party capable of circumventing imperial 
sovereignty and intervening on behalf of colonised people. The unwillingness, or inability, of 
the League to act in this regard led others, such as the revolutionary Rash Behari Bose, to 
view the League as nothing more than a cloak for British imperialism, leading such figures to 
challenge the authority and legitimacy of both. The conflation between empire and the 
international highlights the objective violence of both and points towards reading the 
international history of the first half of the twentieth century as a global ordering of violence 
and sovereignty through which dominant powers such as Britain sought to maintain their 
hegemony through a language of peace. This chapter will therefore provide crucial context 
for the international arena in which the Government of India sought to define a modern prose 
of counter-insurgency, as well as the relationship between imperialism, internationalism, and 
anti-colonial nationalism that this discourse sought to obscure. 
 
India and the League of Nations 
 
 Although India had long been the center of multiple complex interregional trading 
networks,9 it was the First World War that catapulted it onto the international stage in a more 
formal manner. Indian members played an active role at the Imperial Conference of London 
in 1907, with participation to such conferences restricted prior to this time as India was 
considered a mere dependency. As a result of India's massive contribution to the British war 
effort during the First World War, India attended the first meeting of the Imperial War 
Cabinet in March 1917, with the Secretary of State for India as its representative. India was 
afforded a status different to that of the Crown Colonies, as Lord Satyendra Prasanno Sinha 
and the Maharajah of Bikaner were also invited to attend. At the end of the session, the 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George announced that in all subsequent sessions of the 
Imperial Cabinet, whether in war or peace, India was to be separately represented by an 
Indian representative, with the Secretary of State sitting as a member of the British Cabinet 
from then onwards.  From June to September of 1918, Lord Sinha served as the Indian 
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Member, with the Maharajah of Patiala also attending. For the final session from December 
1918 to January of 1919, Lord Sinha and the Maharajah of Bikaner took part as full 
members.10 
 Educated in Presidency College, Calcutta, Sinha was a member of the Indian National 
Congress from 1896 to 1919 and was the first Indian to serve on the Executive Council of the 
Viceroy in 1909, straddling both national and imperial affiliations. In 1919 he would go on to 
become the first Indian member of the British House of Lords, and played an important role 
in the passage of the Government of India Act from the same year. This marked the high 
point of Sinha’s career, and despite a brief stint as Governor of Bihar and Orissa from 1920 
to 1921, his role in the Paris peace negotiations would prove his most profound contribution 
to both the national and international history of India. Sinha’s pedigree is typical of the kind 
of figures drawn on by the colonial state to serve as representatives for India at the level of 
the international. Not simply mouthpieces for the colonial regime, figures like Sinha 
nonetheless represented a set of vested interests in India, thus providing a buffer against the 
more radical politics of nationalist politicians. 
 Participation in the Imperial War Cabinet helped justify India's inclusion at the Paris 
peace negotiations in 1919, following the end of the war. As India's representative, alongside 
the Maharajah of Bikaner and the Secretary of State, Sinha declared that the international 
position of India should not be differentiated from that of the Dominions with regard to its 
inclusion in the League of Nations. Sinha stated that although India was neither an 
independent state nor power, this was equally true of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa. Strictly from the standpoint of international law, Sinha maintained, the position 
of India was exactly the same as that of the Dominions, none of which constituted a 
sovereign state with an independent foreign policy. Although Sinha acknowledged that the 
Dominions exercised greater internal autonomy, he pointed out that from a strictly legal point 
of view, the British Parliament was constitutionally able to legislate for the whole British 
Empire, and as such it should make no difference whether Britain's interference was more 
constant or continuous in India than in the Dominions.11 
 Beyond these technical points, Sinha further argued that the case for India's inclusion 
in the League of Nations could be made on broader grounds. Referring to the British Empire 
as the ‘best model’ for a League of Nations, Sinha used the evidence of the Imperial 
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Conferences to indicate that India's international standing could only be understood on equal 
terms with that of the Dominions. Noting that India's representation at these conferences 
marked a ‘successive and continuous advance’, Sinha remarked that it would be 
inconceivable that the British Government could now backtrack on this position. As Sinha 
pointed out, any differentiation now between India and the Dominions ‘will be looked upon 
not only as retrogression but a denial of privileges granted under the stress of war but 
withdrawn as soon as the pressure was removed.’ Referring to the political consequences of 
denying India a place within the League as ‘deplorable’, Sinha also pointed out that the other 
Great Powers would be well aware of India's massive contribution to the war effort and 
would not force a decision that would create difficulties within the empire. Noting that the 
League was to serve as a permanent institution, Sinha observed that it was not desirable to 
exclude a country with India's ‘past traditions and glorious civilisation.’12 Sir J.C. Coyajee, a 
professor at Andhra University, went so far as to claim that India's ancient tradition of 
nonviolence was identical to the League's interest in disarmament, arguing that ‘Indian 
mentality and culture have been ready for many centuries to welcome the advent of an 
institution like the League.’13 
 Because the Covenant of the League of Nations was made part of the Versailles 
Treaty, and because India obtained a place as a signatory to this treaty, India became an 
original member of the League. Although the Versailles Treaty was signed on the 28th of 
June, 1919, the Covenant of the League became a separate treaty on the 10th of January, 
1920, after ratification by all signatories. As Article 1 of the League Covenant specified, 
subsequent membership would be open only to any ‘fully self-governing State or Dominion 
or Colony not named in the Annex’,14 making India's role within the League a ‘political 
curiosity’ from the very beginning.15 Writing an account of India's place within the League in 
1932, V.S. Ram and B.M. Sharma referred to India's inclusion as an ‘important departure in 
British Foreign Policy’, that ‘completely changed the international position of this country.’16 
As Ram and Sharma pointed out, India held no claim to membership under the rules laid out 
in Article 1, and if India had not become a member of the League through its role as a 
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signatory of the Versailles Treaty, the country ‘would have remained outside this important 
international body for a long time.’17  
 Such an anomalous position nonetheless raised important questions regarding what 
the label of ‘India’ actually meant, as well as how imperial sovereignty was to be understood. 
As Stephen Legg demonstrates, India was not a cohesive political unit at this time, and the 
political geography of the princely states raised important questions regarding how India as a 
category was to be understood at the level of the international.18 India was comprised both of 
the territories under direct British rule as well as a collection of hundreds of princely states 
ranging widely in territory and population across the span of the subcontinent. Local rulers 
administered these states under the watchful eye of British residents, and maintained a 
semblance of domestic independence constrained by ultimate British control over key 
features of sovereignty such as foreign affairs and succession. Although the princes 
comprised a diverse mosaic representing many different religions, priorities, and 
personalities, they shared much in common as a distinct social class within India, making it 
possible to speak – to some extent at least – of a broad princely order with some overarching 
features.19 Despite the stereotypes of backwardness and barbarism that colonial authorities 
often deployed in the pursuance of British claims to civilizational superiority, the British 
attitude towards the princely states was broadly positive, given the inherently conservative 
tendencies of the princes. As a result, the states played a key role in the constitutional 
progression of India through the 1920s and 1930s, as the British increasingly came to see 
them as a counterweight to the growing influence of the Indian National Congress.20  
Despite a domestically divided political landscape, India's status within the League 
allowed it to present a united front at the level of the international. There it was to be 
regarded as a single political unit, at least from a purely legal standpoint, although the reality 
of this position was, of course, much more complicated. In an article printed in 1930, Dr. 
Lanka Sundaram asserted that because international law did not recognize any cleavage 
between British India and the princely states, the juridical unity of India was definitely 
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established and tacitly recognised by the League.21 The Indian delegation consisted of three 
members, one of whom was always a native prince. The Government of India appointed this 
delegation, which was not responsible to the Indian Legislature, or to the Indian people more 
broadly. These delegates held the authority to participate in directing the affairs of the 
international community, while simultaneously lacking any right to govern the affairs of their 
own country. 
 This contradictory relationship raised important questions regarding the role of the 
Indian delegation at Geneva, and its relationship to the delegation of Great Britain and its 
empire. The British Empire, after all, entered the League commanding six delegates - and 
thus six votes - due to the inclusion of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
South Africa, and India. Although each was recognised as a separate member, in practice the 
British delegation consulted extensively with the others before providing any formal position 
to the Assembly of the League.22 India's position in the League represented an inherent 
contradiction, reflecting on the one hand a new international role filled with potential 
opportunities, and on the other a retrenchment or even expansion of the British Empire's 
international clout.  
 India's League delegation, however, should not be thought of simply as a second 
British vote in the Assembly, even though this was often the case in practice. In some cases, 
the Indian delegation took a position different to that of the British delegation, although such 
cases were rare. At the Genoa Maritime Conference of 1920, the Secretary of State instructed 
the Indian delegation to secure special treatment for Indian seamen involved in British 
shipping, despite the fact that there was a concerted effort on the part of the other empire 
delegations to limit Indian involvement in British shipping.  
The British and Indian delegations were similarly at odds over the question of 
compulsory disinfection of Indian wool, which was raised at the International Labour 
Conferences of 1921 and 1924. Despite British insistence that the failure of India to fall in 
line with the British proposal for compulsory disinfection would result in a charge on British 
industry, the Indian delegates took a firm stance and rejected the proposed measures.23 
Although the two were not necessarily at odds over the issue, the Indian and British 
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delegations also took different positions regarding the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism of 1937, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
 Despite these small examples of the Indian delegation exercising some autonomy in 
its international positions, the nature of the Government of India and its relationship to the 
Secretary of State ensured that final sovereignty always rested with Britain. Although the 
choice of delegates rested in the Government of India, which at the time was still dominated 
by British colonial officials, this Government was only itself accountable to the Secretary of 
State and thus the British parliament by extension. In this way, the Secretary of State was 
simultaneously a part of the Government of India and the British Government, creating a very 
complicated situation where Indian representation to the League was concerned. This 
contradictory relationship is exemplified in a series of correspondence exchanged between 
Lord Reading and Secretary of State Lord Olivier in 1924, regarding the latter's desire to 
attend the proceedings of the League in a private capacity. Olivier initially asked whether his 
presence at Geneva would cause issues for ‘Indian susceptibilities’. Although Olivier was 
interested in a number of imperial questions both related and unrelated to India, particularly 
including slavery, he was reluctant to attend if doing so would cause the Indian delegate to 
feel as though the Secretary of State was ‘in any sense disposed to sit on his head.’24   
 Reading initially misunderstood and thought that Olivier's intention was to attend the 
Assembly as part of the British delegation, an idea that Reading strongly advised against. 
Reading observed that any involvement by Olivier in the proceedings would be embarrassing 
and difficult for the Indian delegation, who would be charged with representing the interests 
of India while the minister responsible to the British parliament sat at the same table 
watching their conduct. Reading pointed out that the inevitable result of such a scenario 
would be that the Assembly would look to Olivier and not the delegation for the expression 
of India's position, thus undermining the authority and legitimacy of the Indian delegation. 
Reading wrote,  
 … it would be impossible for the delegation to be present as representing  
 India's interests without you at the head of it, and for you to sit at the  
 table ... as representative of His Majesty's Government. You cannot  
 get rid of your responsibilities for India, but yet you and I will have  
 appointed a special delegation to represent India. You cannot sit still  
 when important questions might arise regarding India, and yet you  
 would not be there to represent India as you would have delegated  
 the representation to others.25 
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Olivier clarified his position and said that he never meant to attend the League as a 
delegate, but rather as a private visitor simply to watch the proceedings, and in the end he 
decided to spend three days in Geneva in a private capacity, during which he spoke at length 
with Lord Hardinge and the other members of the Indian delegation.26 Although Olivier 
never intended to serve on the British delegation to the League, this exchange nonetheless 
highlights the incongruous nature of India's relationship to Britain at Geneva. Despite some 
degree of freedom and opportunity afforded to India by its involvement in the League, this 
freedom was largely hollow at a political level, with ultimate sovereignty still resting firmly 
with the Secretary of State and the British Cabinet. 
 Furthermore, some officials deemed the less visible control through which London 
was able to maintain its Indian interests to be the perfect response to new challenges to 
imperial legitimacy. Despite the expansion of British and French colonial possessions under 
the mandate system established by the League, the legitimacy of a formal imperialism came 
under attack due to the dissemination of new ideas about self-determination and nationalism. 
As Erez Manela argues, these ideas ‘weakened (the) underlying supports of the imperial 
edifice ... (and) ... presented a major challenge to the legitimacy and permanence of the 
imperial order in the international arena.’27 While the formation of the League of Nations did 
not do away with empire, as the anti-colonial critics of 1919 hoped, it did force empire to 
reinvent itself in order to maintain legitimacy within a changing international landscape 
where formal territorial annexation was rapidly becoming less feasible. 
 In a memorandum on League policy written in 1936, Lord Cecil of Chelwood referred 
to the League of Nations as ‘an almost ideal machinery for the preservation of the British 
Empire.’ Cecil wrote that the primary objective of British foreign policy at that time was the 
maintenance of peace, which of course also meant the maintenance of a status quo in which 
Britain retained a dominant role. Cecil argued that armament, alliances, and the force of 
world opinion never successfully prevented war once it was decided upon by a determined 
country. Noting that in previous times it was entirely reasonable to place matters of ‘honour 
and vital interest’ at the forefront of British foreign policy, such an approach was no longer 
the most viable option and it was instead preferable to give the new system a fair trial, as the 
maintenance of the League system was the best hope of retaining imperial control. Cecil 
pointed out that most of the Dominions would now strongly resist having their foreign policy 
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dictated from London, but were entirely willing to co-operate with Britain in pursuing a 
‘world policy’ at Geneva. Observing that the strain to the structure of the British Empire that 
would result from being set at odds with the Dominions on an important international debate, 
Cecil concluded that it was ‘only on the basis of the League of Nations that there is any 
prospect of an imperial foreign policy.’28 
 
Empire, Publicity, and the League 
 
 While the international system established in the wake of the First World War 
provided new mechanisms whereby empire could maintain and replicate itself, this shifting 
global landscape also allowed new sites of critique for the imperial project, as well as 
granting stronger impetus to pre-existing anti-colonial voices.29 With the legitimacy of formal 
empire increasingly coming under pressure by groups in Ireland and America, as well as by 
Indian revolutionaries living abroad in places like Japan, controlling the dissemination of 
news about India became as important as it was difficult to control. The result was a global 
war of voice where propaganda became a key site of contest between imperial and anti-
colonial activists around the world.30  
With the global publicity attracted by Gandhi’s non-violent, non-cooperation 
campaign, the cause of Indian independence gained an unprecedented visibility within the 
American public and political landscapes. The dissemination of Gandhian ideas in the United 
States would of course go on to have profound ramifications for the history of civil rights in 
1960s America, as Sean Scalmer argues.31 In the context of the interwar, however, the idea of 
winning over American opinion was hugely important to both imperialists and anti-colonial 
nationalists alike. While the British believed that a shared cultural heritage and common 
interests made the United States a natural ally for the maintenance of empire, Indians such as 
Gandhi hoped that the history of America’s own struggle for independence against the British 
in the eighteenth century would make Americans sympathetic towards the Indian freedom 
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struggle. Gandhi himself retained mixed feelings regarding America, on the one hand 
drawing inspiration from American traditions of non-violent resistance and anti-imperialism, 
while on the other hand recognizing the role of the United States as an imperial power in its 
own right and particularly the racial discrimination and injustice faced by African-
Americans.32 Gandhi’s reception within America itself was similarly mixed, but in the 
aftermath of the First World War, his message of non-violence resonated strongly with many 
Americans who were themselves critical of the war.33  
 In addition to the dissemination of articles in the American press recounting Gandhi’s 
exploits, the interwar period also saw a pronounced increase in the circulation of 
revolutionary Indian literature. By the early 1920s, the British Library of Information in New 
York was complaining of the difficulty of drowning out Indian radical propaganda in 
America. The British Library of Information was an official outlet for propaganda, tasked 
with both tracking and influencing portrayals of India and of British colonialism within 
American publications. In 1922, Mr. Corbett of the library noted that the American public 
was becoming keenly interested in the topic of India, but lamented that other than official 
government communiqués, the only sources of information available to them were radical 
revolutionary publications.34 Corbett wanted to enhance American access to moderate Indian 
perspectives, observing that it was no longer feasible to disregard the importance of the 
impact of world opinion on British rule in India. The British position was also strongly 
influenced by contemporary events in Ireland, where a long and bloody political struggle was 
waged from 1919 to 1921. The result of this insurgency was that the British government was 
in the process of drawing up an agreement that would come into force on the 6th of 
December, 1922, granting self-government and Dominion status to the twenty-six counties 
comprising the Irish Free State. The Anglo-Irish War attracted a great deal of American 
interest, which aided the revolutionary cause both in terms of funding and legitimacy, and 
Corbett held this up as a cautionary tale for the British position in India.35 
 Although America was an important site of Indian anti-colonial mobilization before 
the war, British officials were particularly concerned with the potential impact of American 
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opinion within the new international context of the interwar. Writing to Edwin Montagu in 
1922, Geoffrey Butler urged the Government of India to take an active role in encouraging 
moderate Indian publications and lecture tours in America, noting that a great shift occurred 
in American public opinion towards India, and stating that in the event of violent trouble in 
India, control in shaping the narrative within the United States ‘might make all the difference 
in American sympathy being given or withheld.’36 Furthermore, Sir Auckland Geddes of the 
British Embassy in Washington worried that American money and unofficial public support 
would strengthen the revolutionary movement within India, and destabilize the position and 
legitimacy of the colonial government.37 
 By the early 1930s, these concerns were heighted following the celebration of the 
26th of January 1930 as India's Independence Day by the Indian National Congress and 
Gandhi's new satyagraha against the colonial salt tax in March. From 1929 to 1930, the 
resources of the Library were ‘strained to their utmost capacity’, and much to the chagrin of 
Library officials, the coverage of the Government of India's responses to Gandhi's campaign 
‘could hardly fail to give an undesirable impression of British administration.’38 Contrary to a 
binary relationship between colonisers and colonised, the international forum of the interwar 
created new spaces of concern within which imperial legitimacy needed to be maintained. 
The emerging importance of this international dimension meant that empire was no longer 
accountable merely to the British parliament and Indian public opinion, but rather to a 
broader world opinion that manifested itself in neutral countries such as the United States, as 
well as in international institutions like the League of Nations. 
 Just as international propaganda played an important role in British attempts to 
maintain the legitimacy of their imperial presence in India, the collection and dissemination 
of relevant information was of central importance to the project of the League. Writing in 
1932, Ram and Sharma called for a greater output of the ‘rigorous propaganda required to 
promote the work of the League throughout India.’ Ram and Sharma maintained that if the 
work of the League was to prosper, increasing public awareness of its goals was of central 
importance, and to this end they advocated adding League pamphlets to school curriculums, 
as well as screening monthly films in important centres and revising history books in order to 
promote ideas of brotherhood, hatred for war, and love of peace. For Ram and Sharma, 
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commitment to the League's ideals was to be almost religious in character, requiring a 
‘missionary spirit among the workers of the League, who would carry to the people in 
general the message of world peace.’39  
 In his report on the work of the League's Indian Bureau from April of 1933 to 
February of 1934, M.V. Venkateswaran detailed some of the measures taken in attempting to 
educate Indian opinion on the work of the League. These were carried out in order ‘to help 
the English and Vernacular Press directly, through Press Agencies ... in getting correct 
information on League matters, to help public opinion to organise itself on behalf of the 
League ideal through League of Nations Unions, and to encourage youth in acquiring habits 
of mind based on the principle of international co-operation.’ Venkateswaran noted that up to 
this point, propaganda explaining and promoting the League had not yet been carried out in 
India to any great degree, and that the primary interest of Indians towards the League was 
restricted to discussions of India's financial contribution.40  
 The 1930s saw a more concerted effort on the part of League officials to raise Indian 
awareness of the League's work. The Indian Bureau in Bombay, of which Venkateswaran 
was the lead officer, was established in 1932, ‘ for the express purpose of interesting public 
opinion in India in the activities of the League.’41 Although papers in India often ignored 
previously material from Geneva, often viewing the information provided as insufficiently 
newsworthy, the issuance of a series of so-called Geneva Letters and other materials to more 
than 50 important English papers achieved a greater degree of success in securing publicity. 
These included prominent publications such as The Leader from Allahabad, The Times of 
India, Bombay Sentinel, and Indian Mirror from Bombay, Delhi’s Hindustan Times, and 
Calcutta-based papers such as Advance, Amrita Bazar Patrika, The Star of India, Forward, 
and The Statesman. While the above papers published a range of different materials 
pertaining to the League, the Geneva Letters themselves were also published in multiple 
regional newspapers including the Malabar Herald in Cochin, the Times of Ceylon, the 
Rangoon Times and the Rangoon Daily News.42 These letters covered just about every field 
of activity addressed by the League, including international disarmament, trafficking of 
women and children, world statistics, leprosy research, veterinary questions, and drug traffic. 
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The Geneva Letters achieved greater circulation in the Indian press than any previous League 
project with the letters also appearing in a wide range of vernacular newspapers in languages 
such as Hindi, Sindhi, Kanarese, Tamil, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali, Telagu, Malayalam, and 
Urdu.43 Material was also published in at least seventeen different educational journals, as 
well as cinema monthlies such as Film Topics, Picturesque, Filmland, and Radio Talkies. 
League materials also found publication in a range of medical journals including Calcutta-
based journals such as Eastern Medical Bulletin, Indian Medical Gazette, and Scientific 
India, as well as a range of other publications across the country such as Practical Medicine, 
published out of Delhi, and the Bombay-based Haffkeine Institute.44 
 At the same time, the Indian Bureau worked on pushing forward the sale of League 
publications on a wide range of topics relating to its social, humanitarian, economic, political, 
and health sections, as well as news regarding the Mandate system.45 These publications were 
marketed towards the educated class through advertisements in periodicals, catalogues, 
bookshops, and individual letters addressed to prominent individuals, although another 
League official noted with dismay that some of these advertisements appeared side by side 
with insertions regarding birth control products, instructions on learning English, and 
products for ‘better physical vigour.’46 Despite this, readership of League publications was on 
the rise, with the sale of such publications rising from Rs. 1,070 to Rs. 3,518 during the 
period of Venkateswaran's report.47 
 In March of 1935 J.V. Wilson, the Chief of the Central Section of the League 
Secretariat, was sent by the Secretary General to visit the Bombay office on his way back 
from New Zealand. Wilson's instructions were to keep the visit purely administrative and not 
political in nature and to obtain an idea of the general activities of the office and its relations 
with both official and non-official circles in India. Of particular interest to the Secretariat was 
any information regarding the relations between the Bombay office and the League of 
Nations Union.48 These relations were in fact quite problematic, as India’s broad 
geographical scope meant that League of Nations Unions within the country were widely 
dispersed, with local Unions starting up in various parts of India and obtaining their literature 
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and inspiration from London, often existing as separate and independent units, mostly 
unaware of the existence of other such organisations in other parts of India. This lack of 
centralisation meant that the Unions rarely exchanged ideas and had no central organisation 
from which to draw.49 
 For this reason, some officials recommended created a federation of League of 
Nations Unions, with the officer in charge of the Bombay bureau acting as honorary secretary 
to the federation. Others warned that the unpopularity of Venkateswaran, the current officer, 
would spell disaster for the proposed federation, ‘crippling the growth of the L.O.N. Unions 
in India.’50 A.C. Chatterjee, the Director of the Bombay office, also warned that allowing 
Venkateswaran to act as the federation's secretary would be problematic, as there existed 
within India a considerable cleavage of opinion between the Government and the educated 
public. The latter were often heavily critical of the League, arguing that although the 
institution was ushered in during widespread claims regarding the self-determination of 
nations, it proved itself unable to assist India in attaining self-government. Chatterjee wrote 
that a Union must be able to openly express its opinion, but worried that if it did so with 
League officials such as Venkateswaran acting openly as representatives of the Unions, this 
would undermine the broader credibility of the League Bureau.51 
 In 1936 A. Pelt, the head of the League of Nations Information Bureau, conducted 
another inspection of India’s Bombay office. Pelt sailed from Marseilles on the 31st of 
January with the goal of determining what could be done to make better use in India of the 
Information Bureau's news bulletins. Pelt's conclusion was that the telegraphic summaries of 
League developments in Geneva were ‘inadequate for the purpose of giving India a really 
effective account of the work of the League.’ Instead, he recommended that all important 
bulletins and public documents of the League be sent to the Bombay office by air mail in 
order to be distributed to the Indian press.52 Pelt concluded that the Indian bureau's publicity 
work was largely working in the right direction, but observed that if they were ever to 
develop their organisation so as to conduct publicity regarding India in foreign countries, 
their staff would have to be greatly increased.53 
 At the same time the League was actively seeking to develop greater publicity within 
India, Indian opinion was becoming increasingly critical of the very notion of League 
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membership. Writing to Lord Linlithgow in July of 1936, the Aga Khan, the League's Indian 
delegate, claimed that the failure of the League to check Italy's aggression in Abyssinia 
completely undermined the power and prestige of the League in India. The Aga Khan wrote 
that unless Italy and Germany could be brought back within the orbit of the League, it would 
be best if the League became a ‘pure centre of intellectual co-operation rather than the 
political 'Chief Court' of the world.’54 The Aga Khan asked Linlithgow if India could work on 
reducing, rather than increasing its commitments to the League, sending a memorandum on 
the 19th of October that outlined all of India's grievances against the League. In the 
memorandum, the Aga Khan referred to the number of Indians employed by the Secretariat 
and the International Labour Office as a ‘joke’, despite the fact that ‘India has a large number 
of people fit to do the kind of work that is now being done by South Americans.’ He further 
pointed out that since its creation, no Asian had ever been President of the full session of the 
League, although several South Americans had held the honour and ‘every possible European 
country has occupied the chair when it possessed a representative fit for it.’ The Aga Khan 
made a strong case for his own appointment to the Presidency, calling it overdue and arguing 
that it would help to increase the goodwill of Asian and particularly Muslim countries.55 
 Although the Aga Khan’s influence within the global Islamic community was not as 
pervasive as he sometimes suggested, it was considerable nonetheless. Born in 1877, Sultan 
Muhammad Shah attained the title of Aga Khan III at the age of ten following the death of 
his father, making him the spiritual leader of the Ismailis, a branch of Shia Islam spread 
throughout Central Asia and beyond. Instructed in Arabic, Persian, and English, the global 
scope of the Aga Khan’s Ismaili adherents led him to adopt and internationalist outlook from 
early in his career. Knighted as a result of his work in assisting with the plague in Bombay at 
the end of the nineteenth century, the Aga Khan was also actively involved with Aligarh 
Muslim University, believing that Muslim learning was in decline and required 
reinvigoration. Generally loyal to British rule in India in his youth, the Aga Khan actively 
campaigned for the British during the First World War by attempting to counter a German 
plot to stir up jihad in Central Asia. As leader of the Ismaili community, the Aga Khan spoke 
out against both Germany and Turkey, and implored Muslims to maintain their loyalty to the 
British Empire.56 Like many Indians, the Aga Khan’s faith in the British was shaken by their 
continued colonial expansion in Asia and the Middle East following the peace treaty. On 
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British expansionism he wrote, ‘The immediate results of the new habit of ignoring the 
Indian attitude towards external Imperial questions is unhappily plain today. While the 
British Empire has drifted into difficulties and entanglements in the Near and Middle East, 
the political situation in India is causing natural alarm. For that situation the Imperial policy 
of the Home Government is, in my view, partly responsible.’57 Despite this, and despite his 
critical view of the Treaty of Sevres and British policy in Turkey following the end of the 
war, the Aga Khan was also critical of what he viewed as the excesses of the Khilafat 
movement, encouraging his followers towards moderation.58 During the interwar, the Aga 
Khan actively worked to prevent the spread of communism amongst his followers in Central 
Asia, as Soviet propaganda began to take hold among former Russian territories.59 
 Following his indignant letter to Linlithgow, the Aga Khan was unanimously elected 
President of the Assembly for the 18th Ordinary Session of the League of Nations that 
convened from the 13th of September to the 6th of October, 1937. One delegate referred to 
the Aga Khan’s appointment as a ‘fitting recognition of the increasing importance of India in 
the League’, while the Prime Minister of Spain called it an honour to see the Assembly 
presided over by the representative of a country ‘whose culture has influenced numerous 
civilisations, including that of Europe.’60 The Aga Khan's Presidential address was entirely 
absent of his earlier criticisms of the League, instead expressing optimism that the League 
was in fact on the rise despite its challenges, with six new nations joining in the previous five 
years, including the U.S.S.R., Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In the Aga Khan’s opinion, this 
made the League, ‘more universal, more truly Catholic, than when I first knew it.’  The Aga 
Khan referred to his appointment as ‘an honour done to a country whose whole philosophy of 
life is attuned to the fundamental principles on which the League of Nations is grounded, and 
whose greatest thinkers ... have sought in the supremacy of law the sole escape from the 
anarchy of force.’61  
 Although the subsequent outbreak of the Second World War and the ultimate 
dissolution of the League makes such optimism appear naive in retrospect, it is nonetheless 
important to note that even in the late 1930s there were still those who advocated for the 
																																																						
57	Eminent	Mussalmans,	1926,	Indian	Bibliographical	Archive,	Asian	and	African	Studies	Collection,	BL,	F.510,	p.	
338.	
58	Ibid,	p.	339.	
59	Russian	intrigues:	proposal	to	direct	the	influence	of	the	Aga	Khan	to	counteract	Soviet	propaganda,	30	
March	1932	to	8	October	1935,	IOR:	L/PS/12/3186.	
60	Report	of	the	Delegates	of	India	to	the	eighteenth	(ordinary)	session	of	the	assembly	of	the	League	of	
Nations,	1937,	NLI,	G.P.341.123In2,	p.	2.	
61	Ibid,	pp.	2-4.	
	150	
League's principles as the way forward. Noting the ‘storms’ that were currently raging in 
Western Europe and East Asia, the Aga Khan nonetheless declared that if the League was 
passing through troubled times and its ideals were sorely wounded, it was ‘no less true that 
the League's ideals live and shall live, and, please God, shall prevail.’62 In his speech at the 
adjourning session of the Assembly on the 6th of October, the Aga Khan said that all of the 
problems faced by the League could in fact be reduced to one, ‘that of man, and the dignity 
of man.’ He went on to say that it was in this sense that the work of the League acquired its 
permanent value, and that the tribulations of one people must be regarded as the tribulations 
of all.63 The following year, the Aga Khan called the principles of the League ‘imperishable’ 
and claimed that they were ‘as ancient as the search of man for God.’64 
 This came in response to a resolution within the Indian Legislative Assembly to 
withdraw from the League of Nations, reflecting a growing trend within Indian nationalist 
circles to view League membership as an unnecessary financial burden. Criticizing the lack 
of Indian representation within the staff of the League, as the Aga Khan did the previous 
year, Sir Govind Pradhan argued that as the League claimed to stand for co-operation 
between all nations, it was only right that India ‘with her vast area and large population and 
her ancient civilization - India who was the fifth largest contributor the League - should be 
treated justly.’ Although Pradhan referred to the call for India to exit the League as a ‘bad 
blunder’, he stated that an attempt must be made to remove ‘the glaring injustice from which 
India was suffering, and to show her that the League of Nations stood for co-operation on 
behalf of humanity in general.’ The Secretary General replied that both the Secretariat and 
the International Labour Office found it difficult to locate competent candidates from India, 
as the salaries offered by the Indian Civil Service meant that qualified young men would only 
be enticed to take up work in Geneva if they were particularly interested in the work.65  
 During the interwar period, publicity and propaganda became important tools of both 
imperialism and internationalism, as both the British Empire and the League of Nations 
sought to bolster their legitimacy and maintain their influence through specialized 
information bureaus. For the British in India, this meant combating revolutionary propaganda 
abroad by sponsoring the dissemination of propaganda that portrayed imperialism in a 
positive light, while simultaneously responding to the new norms of a transformed 
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international order in which non-European nations such as America played an increasingly 
important role and where former colonies such as Ireland were increasingly able to gain both 
political independence and international legitimacy. At the same time, the Information 
Bureau of the League sought to stoke Indian interest in the League's activities through 
deliberate propaganda initiatives in which news from Geneva was disseminated within the 
Indian press. These efforts achieved mixed results with many Indians, including the 
Legislative Assembly, calling for a full withdrawal from the League, while others such as 
Govind Pradhan and the Aga Khan pointed to the injustices faced by India at Geneva, while 
still supporting League membership in broader terms. 
 
Petitioning the League: Circumventing Empire 
 
 Despite concerns on the part of League officials that more effort was needed in 
raising public awareness in India of the League's activities, one area where various Indian 
interests actively sought to establish a relationship with Geneva was through the act of 
petitioning and letter writing. In the context of the interwar period, petitions were formal 
requests made of the League of Nations Secretariat on behalf of those who sought redress for 
perceived breaches of international law. Indian petitions to the League of Nations are largely 
neglected within the scholarship on Indian politics in the first half of the twentieth century, 
and yet they drew a broad range of disparate political actors including the Hindu Mahasabha, 
the Pan-Asianist Mahendra Pratap, and Muslim politician and poet Muhammad Iqbal. These 
letters and petitions covered many different topics, but what linked them all was their attempt 
to circumvent imperial authority and appeal to the League as an independent arbiter capable 
of resolving Indian grievances against the British colonial government. These petitions often 
sought to bring specific issues to the attention of ‘world opinion’ through the League, with 
some arguing against the legitimacy of empire at a fundamental level and others seeking to 
redress particular grievances within an imperial framework. 
            In The Guardians: The League of Nations and the crisis of empire, Susan Pedersen 
examines petitioning as it related to the mandate system established by the League for 
stewardship of former German colonies. Pedersen refers to the petition process as ‘perhaps 
the most significant aspect of the mandate system’ due to the fact that it ‘brought the voices 
of the system's subjects - albeit muted, ventriloquized, and distorted - into the rooms in which 
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their fates were determined.’66 Although on a practical level, petitioning often served to 
contain and delegitimize protests from below, Pedersen notes that petitioners persisted in 
their efforts not through a misguided optimism that the act of petition itself would secure 
redress, but rather due to the other benefits offered by petitioning, which included contacts, 
publicity, and credibility. As a result, Pedersen argues that the true significance of petitioning 
is to be found in the realm of global politics, rather than law. Petitioning provided critics of 
the mandate system a voice within an international arena and became ‘one of the key 
mechanisms ... through which a previously binary relationship - colonizer, colonized - was 
triangulated.’67 Similarly, petitions and letters sent by various Indian interests to the League 
Secretariat should be understood as participating within a triangular dialogue, where both 
imperialists and anti-colonialists sought to derive legitimacy by staking their claims within an 
emerging international forum. 
            Some of these appeals did not actively seek the abolition of empire but rather sought 
to appeal to the international authority of the League in an attempt to ensure that the imperial 
government was adhering to international law, or at least the version of it that served the 
interests of the given group. Writing to the Secretary-General in 1934, in response to the 
Communal Award of 1932, the head office of the Hindu Mahasabha complained that the 
provisions of the award were a violation of international law by undermining and subverting 
the solidarity of the state. Although its architects intended for the Communal Award to 
resolve the difficulties between India's Hindu and Muslim populations, the granting of 
separate electorates for Muslims angered members of the Mahasabha.68 In order to bring this 
grievance to the attention of the League, the Mahasabha invoked Article 11 of the League 
Covenant which allowed any member state to bring to the attention of the Assembly any 
matter that jeopardized international peace. The Mahasabha also argued that if the underlying 
logic of the Communal Award was to find its way to Europe, it could lead to ‘serious conflict 
between (Europe's) more militant communities with all its evil consequences and ultimately 
to a general war.’69 The Secretariat dismissed this appeal on the grounds that Article 11 could 
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only be invoked by the government of a League member and not by private individuals or 
organisations within a member nation, and applied only to cases of war or threats of war.70 
            There were many other cases where a private individual or organisation appealed to 
the League as a potential third party authority with the potential to intervene in Indian affairs. 
Although Samuel Moyn demonstrates that the current conception of human rights as an 
international principle to be appealed to in protecting populations from their governments did 
not become predominant until the 1960s, these petitions reflect a nascent language of 
international redress that gestures towards this later development.71 In 1931 members of the 
third session of the Indian States' People's Conference wrote to the Secretary-General, calling 
the rulers of India's princely states ‘irresponsible and autocratic’ and sought to draw the 
attention of the League to the system of forced labour prevalent in some states. Referring to 
these practices as ‘analogous to slavery’, this petition requested that the League conduct an 
enquiry and take all necessary steps in abolishing the system. The resolution further 
condemned the ‘absentee rulership’ prevalent among the princes and criticised rulers for 
spending too much time in European countries, demanding responsible and accountable 
government in their place.72 A similar criticism was made of the Indian police following a 
public meeting in Bombay. At the meeting unanimous resolutions were passed to be sent on 
to the Secretariat, in which the Bombay police were condemned for their ‘unchivalrous brutal 
and inhuman treatment’ towards Indian women. Referring to police behaviour as ‘an insult to 
India's womanhood and in defiance of all canons of decent and civilised behaviour’, the 
resolutions called on the authorities to take action.73 
 Some appeals went further and sought to delegitimize empire by setting it in direct 
contradistinction to the principles of international law that underpinned the League. In 
reaction to British aerial bombardment of the northwest frontier with Afghanistan, Indian 
internationalist and Pan-Asianist Mahendra Pratap wrote in protest to the Secretariat in 1933. 
Calling global public opinion powerless in the face of such ‘barbarism’, Pratap acknowledged 
that the League would not be able to stop such massacres but suggested instead that everyone 
should raise their ‘pious voices against every barbarous trespass on the rights of Man.’74 
Pratap was not alone in appealing to the League on this matter, with A.W. Tarzi similarly 
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writing to the Secretariat from Istanbul in 1935. Tarzi wrote that although the attention of the 
world was focused on the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Britain's aerial bombardment in 
Afghanistan was in fact a ‘greater injustice, and in its essence far more dishonest and cruel.’ 
The people of Afghanistan, in Tarzi's words, ‘having no means to make their voice reach the 
community of nations, are doomed to perish resignedly ... by means of all those most modern 
implements of warfare, which the League has been endeavouring to forbid its use.’ Tarzi 
pointed out the strong language with which the League condemned Italy's actions in 
Abyssinia, and wrote that if the League did not take action against Britain's own aggressive 
imperialism, it would prove itself to be ‘nothing but the mouthpiece of the British will and 
desire.’75  
 Such criticisms were not unique to India, and must be situated within a growing 
international forum for anti-colonial antagonism that dated back to the ‘Wilsonian moment’ 
of 1919.76 During the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, anti-colonial activists 
framed a resolution that protested British imperialism in Ireland, Egypt, and India. The 
resolution demanded the liberation of subject peoples from the ‘tyranny of empire’, 
articulating its appeal in the language of humanity and demanding that people of all nations 
possessed the same rights as the people of European countries such as Poland, Armenia, and 
Albania.77 Following the independence of the Republic of Ireland and its increasingly vocal 
presence within the League of Nations, Irish supporters of Indian independence sought to 
make use of the international forum of the League to support Indian nationalists. In 1932 the 
President of the Indian-Irish Independence League sought to bring Britain's ‘reign of terror’ 
in India to the attention of the League, in response to the ‘wall of silence that England has 
built up about her.’ The resolution pointed out that despite its place as an original member of 
the League, India was represented only by agents chosen by the colonial government. The 
resolution went on to declare that it was only right that Ireland, having finally succeeded in 
making its own voice heard around the world, should help those who were ‘still compelled to 
be the silent victims of British Imperialism.’78 
 With the emergence of an international sphere of world opinion regarding Indian 
affairs, these ‘silent victims’ were in fact quite vocal. Following Gandhi’s arrest in 1930, 
Indian students at the University of Michigan wrote to the Secretary-General of the League of 
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Nations to condemn the Government of India's actions.79 Another petitioner, M.R. Rau, went 
further, stating that as India was a member of the League with equal status to any other, the 
League's Covenant abrogated India's previous obligations to Britain, including the 
Government of India's acceptance of British suzerainty. By this logic, Gandhi's non-
recognition of British authority was not to be interpreted as a breach of either national or 
international law, while the continuation of British rule in India was to be understood as a 
violation of the Covenant. According to Rau, in ‘killing Indians by fire, assault, 
imprisonment without previous report to the League for India's defying their rule and thus 
making war against another member ... she is breaking another term of the covenant.’ 
Although appeals to the League were supposed to be made by the governments of recognised 
member states, Rau asserted that in appointing ‘British mercenaries’ selected by the 
Government of India as League representatives, Britain was committing ‘an act of false 
personation before the League.’80   
 Despite the interest of a wide range of political actors, both Indian and non-Indian, in 
using the League as a platform for circumventing empire and putting the anti-colonial case 
before world opinion, all petitions and letters that sought to fundamentally challenge 
imperialism were given negative replies. These dismissals should not be read as indicative of 
such appeals being entirely ignored, however. Officials within the League did take some 
appeals seriously, depending on who wrote them. When Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the famous 
poet and political thinker, wrote to the League in his capacity as President of the Kashmir 
Committee to protest the ‘inhuman punishment’ of the ‘brutal flogging of political agitators’, 
an internal memo within the League noted that although private persons were not able to put 
such issues before the League, the reply to Iqbal should ‘be treated with a little more 
consideration and courtesy than a B Form reply.’81  
 Despite Samuel Moyn's assertion that it was only after 1968 that international law 
began to take an interest in intervening within sovereign states in the interests of something 
called human rights, a common thread among those who wrote to the League on behalf of 
Indian interests was the hope that international law could function as a third party authority to 
circumvent the sovereignty of the Government of India and intervene on behalf of either the 
individual or collective interests of Indian subjects. As one anonymous author wrote 
succinctly, the League of Nations ‘should have power to adopt measures to mitigate the 
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wrongs done by a Government to an individual subject of the said Government.’82 The fact 
that the League Covenant and international law bore no such aspirations in practice does not 
negate the fact that for many colonial subjects and anti-colonial activists in the interwar 
period, there was a strong hope that the League represented just such an opportunity. This 
was certainly not yet articulated within a language of human rights, the emergence of which 
Moyn is correct to situate within the Cold War, but instead reflects a shifting global 
landscape wherein an emerging international order was slowly and subtly transplanting a 
language of formal empire.  
 
An Indian Radical in Japan: The Case of Rash Behari Bose 
 
 Although many different Indian and non-Indian political figures sought to use the 
international arena as a forum for circumventing British imperialism, for some the League of 
Nations itself could not be separated from the problem of empire. Before 1919 and 
throughout the interwar period, a wide range of political and geographical imaginaries existed 
through which political thinkers around the world envisioned different forms of political 
communities based on ideas of religion, civilization, or class.83 With the rise of the League of 
Nations and the assertion of international society as an arrangement of nation-states whose 
sovereignty was recognized by the great powers of Europe and America, an important erasure 
of alternative ‘imagined communities’ took place, whereby imagined nations within and 
without the territorially-bounded nation-states of the international system came to be 
regarded as illegitimate and insurgent to the dominant 'peaceful' status quo centered around 
Geneva.84  
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In Asia as Method, Kuan-Hsing Chen argues that the ongoing process of 
decolonization and deimperialization ‘cannot be waged only in terms of the statist 
rearrangement of international relations.’85 Chen writes, ‘If Asia is to have analytical value, it 
does indeed have to be placed within the frame of world history, but if world history is 
understood as Euro-American imperialism and capitalist expansion, the agency and 
subjectivity of Asia are stripped away.’86 Similarly, if international history is understood in 
terms of ‘nation-state logic’, defined by Wang Hui as ‘a pattern of rigid definitions of how 
states should function’ accompanied by ‘an equally rigid set of exclusions’ for those that do 
not follow in the footsteps of European and American nation-states,87 then rethinking 
Eurocentric historical narratives also entails a rethinking of the international as a key 
reference point. To this end, the political thought of the revolutionary Rash Behari Bose 
provides an important vantage point for critiquing the Eurocentrism of the international in 
twentieth century global history. Bose’s political thought can also provide an opportunity for 
understanding some of the alternative world historical narratives that were available to anti-
colonial thinkers at this time, thus ‘provincializing’ readings of world history that privilege 
the teleological account of European progress.88 
Following his failed uprising against British rule, Bose was taken under the protection 
of Mitsuru Tōyama. Tōyama was an important Japanese right-wing political figure with 
strong ties to the Kokuryūkai and the Gen'yôsha, ultranationalist secret societies that Tōyama 
helped found.89 Both of these secret societies reflected a vision of Asianism that assigned 
central importance to territory. The Gen'yôsha, literally the Dark Sea Society, was formed in 
1881 by Japanese ultranationalists, who named the society after Genkai Nada, the name of 
the channel that separates the island of Kyūshū from the continent of Asia. According to John 
Wayne Sabey, the founders selected this name with the intention of implying that the primary 
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goal of the society was to advocate for Japanese leadership in creating an East Asian 
community of nations. Similarly the Kokuryūkai or Amur Society, formed in 1901, named 
themselves after the river that separated Manchuria from Siberia. This was a conscious 
choice, indicating the society's goal of bulwarking Asia against Russian and European 
advances, as well as establishing Japanese leadership throughout China and Korea.90 
Although the importance and influence of these societies is widely exaggerated in popular 
accounts, Bose formed close relationships with members of these two political pressure 
groups during his time in Japan, which had an important impact on the way that he would 
come to conceptualize the Indian nation and its place in a broader Asia. 
 Following the end of the First World War, Bose began developing a more public 
profile in Japan, even marrying a Japanese woman named Toshiko Sōma and becoming a 
naturalised citizen in June of 1923. Bose’s marriage was first proposed by Mitsuru Tōyama 
as a way of facilitating Bose's integration into Japanese society. The marriage was also 
intended to strengthen Bose's ties with his benefactors, as Toshiko was the daughter of Aizō 
Sōma, an important philanthropist and patron of Pan-Asianist politics who sheltered Bose in 
his bakery at Nakamuraya following the deportation order issued by the Japanese 
government. Although it did nothing to dampen his passion for revolutionary politics, the 
marriage certainly does seem to have rooted Bose more firmly in his new life in Japan, as 
well as contributing to his developing understanding of India's position within a broader 
Asian space.  
As Japan began to pull away from the international society of Geneva following 
controversies surrounding its occupation of Manchuria in 1931, British officials became 
increasingly doubtful of the willingness of Tokyo to cooperate in curtailing Bose's anti-
British activities. In the 1920s, Japanese police were willing to keep Bose under surveillance, 
and there was some very limited sharing of information between British and Japanese 
intelligence services, at least where potential links to communism were concerned.91 
Although the seeds of Japanese militarism began to blossom during the 1920s,92 an important 
faction within Japanese political society remained committed to internationalist ideas up until 
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the 1930s, as Thomas Burkman demonstrates. This faction included many important Japanese 
political figures, such as Makino Nobuaki, Ishii Kikujirō, Nitobe Inazō, and Matsuoka 
Yōsuke, and was also reflected in the many internationalist movements that developed within 
the Japanese public during the early years of the League of Nations.93  
 Liberal internationalist thought in Japan particularly suffered following the onset of 
the Great Depression in 1929, which caused the price of Japanese silk in American markets 
to fall by 25 percent, hitting the Japanese economy hard and fueling the growth of right-wing 
nationalist and imperialist ideologies. Under these circumstances, the militarist general 
Ishiwara Kanji and the Kwantung Army initiated the takeover of Manchuria in 1931, drawing 
the condemnation of Britain and of the League of Nations, which nonetheless was powerless 
to intervene on behalf of the Chinese.94 More moderate political circles within the Japanese 
government were similarly unable to prevent the rise of militarism, and a series of 
assassinations in the early 1930s carried out by military officials and right-wingers further 
intimidated the Japanese political leadership.95 With Japan increasingly isolated at the 
international level, Asianist ideologies that emphasized Japan's relationship with its regional 
neighbours became increasingly popular within public discussions, filling the void of Japan's 
abandoned internationalism.96 
 It is within this context that Bose and his anti-British Pan-Asianism gained greater 
prominence within Japanese political circles. When Bose and Anand Mohan Sahay, another 
well-known anti-colonial Indian activist, hosted a banquet attended by a number of Japanese 
officials, Sir Francis Lindley of the British Embassy in Tokyo wrote bitterly, ‘I feel very 
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much tempted to ask Count Uchida what he would think if the Lord Mayor of London was to 
attend a banquet organized by notoriously disaffected Koreans.’97 By 1931, Thomas Snow of 
the British Embassy was beginning to question the sincerity of the Japanese government's 
assurances that Bose remained under constant surveillance and was still on the black-list of 
the Japanese police. ‘I am inclined to think,’ wrote Snow, ‘that Mr. Nagai may have desired 
to go out of his way to give me these assurances, in view of the fact that ... Bose is billed 
among a list of lecturers who will speak during the summer courses ... of an organization 
named the Oriental Culture Summer College of Tokyo.’ These courses were to take place at 
the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto and were organised by Mr. Kaju Nakamura, a 
member of House of Representatives.98 
 In May of 1933, Bose began publication of the monthly leaflet New Asia, which 
referred to itself as, ‘an organ of those who really yearn for the peace of the world and the 
happiness of humanity’. In its inaugural issue, New Asia congratulated Japan for withdrawing 
from the League of Nations, which it claimed dealt ‘this imperialist organisation’ a 
staggering blow.99 In response,  the Government of India issued an order on July 1st under 
the Sea Customs Act that prohibited New Asia’s entry into India, as well as any other 
materials published by Bose. One colonial official remarked, ‘The paper is no worse than 
what is published in India but if we have the powers to keep it out we may as well use 
them.’100 The Intelligence Bureau, on the other hand, justified the ban by pointing out that 
Bose's goal was to ‘attract young Indians to Japan, so that he may instil into their minds some 
of the hatred which he feels for the Government of the land of his birth.’101 
 Just as the colonial government feared that Bose could use his position in Tokyo to 
smuggle arms into Indian territory, there was a growing concern in the 1930s regarding the 
potential for Indian students to fall under the influence of Bose while studying in Japan. For 
Bose, a successful revolution in India could only be carried out with the involvement of the 
youth, as ‘young men only are in a position, and possess the required spirit, to put radical 
ideas into practice. Old men are generally inextricably bound up with selfish interests ... They 
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never can conceive in terms of revolution ... It is on youthful blood that the plant of freedom 
thrives best.’102 To this end, Bose established two lodging houses in Japan that provided 
affordable accommodation and meals for Indian students.103 Charging only ¥ 25 per month, 
the lodgings were much cheaper than the average student accommodations available 
elsewhere, although one student complained that the food was ‘monotonous and almost 
uneatable.’104  
 The Government of India sought to contain Bose's influence by making it more 
difficult for Indian students to go abroad to study in Japan. During the First World War, 
British passport authorities issued an order stipulating that ‘the grant of passports for Japan to 
Indians should be refused altogether unless they have definite business there and their 
antecedents are beyond suspicion.’ Although the order was no longer enforced after the war, 
the government continued to regard Indians bound for Japan with skepticism, and in 1935, 
Mr. Davies of the Home Department stated that it was the duty of the Indian Government 
‘not to facilitate, but definitely to obstruct, the departure of Indian students to Japan ... the 
danger of such students falling under the evil influence of Bose and his friends is real.’105 In a 
confidential file, the Government of India reminded local governments that ‘very careful 
consideration should be given to passport applications by Indians, particularly by students, to 
go to Japan, and ... that subject should be an individual about whose character and bona fides 
there is no doubt whatever.’106  
 With the outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese and British empires on the 8th of 
December, 1941, Rash Behari Bose sought to exploit the Government of India's weakness by 
aligning himself firmly with the Japanese war effort. Jubilant at the prospect of India's 
liberation, Bose dove headlong into the war effort, urging Japanese military officials to 
include India within what Pan-Asianists and Japanese imperialists called the Greater East 
Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. As Japanese forces swept away British resistance in Malaya and 
Singapore, thousands of Indian prisoners of war were formed into a new military force, called 
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the Indian National Army, or INA, that fought alongside the Japanese army against the 
British. As tensions broke out between members of the INA leadership and Japanese military 
authorities, Rash Behari Bose tried to smooth out these disagreements at the Bangkok 
conference in June of 1942, and just managed to hold the INA together long enough for the 
better known Subhas Chandra Bose to take up its leadership in 1943, having travelled by 
submarine from Germany.107  
 Between the ultimate defeat of the INA and of Japanese imperial forces by the Allied 
troops and the horrific wartime atrocities carried out against the people of East and Southeast 
Asia in the name of the 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere', it is easy to understand 
how Rash Behari Bose's link to Japanese Pan-Asianism damaged his reputation as an Indian 
nationalist after the war. Branded a 'Quisling' by The Times,108 Bose's complicity with 
Japanese imperialism remains the largest sticking point barring his entry into the pantheon of 
Indian freedom fighters. More recent work on Rash Behari Bose by Eri Hotta complicates the 
image of him as a tool of Japanese imperialism. Hotta argues that while Bose's ‘view that the 
liberation of India and other Asian nations would arise from Japan's wartime program ... was 
hopelessly misguided,’109 Pan-Asianism must nonetheless be regarded as ‘more than a hollow 
construct that emerged as an ex post facto response to Japan's military expansionism in 
Asia.’110 Having explored some of the ways that Bose's life maps onto the history of Anglo-
Japanese relations in the interwar, this investigation now turns to Bose's own writings in an 
attempt to understand the relationship between India, Asia, and the international within his 
political thought. 
 
Pan-Asianism and the League: Challenging Empire 
 
 The proceedings of the Pan-Asiatic conference at Nagasaki provide an excellent 
example of some of the ways that Bose's critiques of European internationalism fit within a 
broader context of Pan-Asian anti-Westernism. The Pan-Asiatic conference took place at the 
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beginning of August in 1926 with the stated goal of bringing about ‘permanent world peace 
based on justice and equality’ as well as the ‘restoration of the spiritual and material 
civilization of Asia.’111 Although at times the rhetoric of the conference directly mirrored and 
borrowed from that of the League of Nations, the goal of the conference was not reproducing 
the mechanisms of the League, but rather appropriating its vision of a universal humanity 
towards the cause of Asian independence. The conference encountered a number of setbacks, 
particularly in terms of friction between the Japanese and Chinese delegates, who clashed 
over the issue of Japanese imperialism. What is most interesting about the conference is not 
the ways that delegates such as Rash Behari Bose sought to reproduce the language of 
Versailles and Geneva, but rather the ways that they sought to subvert it by challenging the 
League of Nations' claim to speak for a global humanity. The Indian press greeted the 
conference optimistically, with one article in the Bengalee going so far as to claim that the 
conference held the potential to ‘refashion human destiny most drastically’, but would at any 
rate, 
… have much greater claims on the support of the oppressed people  
of Asia - and, we might add, of Africa also - than the so-called  
League of Nations which has been established by Christian nations  
to help in perpetuating the un-Christian doctrine of 'white supremacy'  
all over the world.112  
 
 In his opening address on August 1st, Juntaro Imazato, the chair of the conference and 
a member of Japan's National Diet, spelled out the limits of Eurocentric internationalism, 
calling the League's efforts at world peace ‘a piece of their desk theory.’ Imazato argued that 
although it was understandable that the League sought to work towards world peace ‘under 
the present political system of nation as a unit ... is it not more important to pay higher 
attention to the various races included, sometimes against their will, in the nation?’ Imazato 
concluded; ‘Leaving the league of nations to proceed on their own paths relying upon 
disarmament and international law ... let us make effort to fill up what they found themselves 
unable to do,’ which was to be achieved through ‘a more steady progress of social life and 
cultivation of mutual understanding among different races.’113  
Similarly, in his speech Bose criticized European internationalism as parochial and 
unrepresentative of the interests of humanity; ‘It is said that the League of Nations is founded 
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to ensure world peace but in reality it concerns itself with the interests of Europe and 
America. It does not think of the interests of the millions of Asia. The Pan Asiatic League 
will have at heart not only the interests of those millions but also of the world.’114 For Bose 
and Imazato, the goal of the conference was not necessarily the substitution of European 
internationalism with Asian internationalism, but rather the contestation of internationalism 
as a failed paradigm of Eurocentrism, and the articulation of an alternative framework for a 
global politics that defied the fixed territoriality of the Versailles system of nation-states. 
 For Rash Behari Bose, this alternative framework hinged primarily on the issue of 
race. Reflected through the prism of Pan-Asianism, this framework provided the terminology 
through which Bose envisioned a global counter-geography to the imperialist 
internationalism of the British Empire and the League of Nations. Bose viewed the history of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as a history of the rise of global white 
supremacy, writing in the Standard Bearer that the ‘map of the world at the time of the 
accession of Queen Victoria to the throne of England was, for instance, very widely different 
from what we see at present ... Although the whites had already been showing much activity 
before, the influence at the time was nothing as compared with their influence at present.’ 
Bose charted the expansion of European imperialism in Africa, Australia, North America, 
and Asia, concluding that the ‘rise of the influence of the whites threatens the weaker of the 
coloured races with extermination.’115 In New Asia, Bose wrote that a glance at the global 
political map ‘inspires one with a feeling of awe at the white races' overwhelming political 
supremacy over the world’ with a bare area of six million square miles remaining outside of 
white political control.116  
  In their book Drawing the Global Colour Line, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds 
demonstrate the transnational scope of a developing imagined community of whiteness in the 
early twentieth century, which reinforced its identity through the exclusion and subjugation 
of non-white persons. Tracing immigration restrictions and imperial policies in white settler 
nations such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and South Africa, Lake and Reynolds 
highlight the ways that the category of whiteness provided the basis for an exclusionary logic 
with global reach that sought to shore up white privilege and supremacy around the world.117 
Similarly, Radhika Mohanram examines the role of whiteness in shaping British imperial 
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identities of gender, class, and sexuality in the Victorian period. Historicizing the production 
of white identities throughout the empire, Mohanram demonstrates how these identities 
became interpolated as universal within metropolitan discourses.118 These discourses 
provided the underpinnings for Britain's global imperial project, as articulated in Partha 
Chatterjee's argument regarding colonial rule as a rule of difference that rested upon the 
alienness of the ruling group and the racial and cultural difference of their colonial 
subjects.119 
 Rash Behari Bose's ideas regarding the relationship between race and territory 
demonstrate that while race certainly provided an underlying pillar of European imperial 
oppression, it also provided a language through which revolutionaries could universalize the 
scope and significance of global anti-imperialism. Writing in New Asia, Bose wrote that 
despite the vast scope of European political control across the globe, ‘there is another way of 
looking at the map. Viewed from the Racial side, the map of the world becomes completely 
reversed. The White world on the map is whittled down to 22,000,000 square miles, while the 
Coloured is extended to 31,000,000 square miles.’120 Using a series of figures measuring 
territory and global population sizes and densities, Bose advanced the argument that the same 
map of the world could look radically different depending on how it was analyzed. For Bose, 
the awakening of the oppressed world was a natural consequence of a small population 
expanding so far beyond its own territorial limits. Bose argued that there was ‘only one 
inevitable result of this disproportionate political expansion and encroachment of a minor 
race on the territories of that of a major one's preserves, the edging out of the trespassers ... 
The entire Coloured world ... is astir against the White incursions. There is trouble in every 
country under White control.’ This was a key point of optimism for Bose, as ‘despite the 
most imposing political phenomena presented in the White political map, it is decidedly an 
extremely precarious one, for the basic factor is not political but Racial. Mere passive 
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resistance on the part of the Coloured races against the Whites would change the face of the 
map within the twinkling of an eye.’121 For Bose then, race was not only a tool through which 
the European powers bulwarked their imperial project, but rather also provided the language 
through which anti-colonial nationalism could speak back to empire through territory. Just as 
his analysis of the distribution of global territory formed the crux of his argument regarding 
the expansion of white imperialism, it was also the key element in his re-mapping of a global 
politics of liberation.  
 By mapping out the world in racial, rather than political terms, Bose also sought to 
critique the international by exposing and inverting the global colour line on which it rested. 
Dismissing the pronouncements made during and after the First World War regarding the 
rights of small nations and the self-determination of oppressed peoples as ‘mere bluffs’, Bose 
declared that the purpose of the Versailles conference and the establishment of the League of 
Nations was ‘to diminish or at least postpone the acute danger threatening the political 
frontiers of the White map, and that the peace settlements were based upon imperialistic 
secret treaties for the continuance of White imperium over the Coloured races and regions.’ 
For Bose, the awakening of the oppressed world required a disavowal of the legitimacy of the 
existing international framework, which he referred to as the ‘grotesqueness of the Versailles 
Treaty (and) the superimposed palace of the League of Nations on the quicksands of that 
Treaty.’122 Bose hoped that this awakening would lead to the formation of a ‘Pan-Coloured 
Alliance’, a global community that would maintain the racial binary that underpinned the 
international, but would reverse the power dynamics of that relationship in a way that would 
completely redraw the political map of the world. 
 To this end, violence provides a crucial window into understanding how critics such 
as Bose conceived of the international order of the interwar. Although a central discourse of 
the Geneva system was the language of peace, many critics - whether fascist, anti-colonialist, 
or Pan-Asianist - saw this as nothing more than a smokescreen concealing the preservation of 
an inherently violent status quo. To understand this perspective, it is necessary to rethink 
violence along the lines proposed by Slavoj Zizek, who argues that there are in fact two 
different types of violence: subjective and objective. Subjective violence, according to Zizek, 
is violence that is performed by a clearly identifiable agent, while objective violence is the 
invisible violence, either symbolic or systemic, that preserves the status quo in which 
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subjective acts of violence take place. Zizek argues that if seemingly irrational or random 
outbursts of subjective violence are to be understood, it is first necessary to acknowledge the 
‘contours of a background which generates such outbursts.’123  
Here it is useful to read Zizek in tandem with Carl Schmitt, a German jurist and 
political thinker who was highly critical of the international order of Versailles. Schmitt 
worried that the criminalisation of war proposed by the League would ‘sharpen and deepen 
the belligerents' hostility, surely in the most gruesome way’ by replacing earlier conceptions 
of war as a conflict between two equal and just enemies with a universalising status quo in 
which war became a matter of punitive action against aggressors.124 For both Zizek and 
Schmitt, an allegedly peaceful status quo should be seen as obfuscating a deeper violent 
ordering of global politics. 
 Thinking through the universalising rhetoric of the League of Nations as a form of 
objective violence helps render the apparent incongruities of a figure like Rash Behari Bose 
more intelligible. Rather than understand Bose's support for Japanese imperialism as a 
hypocritical aberration within his anti-colonial thought, or as simply a strategic decision 
made in the pursuit of his struggle against the British Empire, it is possible to instead situate 
this apparent contradiction within a broader understanding of violence within the 
international system of the interwar. For Bose, Japan's increasing international isolation 
through the 1930s was a direct result of British attempts to prevent it from becoming an 
economic competitor. Pointing to the past examples of France, Russia, and Germany, Bose 
argued that every time a rival country threatened its economic dominance, it became British 
policy worked to isolate that country and prevent it from expanding at Britain’s expense. 
Bose saw Britain's ‘checkmating’ of Japan as an unfair attempt to preserve a status quo in 
which Britain, through the League of Nations, could continue to dominate the international 
system.125 
 Bose’s perspective on this issue was by no means marginal or radical during the 
interwar period. Even the Aga Khan recognised that the focus of the League of Nations on 
maintaining the status quo created an inherent disadvantage for any whose interests this status 
quo did not represent. In his words, 
 The status quo had everything on its side. There was as much chance  
 of achieving any real rectification of frontiers, any adjustment of  
 conflicting national claims, through the League, as there would have  
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 been of steering a bill providing for universal suffrage successfully  
 through the House of Lords of 1820. The ideologues of the immediate  
 post-war era worshipped the constitution of the League, but like most  
 idols it had feet of clay ... It was Metternich's system, dressed up anew  
 as democracy, freedom, and - sacred word - self-determination. But it  
 had been so adjusted that the 'haves' among the nations had things all  
 their own way, and the only hope for the 'have-nots' of changing their  
 inferior status lay ... in building up their military power ... until they  
 were able to launch direct and open aggression.126 
 
Referring specifically to Japan and the Manchurian crisis, the Aga Khan wrote that 
the fundamental issue at stake was that Japan would not and could not accept the fact that the 
League inaugurated a new international order in which older methods of securing territorial 
expansion and resources were no longer permitted. Within this system, it was ‘far easier for a 
camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for Japan to procure de jure recognition by the 
League of her de facto position on the northern Asiatic mainland.’ In reinforcing their own 
hegemony through a system designed to maintain the status quo, the dominant powers such 
as Britain ensured that ‘it was only open to the 'have-nots' to break through or to circumvent 
this wall of negatives.’127 
 Such logic was not limited to Japan, but applied to the case of Indian independence as 
well. At a meeting in 1930, the India Independence Central Committee of Detroit, Michigan, 
passed a series of resolutions that were in turn submitted to the League of Nations by Vida 
Malik. While the first and third resolutions criticized the arrest of Gandhi and the heavy-
handed actions of British troops, the second resolution sought to portray British imperial rule 
as a direct threat to world peace. This resolution inverted the popular argument put forward 
by imperialists that Indians needed to be ruled over for their own good in the interests of 
maintaining peace within the subcontinent, by instead arguing that the British Government 
was ‘goading the people of India to violence with brutalities.’128 The widespread popularity 
of Gandhi's non-violent political campaign, and the increasing degree of legitimacy afforded 
to it by audiences in America and elsewhere, served to highlight the objective violence of an 
imperial status quo that would allow no opportunity for nationalist agitation, even when such 
agitation couched itself in the internationally intelligible terminology of self-determination. 
Recognizing the violent nature of global imperialism rendered legitimacy to political violence 
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by framing it as a logical and inevitable product of a violent status quo in which the imperial 
powers of Europe suppressed 'legitimate' politics. 
 The particular significance of Rash Behari Bose is that in bridging the apparent divide 
between Japanese militarism and Indian revolutionaries, he highlights the connected 
dimensions of international violence during the interwar period. If the status quo maintained 
by the League of Nations on the one hand and the British Empire on the other can be 
understood in terms of Zizek's argument regarding objective violence, then the conflation of 
the two within Bose's political thought speaks to a larger global ordering of violence and 
legitimacy through which dominant powers such as Britain sought to maintain their 
hegemony through a language of peace. This language sought to delegitimize challengers to 
the status quo by labelling them as terrorists or aggressors, whose politics could be pushed 
aside by a universalising rhetoric that legitimized the established order through a language of 
humanity. This claim to humanity did not go uncontested, but was adopted by revolutionaries 
such as Bose who articulated his own version of Indian nationalism within a larger Pan-Asian 
and indeed ‘Pan-Coloured’ framework.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Following the end of the Second World War, the Great Powers dissolved the League 
of Nations and the United Nations took its place. At the final session of the League on the 
11th of April, 1946, India's representative Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin gave a tribute to India's 
long service within the League. An aristocratic Muslim from Dacca, Nazimuddin played an 
active role in Bengal politics throughout the first half of the century, serving at the education 
minister of Bengal from 1929 to 1934 and as a member of the Bengal Legislative Assembly 
on behalf of the Muslim League.  He would go on to a short stint as the second Prime 
Minister of Pakistan from 1951 to 1953. In looking forward towards the formation of the UN, 
Nazimuddin pointed out that India would join other countries in collaborating with the UN, 
thereby demonstrating its desire to continue to play a role in international measures ‘to secure 
those conditions of peace which alone will allow a happier and improved standard of living 
for the various peoples of the world.’129 Nazimuddin said that he did not believe ‘that we 
have come to the burial ceremony of the League of Nations’, but rather hoped that through 
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the UN members could ‘look forward to the future, and avoid the mistakes of the past.’ With 
Indian independence only one year away, Nazimuddin remarked that the ‘nations of India are 
standing on the threshold of independent sovereign status.’ Despite this, his response to the 
question of mandates and non-self-governing territories in the aftermath of the war seems 
surprising, given India's long colonial past. Although Nazimuddin noted that India ‘believes 
in the independence of all nations, irrespective of colour or creed’, he nonetheless reiterated 
the UN official position that ‘until they are in a position to attain their independence, she 
believes in the trusteeship system of the United Nations, not only in the interest of the 
territories themselves, but in the larger interests of preserving world peace.’130  
 It seems incongruous that India, on the very cusp of its independence from almost two 
centuries of colonial rule, would support the notion that some states were not yet ready to 
govern themselves or, to use the language of the League from several decades earlier, ‘not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.’131 It is 
important to note that India’s broader policy towards the UN actively promoted the interests 
of anti-colonial interests around the world.132 Jawaharlal Nehru warmly greeted the idea of a 
United Nations, and with his idealistic internationalism and preference for a One World 
policy, Nehru saw within the UN an essential tool for the maintenance of global peace. As a 
result, India would come to play an active role in the early days of the organisation, with 
Nehru’s sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit selected as the first female president of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1953. Historian Manu Bhagavan explains India’s acceptance of 
Chapters XI and XII of the UN Charter – those pertaining to non-self-governing territories 
and trusteeship – as a result of Nehru and Madame Pandit seeking to read the terms of these 
chapters in ‘spirit and letter’, not as props for continued imperialism but as a genuine 
aspiration for imminent self-government for the colonized peoples of the world.133 
More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, such a stance is entirely 
understandable in light of the longer anomalous history of India's position within the League 
of Nations. The emergence of a particular international order in the aftermath of the First 
World War created an often contradictory relationship between empire and the international 
in India, wherein these two processes sometimes opposed, and sometimes reinforced each 
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other. By moving away from a language of formal imperialism and towards more subtle 
practices of coercion, the League of Nations created the space for empire to retain its hold 
throughout the interwar period. At the same time, however, the language of the international 
and particularly the popular dissemination of the idea of self-determination gave impetus to 
anti-colonial nationalist movements and provided a new vocabulary with which they could 
put their cause before world opinion.  
 Rather than regarding them either as two separate or interlinked processes, empire and 
the international must instead be thought of in relation to the global ordering of sovereignty 
and violence that took place over the first half of the twentieth century. In seeking to combat 
ideas of self-determination and delegitimize anti-colonial forces in the eyes of world opinion, 
imperial officials struggled to control the narrative of India that the international audience 
consumed, while India's position as a member of the League made this task increasingly 
difficult. At the same time, League officials sought to promote the work of this international 
organisation in places such as India by raising public awareness and thereby seeking to 
enhance League authority. This awareness generated petitions by a range of private 
individuals and groups, who sought to appeal to the authority of the League as a third party 
capable of circumventing the sovereignty of the imperial government. Because of the failure 
of the League to do so, it was easier for revolutionaries like Rash Behari Bose to argue that 
the international order represented by the League was nothing more than a smokescreen 
concealing British imperial ambitions and the preservation of a status quo of objective 
violence.  
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Chapter 5:  
India, the League of Nations, and International Terrorism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 From the 1st to the 16th of November, 1937, the League of Nations hosted a special 
diplomatic conference with the goal of passing the world's first international law to target 
terrorism as a distinct category of crime. Among a diverse range of nation-states represented 
at the conference, 24 signed the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. 
This convention was the result of a three year process of drafting and debates undertaken by a 
Committee of Experts composed of representatives from Belgium, Britain, Chile, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.S.S.R. The Council of the 
League of Nations appointed this committee on December 10th, 1934, following the highly 
publicized assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, the French 
Foreign Minister, by members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization two 
months earlier in Marseilles. The assassination attracted international attention, particularly 
because it was the first regicide ever caught on film.1 The assassin, a Bulgarian named Vlado 
Chernozemski, was immediately apprehended by French police with such violence that he 
died of his injuries. His co-conspirators escaped to Italy where they were safe from 
extradition due to an 1870 law that deliberately omitted political crimes from the list of 
extraditable offences. 
 The assassination of Alexander I was by no means the first incident of its kind, but 
was situated in a long history of internationally prominent assassinations that spanned the 
length of the nineteenth century. From the 1870s until the interwar period, anarchism was the 
most popular term used to describe acts of political violence that would later come to be 
referred to as terrorism. Anarchism more accurately refers to an ideology originating out of 
radical strands of left-wing European political thought, which advocates the abolition of 
state-based forms of government in favour of voluntary self-governing institutions. During 
the late nineteenth century, anarchism came to be conflated in popular and governmental 
discourses with so-called ‘assassinationism’ or ‘propaganda of the deed’, referring to 
bombings or assassinations carried out with the intention of undermining or challenging state 
																																																						
1		Although	the	video	does	not	capture	the	murder	itself	on	camera,	both	the	build-up	and	aftermath	were	
filmed	and	are	now	readily	available	online.	See	for	example	http://publicdomainreview.org/collections/live-
footage-of-king-alexanders-assassination-1934/.	
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authority. Richard Bach Jensen defines ‘anarchist terrorism’ as a worldwide phenomenon that 
was depicted in print media as a ‘powerful conspiratorial force moving throughout the 
world.’ Jensen, however, demonstrates that in reality there was a wide gap in perception 
between the myth and reality of global anarchist plots. He further argues that the many acts of 
violence committed by disparate groups of nationalists, radicals, police spies, and the 
mentally ill during this period became conflated with the catch-all categorization of 
‘anarchism’.2 
 Such acts of political violence took place all around the world, with notable examples 
including the assassination of Czar Alexander II of Russia in 1882, the murder of President 
William McKinley in America in 1901, and – most famously – the killing of Austrian 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, which served as the catalyst for the First World War. The 
policing of anarchism took on a variety of forms in different countries, with some 
governments opting for preventative measures that aimed to stop anarchist plots before they 
could come to fruition, while other nations favoured the repression of anarchist networks 
following their commission of specific crimes. In general, more despotic regimes such as 
czarist Russia opted for preventative measures that included the prohibition of meetings, 
censorship, and mass arrests of suspected anarchists, while ostensibly liberal or progressive 
governments sought to protect the rights of an individual until they committed an actual 
crime. As Jensen notes, the distinction was often not as clear cut, and preventative policies 
aiming to monitor anarchist networks rather than destroy them were often the most successful 
in preventing political assassinations.3 As the case of India demonstrated throughout the first 
three chapters of this dissertation, supposedly liberal governments such as the British were 
also prone to adopt markedly less liberal policies where their colonies were concerned. 
Following the assassination of Elisabeth, the Empress of Austria and Queen of 
Hungary by an Italian anarchist on the 10th of September, 1898, the Italian government 
convened the ‘International Conference for the Defense of Society against the Anarchists’ 
from November 24th to December 21st. This marked the first international conference to 
specifically target anarchism, and would set the tone for future international cooperation on 
this issue. A key legacy of this conference was increased cooperation among European police 
forces as well as the expansion of the portrait parlé system that deployed a complex series of 
																																																						
2	Richard	Bach	Jensen,	The	battle	against	anarchist	terrorism:	an	international	history,	1878-1934	(Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	2013),	p.	3.	
3	Jensen,	Battle	against	anarchism,	p.	5.	
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measurements and recordings of identifying markers in order to facilitate the recognition of 
suspected criminals.4 
Following the Rome Conference, the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 
resulted in the St. Petersburg Protocol of 1904, in which a number of European powers came 
together in a second attempt to establish a concerted international response. This consisted of 
countries that would later stand on both sides of the First World War, including Russia, 
Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Sweden-Norway, Spain, 
Portugal, Switzerland, and the Ottoman Empire. The protocol provided procedures for the 
expulsion of criminals designated as anarchists, and called for the creation of central anti-
anarchist offices in member countries, as well as cooperation between member police forces. 
Despite the urging of Berlin, London officials were unwilling to sign on to the protocol in 
1906, with the excuse that British law already carried out most of the provisions in practice. 
The protocol ultimately fell through due to the fact that national interests and political 
rivalries won out over coordination and multi-lateral cooperation.5 
 Many of the same concerns that animated the formulation of the St. Petersburg 
Protocol were shared by the Committee of Experts in drafting the international Terrorism 
Convention of 1937. By this time, however, the category of anarchism was definitively 
replaced by a new target of international concern through the concept of terrorism. The 
novelty of this category meant that the first difficulty in drafting a counter-terrorism 
convention lay in establishing a precise legal definition for what terrorism actually was. To 
this end, the Committee of Experts held three meetings between 1935 and 1937,6 in which 
they examined a series of proposals made by 13 different governments, along with advice 
from relevant experts such as the International Criminal Police Commission based out of 
Vienna.7 Throughout this drafting process, a number of important debates took place 
regarding the relationship between terrorism and politics, the problematic tautology of 
																																																						
4	See	Jensen,	Battle	against	anarchism,	pp.	131-84.	For	more	on	the	development	of	international	policing	
itself,	see	Mathieu	Deflem,	Policing	World	Society:	historical	foundations	of	international	police	cooperation	
(Oxford:Oxford	University	Press,	2002).	
5	See	Richard	Bach	Jensen,	‘The	first	global	wave	of	terrorism	and	international	counter-terrorism,	1905-1914’,	
in	Jussi	Hanhimäki	and	Bernhard	Blumenau	(eds.),	An	International	History	of	Terrorism	(New	York:	Routledge,	
2013),	pp.	16-33.		
6	The	first	session	took	place	between	April	and	May	of	1935,	the	second	session	was	in	January	of	1936,	and	
the	third	and	final	session	occurred	in	April,	1937.	
7	League	of	Nations	Archives,	Geneva.	April	11th,	1935.	Communications	from	International	Organizations.	
International	Criminal	Police	Commission.	C.R.T.	2.	This	commission	had	been	formed	in	1923,	with	the	aim	of	
targeting	the	‘common	enemy	of	humankind:	the	ordinary	criminal.’	See	Deflem,	Policing	World	Society,	pp.	
124-52.	
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defining terrorism as an action that causes terror, as well as the tensions between international 
law and questions of  territory and sovereignty. The convention ultimately compelled 
signatories to criminalize terrorist offences within their borders, while recommending that 
such offences should be exempt from the protection from extradition provided by the existing 
international law with regard to political offences.8 The main function of the convention, 
however, was its goal to establish an internationally acceptable definition for terrorism as a 
distinct category of crime. As such, it is the specificities of this definition that are of central 
importance to the current chapter. 
In attempting to reach a consensus regarding an intelligible definition for ‘terrorism’, 
each representative came at the topic with their own ideas about political violence, usually 
motivated by their own national interests. Roumania proposed the idea of drafting a League 
of Nations treaty targeting terrorism back in 1926, and it was the Roumanian delegate, 
Professor M. Pella, who acted as chair of the Committee of Experts. The strong Roumanian 
presence in the 1937 debates can furthermore be explained by the recent assassination of 
Prime Minister Ion G. Duca in 1933 due to his attempt to suppress the Iron Guard, an ultra-
nationalist fascist movement, which lent urgency to Roumania’s position. Representative 
Koukai of Czechoslovakia also played a disproportionately vocal role in the debates, likely 
due to Czechoslovak fears triggered by the activities of the Ordnersgruppe, a paramilitary 
organisation comprised of ethnic Germans formed in 1933, who would go on to receive Nazi 
backing in 1938 prior to the German annexation of the Sudetenland. Sir John Fischer 
Williams, the British representative, also played a key role in the proceedings, despite the fact 
that the British government never had any intention of signing on to the convention. An 
impressive scholar of international law who produced books on international law, the League, 
and the League’s goal of international peace, Williams consistently sought to steer the 
discussions in a way that reflected Britain’s commitment to the right to political asylum 
guaranteed by the international law of the time.9 When the Indian representative Sir Denys 
Bray became indisposed, Williams also stood in for India and put forward India’s main 
contribution to the convention, a clause regarding the sale and circulation of firearms.10  
																																																						
8	Ben	Saul,	‘The	Legal	Response	of	the	League	of	Nations	to	Terrorism’,	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	
4,	1	(2006),	p.	3.	
9	For	some	of	Williams’	earlier	writings,	see	John	Fischer	Williams,	Some	aspects	of	the	covenant	of	the	League	
of	Nations	(London:	1934)	and	International	change	and	international	peace	(London:	Oxford	University	Press,	
1932).	
10	International	Conference	on	the	Repression	of	Terrorism.	Report	by	Sir	Denys	Bray,	1937.	IOR:	L/PJ/8/583,	
223.	
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 Despite the richness of these discussions, the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism has received very little scholarly attention, notwithstanding a recent 
outpouring of interest in the history of interwar internationalism and the League of Nations.11 
This is partly because with the breakdown of the League of Nations during the Second World 
War and its dissolution thereafter, the convention never entered into force. As a result, 
despite the interest it generated at the time and the fact that it attracted 24 initial signatories, 
the convention was only ever ratified by one country, India. In becoming signatories to the 
convention, the representatives of the 24 countries involved were expressing their willingness 
to move forward with the convention on the condition of ratification by their home 
governments. Because of the disruption of the Second World War, only the Government of 
India ever finished the ratification process signifying formal consent to abide by the terms of 
the convention.12 Ben Saul argues that despite these apparent failings, the convention 
provides important insight into more recent debates regarding terrorism and international law, 
which have largely replicated the ideas and problematics initially laid out in the discussions 
of the mid-1930s.13 
 While this is certainly true, the more important historical significance of this 
convention is the insight it provides into the origins of terrorism as a legal and political idea 
rooted in the international context of the interwar period. The convention is particularly 
important for understanding the processes through which terrorism emerged as a tool of 
government discourse in late colonial India, as explored in previous chapters. A closer look at 
India's role in this convention provides new and important ways of understanding the larger 
context in which colonial officials framed their ideas about terrorism as a new and 
particularly dangerous form of criminality that threatened not only the governing structures 
of an existing political regime, but rather the very notion of civilization itself. In particular, 
India’s anomalous position as the only non-self-governing member of the League makes its 
enthusiasm for labeling acts of political violence with the emerging internationally 
recognizable trope of ‘terrorism’ all the more intelligible. In signing on to the convention, the 
Government of India sought to secure international recognition for its existing domestic 
policies towards anti-colonial violence. In doing so, it participated within a larger 
international discussion regarding the relationship between terrorism and domestic authority. 
																																																						
11	See	Chapter	4.	
12	The	signatories	were	Albania,	Belgium,	Bulgaria,	Czechoslovakia,	Estonia,	France,	Greece,	Monaco,	the	
Netherlands,	Norway,	Roumania,	Spain,	and	Yugoslavia	from	Europe,	Argentina,	Cuba,	the	Dominican	
Republic,	Ecuador,	Haiti,	Peru,	and	Venezuela	from	the	Americas,	as	well	as	Turkey,	the	USSR,	Egypt,	and	India.	
13Saul,	‘The	Legal	Response	of	the	League	of	Nations	to	Terrorism’,	pp.	78-102.	
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This chapter explores these ideas through themes of territory, politics, and sovereignty in 
order to better understand the legal and intellectual framework in which terrorism first came 
to be articulated as a category of global concern. 
 
Terrorism and Territory in French Chandernagore 
 
 From its first inception, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism was a topic of ‘vital concern’ for the Government of India, whose own experience 
with political violence over the past 30 years reified terrorism as a distinct category of 
governmental interest, as the preceding chapters have indicated. In drafting the letter to be 
submitted to the League of Nations regarding India's position on the subject, J.A. Throne 
wrote that his government was ‘fully in accord with the principle of international co-
operation for the prevention and punishment of terrorism.’14 In particular, the Government of 
India was interested in the question of territory, and hoped that signing on to the convention 
would provide legal recourse regarding the ongoing challenge posed by the French 
possession of Chandernagore, which was often used as a safe haven by absconding Bengali 
revolutionaries including Aurobindo Ghose of the Alipore conspiracy case in 1909. 
Subsequently establishing an ashram in the French territory of Pondicherry, Aurobindo 
remained a source of irritation to colonial authorities for the remainder of his career. Despite 
retiring from politics and pursuing a life of spirituality, Aurobindo continued to be visited by 
nationalists and revolutionaries, and his presence in French territory made his activities 
notoriously difficult for the colonial police to properly monitor.15 
 A small strip of territory lying just north of Calcutta, Chandernagore was first settled 
by French colonists in 1673. Despite the British having twice captured this territory in the 
mid to late eighteenth century, the land was ceded back to the French in 1815. The French 
retained their colonial presence in India until 1962. With the rise of anticolonial violence in 
the first half of the twentieth century, Chandernagore quickly became a sore spot for British 
imperial officials, who viewed it as a ‘dangerous spot in the heart of Bengal’ that afforded 
safe passage and refuge to violent criminals.16 The border lines between British and French 
																																																						
14	Views	of	the	Government	of	India	on	draft	conventions	for	the	creation	of	an	international	criminal	court	for	
the	prevention	and	punishment	of	terrorism,	1936,	Foreign	and	Political	Department,	NAI,	File	No.	547-X,	p.	
13.	
15	For	some	of	the	most	recent	work	on	Aurobindo,	see	Wolfers,	‘Born	like	Krishna	in	the	Prison-House’	and	
Hees,	Lives	of	Sri	Aurobindo.	
16	Letter	from	Governor	of	Bengal,	21	November	1918,	Home	Political	A,	NAI,	Nos.	137-139,	p.	1.	
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Indian possessions were all the more difficult to police due to their ‘arbitrary and 
administrative nature’, as Akhila Yechury phrases it. As Yechury points out, these lines ‘did 
not break social, cultural or economic ties with contiguous regions’ and as such created a 
messy jurisdictional morass that was difficult for police investigators to navigate. Such issues 
were not limited to political absconders, but encompassed a wide range of criminalized 
activities, such as the marriage of children under the age of 14 following the passage of the 
Child Marriage Restraint Act throughout British India in 1929.17  
 Frustration over the perceived inefficiency of the administration of Chandernagore led 
the Government of India to push for the cession of the territory by France at the Paris peace 
talks of 1919. By 1918, Sir Henry Wheeler and other officials concluded that the cooperation 
of the French Government was insufficient, due to ‘the deplorable condition of the executive 
in Chandernagore, which was practically represented by Bengalis and was inadequate and 
inefficient.’18 During the war, the Government of India demanded that French authorities 
pass emergency legislation similar to the Defence of India Act that would provide executive 
powers to deal summarily with seditionists and revolutionaries, including Rash Behari Bose. 
The French government agreed to a more mild form of punitive legislation, which was 
enough to placate the Government of India for the duration of the war, but the hope remained 
that after the war Chandernagore could be ceded to British India ‘possibly as an element in 
general territorial adjustments all over the globe as a result of the war.’19 In the lead up to the 
peace negotiations, officials in Bengal insisted that if Chandernagore retained its position as a 
French colony, it would remain a constant threat to broader Indian interests, urgently warning 
the Government of India, ‘as long as this town is not under British control so long it must 
continue to furnish a refuge for revolutionary murderers and robbers ... and a starting point 
for fresh plots against the British Government.’20  
 Despite this, other priorities won out in Paris, leaving Chandernagore as a constant 
source of frustration for British officials throughout the interwar period. The issue of 
Chandernagore became particularly important in the early 1930s, when political violence in 
Bengal reached its peak with regular murders in and around Calcutta and the raid on the 
Chittagong armoury in 1930, discussed in Chapter 3. Despite the initial help offered by 
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French authorities in the apprehension of absconders from the Chittagong raid, the overall 
perception of British officials at this time was that the actions of the Chandernagore 
authorities in suppressing revolutionary crime ‘cannot by any means be described as 
vigorous.’21 The French were extremely reluctant to take action against criminals with 
political motives that were protected under international law. Even when the authorities were 
willing to cooperate with the British Indian police force, however, the specificities of French 
law provided a source of great frustration for the Government of India, who argued that ‘the 
legal procedure obtaining in that territory is unsuitable to the success of any operation 
there.’22 In one example cited by the Superintendent of Police for Hooghly, a series of French 
legal restrictions including the prohibition of night raids and the necessity of formal warrants 
listing the owner of any houses that were to be searched stymied an attempt to apprehend the 
murderers of the Police Commissioner, Mr. Garlick.23 In comparison to the executive 
authority granted by the laws of exception implemented in British Bengal that have been 
outlined throughout this dissertation, the Government of India viewed the legal safeguards of 
French procedure as unnecessary and unwieldy impediments to the swift and secret detention 
of dangerous terrorists. 
 The longer history of Britain’s relationship with the French territories, including 
Chandernagore, provides important context for understanding the priorities of the 
Government of India regarding the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism in 1937. The main instructions that the Government of India provided for its 
representative, Sir Denys Bray, were to push for the inclusion of a provision within the 
convention that would regulate and monitor the circulation of firearms in signatory nations. 
Bray proposed this measure at the convention using the argument that the experience of 
terrorism in India, and particularly in Bengal, demonstrated that ‘the potential danger of a 
terrorist would be reduced very considerably if steps could be taken to prevent him from 
arming himself with revolvers and pistols’ and that to this end ‘the fullest co-operation 
should exist among contracting States to prevent the smuggling of such weapons from one 
State to another.’24 Bray proposed an amendment that resulted in Article 12 of the convention 
– Article 13 in the final version – being reframed to require gun retailers and manufacturers 
to maintain a register of the names and addresses of all fire-arm purchasers. The other 
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	180	
members of the convention accepted Bray's proposal without discussion, although his illness 
on the day of the formal proposal meant that the amendment was put forward by the British 
representative Sir John Fischer Williams on Bray's behalf, a fact indicative of the intimate 
relationship between British and Indian interests and personnel at Geneva.25 
 The Government of India's emphasis on the firearm clause, and particularly its 
interest in preventing the smuggling of weapons between contracting states, was a direct 
response to concerns regarding the potential danger that French Chandernagore posed to the 
maintenance of British India's territorial integrity. Following the passage of the convention, 
members of the Government of India expressed disappointment that although France was a 
signatory, its colonies including Chandernagore were exempted from the terms of the 
convention under Article 25, which stated that signatories would assume no obligations on 
behalf of colonies, territories, or mandates.26 This, combined with the unwillingness of the 
British government to sign on to the convention at all, significantly dampened the 
Government of India's enthusiasm for the new measures, as ‘one of the chief advantages 
which (they) hoped to gain from the Convention was the prevention of the smuggling of arms 
into British India from the French possessions.’27 The Government of India’s preoccupation 
with Chandernagore, and with the transnational circulation of firearms, indicates the central 
role of territory in shaping colonial anxieties towards terrorism. More particularly, it points 
towards reading the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism as more 
than simply a failed exercise in international legislation Instead, the convention should be 
regarded as an attempt to compensate for the territorial limits of the modern nation-state 
through the formulation of a standardized script by which challengers to state sovereignty 
could be made legible and punishable irrespective of their circulation or relocation within an 
increasingly bounded global arena.  
 
Territory and Responsibility  
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 Of central importance to this project was the responsibility of states to effectively 
exert sovereign control within their own territory. David Armitage argues that ‘(p)erhaps the 
most momentous but least widely understood development in modern history is the long 
transition from a world of empires to a world of states.’28 While Armitage locates the 
intellectual origins of this process within the revolutionary moment of the American War of 
Independence, which contributed to world history the radical proposition that states could be 
conjured out of colonies,29 it was not until the formation of the League of Nations that this 
process came to be institutionalized in the formal structures of international relations. 
Whereas nineteenth century imperialisms retained a dynamic and expansive quality that 
allowed for shifting territorial claims and balance of power politics, the international system 
inaugurated at Versailles sought to legitimize an inter-state system wherein sovereignty 
rested within the fixed territoriality of geographically contiguous nation-states situated within 
a bounded global space. This process has also seen an increasing international regulation of 
movement through the creation of passports and other forms of documentary identification. 
In addition to the monopoly on violence claimed by emerging nation-states, modern 
governments have also claimed a ‘monopoly of the legitimate means of movement’, making 
themselves the final arbiters for determining who or what may cross these fixed borders.30 
As Matthieu Deflem asserts, in the international system of the interwar, national 
interests remained of primary importance to governments in the planning of international 
policing initiatives. In other words, while nation-states worked increasingly towards 
cooperation with one another, their primary focus remained the maintenance of their own 
monopoly on legitimate coercion within their own national borders.31 Central to this system 
was the concept of responsibility, whereby the sovereignty of a state was made contingent 
upon its ability to uphold a certain ‘standard of civilization’ by replicating the structures and 
technologies of Western government. As Susan Pedersen demonstrates in her comprehensive 
account of the League of Nations' mandate system, the transformation of former German 
colonies into mandates provided the means by which empire in the interwar period could be 
simultaneously reinvigorated and contested.32 The mandates system was premised on the 
argument that certain people or cultures ‘not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world’ required the supervision and guidance of 
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‘advanced nations’ in order to progress to a stage at which self-government and international 
recognition could be made possible.33 
 The relationship between sovereignty and responsibility was not limited to the 
mandates, but was also important for international law more broadly. In 1935, the Roumanian 
delegation to the Terrorism Convention's Committee of Experts circulated a study by Thomas 
Givenovitch, a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Belgrade. In it, Givenovitch argued that in 
order to properly prohibit the proliferation of terrorism, ‘it would be necessary to make the 
States themselves ... penally responsible for the preparatory acts’ carried out within their own 
territory. Givenovitch stated, ‘While a State cannot, of course, be a legal-domestic 
delinquent, that is to say, itself declare itself delinquent in its sovereign territory, it can be 
declared a possible delinquent in the eyes of the law of the international legal community, 
personified in the League of Nations.’34 According to Givenovitch, this would even include a 
state's failure to communicate to the international community information regarding a 
terrorist attack planned within its own territory and carried out elsewhere. For Givenovitch, 
‘political terrorist crimes’, as he referred to them, were delicta juris gentium, or crimes 
against international law. Terrorists proclaimed this international nature, according to 
Givenovitch, both through their selection of public targets which increased the likelihood of 
foreign citizens being injured, as well as their tendency to transgress state borders in the 
process between their preparation and their commission. More importantly, Givenovitch 
asserted that the ‘property attacked by acts of political terrorism is thus international 
property, since it is attacked in an internationally dangerous manner, even if that property is 
not actually international property.’ For Givenovitch, this meant that states should adopt the 
principle of universality in policing terrorist crime, entailing that acts contemplated or carried 
out in one state's territory should be regarded as directed against that state itself, even if the 
actual intended target was a foreign government.35 This reflects a particular concern with the 
public nature of political assassinations. Unlike ‘ordinary’ murder which typically occurred 
behind closed doors, either within the domestic sphere or otherwise obscured from public 
view, ‘terrorism’ represented not only an attack against an individual but an attack carried out 
within the public sphere where the state was particularly responsible for maintaining security. 
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 Although Givenovitch's suggestion that states be made penally responsible for acts of 
terrorism planned or executed within their territory was unsurprisingly omitted in the drafting 
of the convention, the convention retained the broader notion of territorial responsibility. In 
an amendment to the draft convention submitted in 1936, the Soviet representative pushed for 
the inclusion of an article that stipulated that each High Contracting Party must take 
appropriate measures ‘to prohibit and suppress the existence in their territories of associations 
avowedly engaged in international terrorism ... including the organisation of armed bands for 
the purpose of infringing the inviolability of the frontiers of the contracting States.’36 The 
U.S.S.R. was particularly concerned about the possibility of states exploiting terrorist 
activities as a means for disguised intervention in the political affairs of other states, a fact 
that was both understandable in light of the early history of the Bolshevik revolution, as well 
as deeply ironic given Soviet sponsorship for subversive political organizations around the 
world in the early interwar period.37 This proposal was agreeable to Sir John Fischer 
Williams of the British delegation, who suggested that such a stipulation was entirely 
consistent with the existing law in Britain, which in his view already took sufficient measures 
towards this end.38 
 India's self-presentation within these discussions provides important insight into the 
balancing act that government officials sought to achieve in affirming the need for legislation 
to curb the problem of terrorism, while simultaneously conveying to the international 
community that the Government of India was living up to its responsibilities as a legitimate 
sovereign. India’s anomalous position within the League made this balancing act all the more 
important. Although the 1935 Government of India Act dissolved some sovereignty to local 
Indian authorities, ultimate executive authority still rested in the hands of the British Viceroy 
and the Secretary of State, and therefore the British parliament. India was not a state among 
states, despite the efforts of the Indian delegation to present it as such, which explains why 
the Government of India was particularly eager to categorize anti-governmental protest as 
terrorism and thus claim international support for its repression. Despite the fact that 
domestic legislation tackling the problem of terrorism was always justified through the 
argument that the ordinary law was insufficient and thus extraordinary powers were needed, 
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the Government of India presented an entirely different argument at the level of the 
international. In addressing the proposed inauguration of an International Criminal Court, 
which was being discussed in tandem with the Terrorism Convention, J.A. Throne of the 
Government of India wrote in the statement to be delivered by Sir Denys Bray at Geneva, 
‘Terrorism in India has very little connection at present with that in European countries; the 
Governments in India have adequate legal powers to deal with it and it appears most unlikely 
that they would ever wish to resort to the proposed Court.’ 39 In fact, the most obvious factor 
differentiating terrorism in India from its European manifestations was India’s lack of 
political independence, and its status as the only non-self-governing member of the League.  
Despite enthusiasm for the Terrorism Convention itself, the Government of India 
regarded participation in the International Criminal Court as an expensive venture that would 
provide little benefit to India, due to the great distances which would be involved in 
transferring prisoners and personnel back and forth from Europe. Privately, Government of 
India officials were quite blunt about their feelings towards the proposed court, with M.G. 
Hallet writing, ‘This is one of the activities of the League of Nations which makes me feel 
tired; the suggestion that an expensive criminal court should be established is a half baked 
idea and the sooner it is killed the better.’40 As such, the Government of India sought to 
present itself in a way that made it clear that the need for new international legislation that 
targeted transnational terrorism was not a reflection of the colonial government's inability to 
maintain law and order within its own territory. To this end, Throne noted that although 
alterations to local law would be required in some cases, ‘the existing law is likely to be 
found to be adequate to implement the more essential provisions of the Convention.’41  
 Informing this insistence was the concern shared by many Government of India 
officials that existing measures for preventing foreign nationals from printing seditious 
materials were in fact woefully inadequate. In an official note, O.K. Caroe mentioned the 
many complaints received by the Government of India from foreign governments regarding 
activities carried out in India that sought to subvert or damage their states. Although Caroe 
noted that these complaints were primarily directed against newspaper propaganda and other 
forms of dissent that would fall within the purview of sedition, rather than terrorism, he 
expressed concern that ‘the liberty of the Indian Press in this regard is too often extremely 
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embarrassing.’42 As Stuart Elden argues in the context of the twenty-first century's ‘War on 
Terror’, a state that is unable to maintain its own territorial integrity by controlling the actions 
of non-state actors within its borders finds itself in a position where its sovereignty may be 
called into question.43 While Elden locates this process within the global circumstances of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, referring to the idea that states exercise control within their own 
territories as ‘the sovereign fiction on which the United Nations is constructed’,44 this 
analysis neglects the particular historical contingencies of the early interwar period where 
this idea originated. It was in the particular moment, following the cataclysm of the First 
World War and the initial collapse of Western narratives of civilization and progress, that 
European imperialism sought to reconstitute itself through a new interstate system that 
reframed nineteenth century ideas of empire as tutelage into a mandates system that instead 
positioned tutelage as development. This system rested on a new discourse of progress and 
historical time in which state sovereignty was positioned as a universally attainable goal that, 
in practice, maintained European hegemony through a new set of exclusionary restrictions. 
Because sovereignty under this system was thus made contingent upon ideas of territorial 
responsibility, a state's claim to legitimacy could be undermined by a number of factors, 
including an inability to control or prevent the proliferation of terrorism within its territory. It 
is for this reason that the narrative projected by the Government of India at Geneva - that 
‘adequate legal powers’ existed to deal with terrorism - stands in such stark contrast to 
domestic speeches and publications that emphasize the law's inadequacy and the need for 
increasingly drastic emergency powers.  
 
Political Terrorism or Terrorism as Politics? 
 
 Although the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism stimulated 
a great deal of debate, one item that was accepted with relatively little discussion was the 
definition of terrorism as violence directed against the state. In the final convention, terrorism 
was defined as ‘criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a 
state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general 
public.’45 Within this definition, the possible targets of terrorism included heads of state, their 
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descendents or spouses, and persons acting in a public capacity.46 This definition is key to 
understanding the function of the ‘terminology of terrorism’, to use Philip Deery's 
expression.47  
As Mikkel Thorup argues, the emergence of terrorism as a distinct category of crime 
had its roots in the French Revolution, and specifically in the execution of King Louis XVI. 
What made Louis’ execution such a significant turning point, according to Thorup, was the 
fact that while previous acts of tyrannicide were based on the principle of upholding justice 
through the murder of an unjust ruler, Louis was killed not for his specific actions but for his 
symbolic position as king. This means that what made terrorism a historically new form of 
violence was the fact that ‘even though actual persons are being targeted, and perhaps their 
killing is being legitimated by specific actions they have committed, the real target of the 
attack is not the person but the abstraction of the system.’48 In other words, terrorism is 
understood by Thorup as an action that is significant, not for what it does, but for what it 
represents through its symbolic use of violence. This is why ideas of terrorism came to be so 
closely coupled with violence directed against the state, because terrorism, in the structural 
position of both its perpetrator and its victim, was an inherently political crime.  
In The Foundations of Modern Terrorism, Martin Miller persuasively argues that the 
distinction between state ‘terror’ and non-state ‘terrorism’ must be set aside if ‘terrorism’ as a 
form of political violence is to be understood within a properly historical context.49 While 
this is absolutely correct in the context of academic work that seeks to locate the origins of a 
distinct phenomenon called terrorism, it is less relevant for the current project, which seeks to 
understand the political uses of the term terrorism and its legal articulation as it was defined 
by state powers, and particularly the Government of India, during the interwar.  
 Defining terrorism in political terms posed immediate difficulties regarding the right 
of political asylum, an important aspect of twentieth century international law. The right of 
asylum was a particular concern for British officials, who prided themselves on liberal 
traditions of free speech and political freedom. Although it is true that British law maintained 
stronger protections for political refugees than most continental powers, and that Britain was 
a relative latecomer to the kinds of racially exclusionary laws that were common throughout 
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its colonies and the Dominions, it was never the free political haven that it purported to be.50 
Still, as one official noted in a memorandum to the Home Office, public opinion in Britain 
would surely condemn many acts of a ‘specifically 'terrorist' character’, but might likewise 
regard others as being legitimate forms of protest against a tyrannical government. According 
to this logic, if a country lacked constitutional means for redressing the wrongs of a bad 
Government, ‘it can only be changed by measures involving force or the display of force; and 
public opinion might not support legislation which would make it a crime ... to concert 
measures in this country ... for carrying out an armed insurrection in a foreign country.’ As 
such, the British government instructed Williams to make it clear that the ‘object of the 
proposed Convention is not to make it more difficult to change existing Governments by 
revolutionary methods, but to discountenance the use for political purposes of methods which 
all civilised opinion must condemn.’51 
 In an attempt to address these concerns, the convention provided an exception from 
the obligation of extradition in the case of crimes that fell within the definition of political 
offences of a given country.  Ultimately a great deal of discretion was left to member states to 
determine according to their own laws ‘whether the terrorist aspect of the extraditable act 
outweighed its political aspect or vice versa.’52 This was partly a result of the insistence of 
the British delegation, who viewed defining the political character of an offence as outside of 
the scope of an international convention.53 British officials further maintained that British and 
continental definitions of political crime were legally incompatible.54 Most European states 
judged that ‘the political character of an offence may be established solely by the motive of 
the offender’55 whereas under British law the political nature of a crime was determined by 
whether or not the perpetrators committed in the course or furtherance of a political rising.56  
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This meant that, from the British point of view, in order to maintain sufficient precision to 
defend political freedoms, the convention would need to make a clear distinction between 
‘cold-blooded assassinations or isolated incendiarism’ as opposed to acts that constituted or 
led up to a legitimate civil war. As noted in a memorandum on the subject, ‘Acts intended to 
cause death or grievous bodily harm ... are the normal incidents of any revolt or rising even 
before it has reached the stage of civil war’ and co-operating with or assisting such acts was 
not necessarily unlawful, depending on the nature of the foreign insurgents. For the British, it 
was thus not political violence itself, but rather ‘the drawing of the line between acts which 
everyone would condemn and political movements attended by violence ... which is ... the 
real difficulty in framing legislation on the lines of the Convention.’57 
 For some commentators, the political distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
forms of violence was inherently misguided. T.W.H. Inskip, the British Attorney General, 
argued in 1935 that adhering to such a distinction went too far towards granting potential 
legitimacy for rebellions conducted against foreign governments. Although Inskip, like his 
contemporaries, acknowledged that a political uprising could be justified in cases where no 
mechanism existed for constitutional change, he nonetheless maintained that the potential 
pitfalls of including such a stipulation outweighed the benefits. Remarking on the difficulty 
of drawing a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of rebellion, Inskip wrote 
that it was ‘not only illogical but unreasonable to prohibit ... the preparation of an 
insurrectionary expedition to proceed against a friendly State and at the same time to make it 
possible for a body of foreign revolutionaries or of British sympathisers to conspire to 
subvert a foreign Government by acts of violence.’58  
 The question of legitimate versus illegitimate forms of rebellion was also intimately 
connected to Britain’s historical relationship with Europe. Many British officials viewed 
political violence as essentially a continental problem, with G.B. McClure remarking at one 
point that it ‘seems a little unreal that the word terrorism should be used or defined in an Act 
of Parliament in this country.’59 However, there were also those who recognized the utility of 
the Terrorism Convention for helping to solve colonial difficulties. In November of 1937, 
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while the final version of the convention was being debated, J.G. Hibbert of the Colonial 
Office sent a message to the Home Office pointing out that although there was little desire for 
the colonies to be brought within the scope of the convention, it may nonetheless be of value 
in dealing with territories such as Palestine.60 The British delegation at Geneva was also 
approached in confidence by the delegate for Egypt, who asked whether Britain intended to 
sign the convention on behalf of Palestine or Sudan in order to simplify the task of managing 
insurgency in these locations.61 As Martin Thomas argues, this concern with policing dissent 
within the British Empire cannot be understood purely through the lens of managing 
existential threats to a colonial regime, but must also be considered from the standpoint of 
political economy. While coding itself in a language of protecting imperial security, imperial 
policing often sought to manage industrial disputes within British colonies, something that 
the Terrorism Convention explicitly excluded from its mandate.62 As such British interest in 
potentially applying the terms of the convention to these territories should be read within the 
context of imperial attempts to manage the economic and political aspirations of colonized 
subjects.  
 Recognition of the right of revolt as a legitimate political weapon against tyranny thus 
raised problematic concerns for British imperialism, as these narratives of legitimization were 
central to the project of many anti-colonial activists, who claimed that their actions were an 
expression of legitimate politics. When British intelligence services discovered Rash Behari 
Bose's presence in Japan during the summer of 1915, his extradition posed major legal 
challenges because of the political nature of his crime.63 A message to Lord Hardinge from 
the British Embassy in Tokyo explained, ‘The position is that the Japanese Government will 
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not arrest persons, Indians or others, accused of merely political crimes such as 'sedition'.’64 
Hardinge was forced to admit that, ‘although the offences were punishable in India under 
ordinary Criminal Law we could not say that the motives for the crimes were entirely free of 
political character.’ Despite this, Hardinge stressed that this was a case of great importance 
and urged the embassy to ‘press most strongly for his deportation to India or to a British 
Territory under effective arrest.’65 After a flurry of diplomatic correspondence in which 
Hardinge presented Bose's actions as neither political nor criminal but as part of a larger 
German plot to undermine the Allied war effort, the Japanese government finally agreed to 
issue a deportation order against Bose. Aided by friends linked to the Kokuryūkai and the 
Gen'yôsha, Bose went into hiding in a small studio at Nakamuraya in Shinjuku, where he 
remained until the deportation order was withdrawn in March 1916, following the firing upon 
the Japanese ship Tenyō-maru by a British naval vessel and the forcible seizure of seven 
Indians traveling on board.66 
There is no denying the fact that Bose saw his own work in political terms that were 
not limited to India alone but were connected to global anti-imperial politics. Writing to 
Sachindranath Sanyal in 1922, Bose explained his new vision of the revolutionary struggle:  
Hitherto our knowledge of international situation was very meagre.  
We mostly confined our attention to India. But now I have come to  
understand a bit of international politics. This has greatly altered my  
former ideas. Please remember that we shall have to - rather we  
are destined to - tackle the problem of the world. It is India's  
mission to usher in a new era of real peace and happiness in  
the world. India's freedom is but a means to this end and it is  
not an end in itself.67  
 
Bose’s participation in Pan-Asian conferences throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
illustrates how his own project of anti-colonial nationalism was linked to a broader narrative 
of international justice. Although Bose's primary focus was on the impact that India's 
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freedom would have for the people of Asia,68 his eschatology was global in its ultimate 
ambitions. This is best demonstrated in one particularly evocative passage of New Asia, in 
which Bose wrote, ‘After a history of millennia ... India ... the Crucified among the Nations, 
now stands on this her Resurrection morning the Immortal, the Glorious, the Ever-Young, 
and India shall soon be ... the radiant Splendour of Asia, as the Light and the Benediction of 
the world.’69 
Following his marriage to Toshiko Sōma, Bose became a naturalized citizen of Japan 
in June of 1923, as discussed in Chapter 4. With the rights afforded by his new citizenship, 
Bose was able to move much more freely around Japan, and even contemplate trips to other 
parts of Asia. When the Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, received intelligence that 
Bose was contemplating a visit to Shanghai, he immediately sent orders to the Consul 
General in Shanghai to effect Bose's arrest should his boat enter Chinese territorial waters. 
The Consul General wrote back stating that, having consulted with a Supreme Court Judge, 
he determined that such a course of action was illegal given Bose's new status as naturalised 
Japanese. Bose was aware that this status gave him significantly more freedom to travel, and 
wrote to a friend in Chandernagore explaining that, ‘Hitherto he was practically shut up in a 
cage and could not travel freely, even in Japan. The British Government always kept a 
vigilant eye upon him wherever he was but now he was no longer under the control of the 
British Government, and it could take no action against him under the law.’70  
All that the British government was able to accomplish was to ensure that Bose would 
never again set foot on Indian territory. In 1921, Bose met with the British Consul General in 
Tokyo to enquire into the possibility of being granted a pardon for his revolutionary activities 
in India consistent with the policy of the imperial government, which sought to assuage 
public opinion following the conclusion of the First World War by granting pardons to other 
revolutionaries. The Government of India denied Bose's request, as well as a subsequent 
request for amnesty in 1931 when his family requested that he return to visit his dying father. 
In response to a question posed in the Council of State in 1938, the Government of India 
denied that they permanently prohibited Bose or any other Indian from entering India. 
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Officials claimed that Bose discarded his Indian nationality upon taking up Japanese 
citizenship in 1923, and that it was for this reason that his re-entry was prohibited.71 
As tensions between Britain and Japan continued to mount in the build up to the 
Second World War, British diplomatic and imperial officials found themselves increasingly 
powerless when it came to convincing the Japanese government to place any kind of limit on 
Bose's activities. In March 1938, Sir Robert Craigie tried one last time to convince the 
Japanese government to curtail Bose's political activities following Bose's publication of Indo 
no sakebi, a scathing denunciation of imperial rule in India. In a letter to the Japanese 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Craigie wrote, ‘As I know that the Japanese Government are 
sincerely anxious to promote good relations with Great Britain, I find it somewhat difficult to 
understand why the Japanese authorities should apparently turn so tolerant an eye on the 
activities of a professional agitator whose sole purpose appears to be to sow discord between 
our two countries.’72 The Intelligence Branch in Delhi was less equivocal in its assessment of 
Bose's relationship to the Japanese government, ‘It is now definitely known that R.B. Bose is 
a Japanese agent and engaged in spreading propaganda both Japanese and terrorist.’73 
 What actually made Bose’s propaganda so threatening to Britain’s imperial project 
was the way it articulated its anti-colonial message in universalist language similar to the 
League of Nations itself. In 1930, a number of the insurgents responsible for the Chittagong 
armoury attack fled to Chandernagore where British authorities, with the permission of the 
French police, stormed the house where these revolutionaries were taking refuge and 
apprehended them. This incident drew the condemnation of the Directors of the Pan-Asiatic 
League, including Rash Behari Bose, who petitioned the League of Nations to condemn this 
‘gross breach of the international laws.’ In their petition, the Directors pointed out that as a 
French possession, Chandernagore was considered to be a foreign country under international 
law. They further argued that India was at war with Britain due to the resolution of national 
independence passed at Lahore by the Indian National Congress on the 1st of January, 1930, 
and that the arrested persons took refuge in Chandernagore ‘in the capacity of belligerents.’ 
Citing other historical examples where belligerents received the right of asylum in foreign 
countries, the Directors declared that in ceding to the demands of the British authorities, the 
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French government ‘abdicated its sovereign rights when it permitted the British police to 
enter its territory and exercise police rights there.’ For the Directors, this incident was 
nothing short of naked British imperialism, making their actions a violation of international 
law, referred to as ‘not the cause of India ... (but) the cause of humanity.’74  
 In this declaration, Rash Behari Bose and the other Directors were deploying the 
category of humanity in a manner that was familiar to their international interlocutors. In 
charging the British colonial police with violating the cause of humanity through their 
violation of international law, this declaration made use of the same logic through which 
British officials expressed concerns regarding European and Oriental despotism. Although 
the French delegation wanted assassination excluded entirely from the list of offences that 
could be considered political,75 a note drawn up for the British representative indicated that 
although homicide was a ‘most heinous crime’, it could nonetheless be justified in rare 
circumstances in which ‘no other method exists of protecting the final rights of humanity.’76 
Thus, the category of humanity provided a potential source of critique for laws that sought to 
repress terrorism through the repression of political rights. In addition to discussions 
surrounding the legitimacy versus illegitimacy of certain forms of insurgency, this also 
carried implications for broader political freedoms such as the freedom of workers to conduct 
a legitimate strike.77 These concerns regarding the potential misuses of the convention in 
being deployed to curb the ‘rights of humanity’ also  included left-leaning political 
organizations.78 International groups such as the International Women's League for Peace and 
Freedom, also cautioned against ‘the present tendency of governments to assume that the 
maintenance of order and stability is possible only under a regime of suppression of liberty 
and normal rights.’79 
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Terrorism, Humanity, Civilization 
 
 The concept of humanity also played another important function within international 
discourses of terrorism as a means of universalizing the particularities of local insurgencies 
into a more global narrative that maintained the interests of the state governments of whom 
the international community was composed. In crafting this universally oriented discourse, 
the convention made three key interpretive moves. First, it distinguished terrorism from 
forms of political violence that targeted a particular government or state. Second, this version 
of terrorism - not regional or local, but global in its supposed ambitions - was reframed as an 
attack upon international order and peace, as embodied by the international society of 
Geneva. Third, the convention narrated this attack upon international order through existing 
discourses of civilization and humanity in a way that set terrorism apart as a particularly 
reprehensible moral crime. This rhetorical strategy sought to shore up the conflation of the 
international with the category of humanity in a way that reinforced the role of nation-states 
in representing the collective interests of a global humanity, which could be more effectively 
envisioned through its juxtaposition against the global threat of terrorism. While accepting 
Faisal Devji's intervention regarding late twentieth and early twenty-first century terrorism as 
a project in search of a global politics, this chapter seeks to probe how such a politics should 
be understood in the period before atom bomb and space age rendered humanity as a singular 
global category through its understanding of its own destructibility. In the interwar period, 
humanity as a category bore a different set of stakes and assumptions, that must be 
understood in their particular context if we are to situate the ideological provenance of the 
more Arendtian notion of humanity that emerged after the Second World War.80  
 First, it is important to note the repeated emphasis of delegates to the convention that 
terrorism was not to be understood as political violence directed towards a particular political 
system or government. At the final conference in November, the Roumanian delegate Mr. 
Pella admitted that there was a great deal of difficulty in drawing a distinction between acts 
of terrorism and political crimes, because it was almost universally agreed that political 
offences were not ‘of an anti-social character and did not shake the foundations of social 
life.’ Because political offences were of a specifically anti-governmental character, ‘they 
conflicted only with the principles of a quite special morality - namely, principles which were 
often connected with the form of government of each State and varied from one country to 
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another ... It was therefore advisable that other States should not intervene in questions which 
concerned the political life of a given State.’ According to Pella, if a state aided in the 
repression of political offences directed against the interests of another state, that 
participation would be regarded as an interference within the latter state's internal affairs and 
hence an infringement on its sovereignty. For Pella, however, state sovereignty was not a 
sufficient justification for non-interference when it came to repressing acts of terrorism, 
precisely because these acts ‘did not merely endanger the order of a given State but social 
order in general.’ When a political offender or movement expressed their will ‘in acts of 
barbarity and terrorism’, the non-collaboration of states in suppressing these acts constituted 
for Pella ‘the most flagrant repudiation of the duties of international solidarity.’81 
 Pella’s argument reflected the belief in a shared set of state concerns and 
responsibilities at the level of the international that cut across national or regional divisions. 
Mr Chatelain of Haiti argued at the third meeting of the conference that ‘no Government 
worthy of the name’ could afford to remain indifferent to such a cause, because the 
interdependence of states rested not only in economic, social, and intellectual matters but also 
in the principle of collective security.82 The legal advisors to the British government shared 
this concern and worried that the particular danger of acts of terrorism was their ability to 
transgress national boundaries, thus containing within them an inherent potential for 
damaging relations between friendly states and undermining a key goal of the League; the 
maintenance of international peace.83 More important, however, was the fear that terrorism 
was an action that sought to ‘undermine the credit of the State’ by ‘destroying discipline, 
increasing poverty and suffering, and ... paralysing the State's powers of reaction.’ This 
imperiled not only the sovereignty of a given state, but also the mutual recognition of 
sovereignty upon which the international order of Geneva rested its authority and legitimacy. 
Because the existing international law was, according to some, structured in such a way as to 
safeguard the rights of national subjects, while doing nothing to guarantee the ‘highly 
valuable legal rights of the State itself’, international criminal law was deemed insufficient 
for preventing or punishing crimes that violated the ‘universal conscience of mankind’ by 
simultaneously injuring the interests of all states.84 
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 The idea of a ‘universal conscience of mankind’ was enshrined in the international 
order of the interwar through the concept of civilization. Prior to the First World War, and 
particularly in the late nineteenth century, the universal language of civilization held a 
powerful appeal for non-Western peoples seeking to enter the international society centered 
around Europe. In Cemal Aydin’s work on Japan and Ottoman Turkey, he argues that 
European military and technological dominance on the world stage greatly impressed 
intellectuals in Asia, who sought to replicate European power through the development of 
their own societies along European lines. While Aydin notes earlier setbacks to European 
hegemony, and particularly Japan's victory against Russia in 1905, it was the First World 
War that truly ‘confirmed the moral crisis of the European world order.’85 The apocalyptic 
scale of the war, as well as its destruction of ideas of European civilizational superiority 
caused nationalist groups in Asia such as the Kokuryūkai of Japan to declare ‘the Great 
European War was their suicide as a civilisation ... (and) ... the great opportunity for an Asian 
revival.’86 While the nineteenth century saw the deployment of civilization as a barrier to the 
legitimacy and sovereignty of non-European states seeking to enter international society, as 
Gerrit Gong demonstrates,87 the crisis of the First World War refracted this challenge back 
onto European states, which were themselves forced to uphold the theory, if not the practice, 
of a particular standard of civilization. 
 To this end, political violence that challenged state sovereignty through its subversion 
of the governmental monopoly on violence within a given territory needed to be described in 
a way that would not jeopardize international society's larger claim to represent a global 
standard of civilization. While earlier narratives juxtaposed civilization with barbarism 
through a notion of historical time that trapped certain cultures or practices in the ‘waiting 
room of history’, as Dipesh Chakrabarty argues,88 terrorism was instead viewed as not simply 
an antithesis of modernity, but also as modernity’s product.  In the opening speech of the 
international conference on terrorism, the conference president, Court Carton de Wiart argued 
that although the progressive march of European civilization succeeded in many instances ‘in 
toning down the savagery and brutality of primitive times’, the sinister companion to this 
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progress was the way that, ‘advancing knowledge and improved communications have served 
in their turn ... to promote acts designated by that new term 'terrorism.'‘89  
The conflation of terrorism with modern technology and progress served an important 
function in setting it apart as a new form of criminality that sat in inherent contradistinction 
to the civilization of advanced society. In other words, terrorism was a new form of 
barbarism that, despite its trappings of modernity, remained fundamentally incompatible with 
the functioning of a civilized international order. While barbarism carried historical 
connotations of a ‘primitive’ culture that failed to live up to the standard of civilization, 
terrorism threatened civilization through a deployment of entirely modern scientific tools of 
destruction, such as the bomb. For Mr. Koukai of the delegation from Czechoslovakia, 
terrorism threatened the ‘common heritage of the whole civilised world’90 and constituted a 
particular moral crime, or ‘world crime’, on par with other targets of global concern from this 
period such as human trafficking, piracy, counterfeiting currency, and the illegal drug trade.91 
What connected these ‘world crimes’ was not only their transnational scope, but also their 
immoral or ‘uncivilized’ nature, which carried within it an innate threat to an international 
order that sought to buttress its legitimacy on the claim to uphold and enforce a universal 
standard of civilization. 
  
Terrorism and International Authority 
 
 Terrorism as a ‘world crime’ must be understood within the context of an emerging 
alignment of international interests that was, at the level of violence and sovereignty, more 
united than historians have previously recognized. Most of the scholarship that looks at 
interwar internationalism assumes a clear divide between the competing ideologies of 
Wilsonian and communist internationalisms. In 1917, the same year as the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia, Vladimir Lenin wrote Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, a 
book that rejected and condemned European economic and imperial practices. In response, 
American president Woodrow Wilson issued his famous Fourteen Points in 1918, spelling 
out an alternative vision for a post-war settlement that would seek to address some of the 
roots causes of the First World War.92 The exact importance of Bolshevism in shaping the 
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Paris peace talks is the subject of some debate with Margaret Macmillan viewing Germany, 
not Russia, as the primary object of concern in 1919.93 On the other hand, Anthony Read 
argues that the peacemakers at Versailles held the spectre of Bolshevism constantly at the 
back of their minds.94 Because Lenin's political vision gave rise to the Third International, or 
Comintern, and Wilson's formed the basis of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, 
most historians regard the two as envisioning conflicting ideas of international order that 
competed throughout the interwar period to win over European and global public opinion.95  
 Still, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism illustrates one 
way that the stark divide between Wilsonian and communist internationalisms is traditionally 
overemphasized in understanding the category of the international during the interwar period. 
As Mark Mazower notes, the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations in 1934 
signalled a shift in priorities for the Soviets, who became increasingly conciliatory towards 
the League as hopes of a world revolution declined and the two previously competing 
internationalisms aligned themselves against the emerging anti-internationalism of fascism.96 
More than this, however, the broad alignment of priorities between disparate nation-states 
including the U.S.S.R. regarding the danger posed by terrorism illustrates the ways that the 
international system of the interwar stimulated new concerns that transcended particular 
ideological or political orientations. This was the product of an increasing normalization of 
‘vertebrate’ structures of statehood, which sought to bulwark themselves against the threat 
posed by new ‘cellular’ forms of political organization.97 As Ben Saul notes, ‘criminalizing 
terrorism was not designed to protect only democracies from political violence, but to protect 
all forms of political organization from violence.’98 The international criminalization of 
terrorism rested on the notion that there was a ‘feeling of solidarity and cooperation which 
exists between the States in the campaign against the activities of terrorists, who are enemies 
of the human race, and must be relentlessly tracked down and prevented from injuring their 
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fellow creatures.’99 The diplomats at Geneva spoke of an international solidarity, or ‘le 
système de la solidarité des États’,100 that existed between the disparate states of the world, 
and that ensured that the threat of terrorism should be dealt with through a unified and 
concerted response at the level of the international. 
 International solidarity was, of course, not without limits. The political gulf between 
Britain and the U.S.S.R., as well as the emerging threat posed by fascist regimes in Germany 
and Italy, remained a source of tension, particularly for British security services as Calder 
Walton and Christopher Andrew demonstrate.101 When the British government consulted the 
superintendent of the Special Branch regarding the advisability of signing on to the 
convention, he pointed out that the new legislation would cause a great deal more work for 
Special Branch, as it would obligate them to take action against alien refugees plotting 
against authoritarian regimes, such as that of Mussolini.102 In June of 1937, Norman Kendall 
wrote to Leslie Brass of the League of Nations delegation, reiterating that the convention 
would likely result in many requests for the deportation of subversive elements from 
Germany, Italy, and Yugoslavia, with little benefit in return for the British government.103 
Other officials said that it was ‘fundamentally absurd’ to believe that a Russian or German 
Court would hold to the convention with good faith in prosecuting Russians or Germans who 
plotted terrorist outrages against England.104 These concerns, among others, ultimately 
outweighed British interest in the convention, meaning that when the convention was passed 
later that year in November, the United Kingdom was not a signatory. 
 Despite the practical limitations of the convention, the concerns animating it are 
instructive in understanding the emergence of terrorism as a category of international interest. 
As argued above, the threat of terrorism provided a common enemy against which all forms 
of government could unite, regardless of their particular political systems. Thus, the category 
of terrorism provided a new language whereby international authority could assert itself as 
representing the interests and security of a common civilization. Such a categorization 
occurred not only at the level of law and rhetoric but also through the pooling of information 
regarding suspected terrorists, as well as fingerprinting, photographing, the collection and 
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circulation of history sheets, and the ‘constant supervision of all bodies ... which cannot 
establish their bona fide character and ... the detention and careful identification of the 
members of such organisations without prejudice to the appropriate legal penalties.’105 
Although Britain was not a signatory in November of 1937, the British representative Sir 
John Fischer Williams played a key role in drafting the convention, and the definition of 
terrorism upon which it relied. Despite being reluctant to formally commit itself to the laws 
of the convention, the British government nonetheless bore the ‘greatest sympathy with the 
object of the Conference’ and claimed that they would uphold in practice all necessary 
measures for preventing and punishing any acts of terrorism carried out or planned within the 
United Kingdom.106  
 The states that did ultimately sign on to the convention reflect a wide political and 
geographical diversity, including France, Yugoslavia, Spain, Argentina, the U.S.S.R., 
Turkey, Egypt, and India, among others. This diversity reflects the broad concerns shared by 
members of the international system of the interwar, regarding the threat that non-state 
violence posed to their own sovereignty and, by extension, the legitimacy of an international 
order premised upon the mutual recognition of this sovereignty. By framing terrorism as a 
‘world crime’ or a ‘crime against civilisation’, the governmental representatives at Geneva 
sought, in their own words, to ‘ensure the safety of all States, regardless of their social or 
political organisation, and to protect international order as such.’107 The purpose of this 
convention was not simply to prevent and punish a set of politically motivated crimes, but 
rather to shore up international authority with the articulation of a new threat that could be 
described in universally intelligible terms through the category of terrorism. In this way, 
terrorism can be understood, not as a universal category, but as a universalisable trope 
capable of transcending national boundaries precisely because of the ease with which it could 
be applied to describe a wide range of acts of anti-state political violence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism provides an 
important window into understanding the emergence of terrorism as a category of 
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international concern during the interwar period. As the first international law to target 
terrorism as a distinct category of criminality, the convention sheds light on the definitions 
and debates that informed interwar ideas about political violence, territory, and sovereignty. 
The convention is particularly useful for understanding the context within which colonial 
officials framed their understanding of revolutionary violence in India, as well as the ways 
that their own experiences of anti-colonial politics shaped the Indian delegate's concerns and 
priorities at Geneva. The emphasis placed on terrorism as a problem of territory, the 
relationship between terrorism and political crime, and the framing of terrorism as a threat to 
civilization itself all serve to highlight the importance of situating India's colonial laws of 
terror within a larger contextual framework. The convention also indicates the highly 
contingent nature of modern understandings of terrorism, and the ways that they were 
produced through a particular set of local and international circumstances. By reading India's 
laws of terror alongside its participation in a larger international discussion regarding the 
challenge that non-state violence posed to state actors, it becomes possible to locate terrorism 
as a form of violence intimately linked to questions of authority and state formation. If 
terrorism and international authority are to be understood as competing yet complementary 
aspects of modern governance, the question of terrorism then becomes an important entry 
point not only into issues of political violence, but also into the very nature of the modern 
international system itself. 
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Conclusion: 
Postcolonial Legacies 
 
On the 30th of January, 1948 the newly independent nation-state of India suffered an 
act of patricide. At a multi-faith prayer meeting at Birla House in New Delhi, Mohandas 
Gandhi was shot three times at close range by a young member of the Hindu Mahasabha and 
RSS. Mortally wounded, Gandhi was carried back to his room but was declared dead within 
half an hour. His killer, a young Hindu radical by the name of Nathuram Godse, was 
apprehended on the spot and beaten with sticks by the angry crowd before being taken into 
custody by the police. Just as had been the case approximately four decades earlier following 
the assassination of Curzon-Wylie by Madan Lal Dhingra, V.D. Savarkar fell under suspicion 
as the alleged mastermind behind the plot, although he ultimately escaped conviction. A 
Hindu nationalist, Godse blamed Gandhi for the partition of India and saw his murder as 
revenge for the chaos inflicted by this partition upon the Hindu community. However, as 
Yasmin Khan demonstrates, the assassination and the mourning rituals that followed it 
ironically served only to consolidate the sovereignty of the Nehruvian state dominated by the 
secular Indian National Congress.1 
Following the murder of Gandhi, different newspapers referred to Godse as a ‘Hindu 
fanatic’2 or simply an ‘assassin’,3 while Jawaharlal Nehru referred to him as ‘a madman’.4 
The question of whether Godse should be regarded as an assassin, terrorist, or even patriot is 
a hotly contested political issue in contemporary India. A 2013 article in Mainstream Weekly 
referred to Godse as the ‘First Terrorist of Independent India’,5 while in 2014 an MP for the 
Bharatiya Janata Party named Sakshi Maharaj controversially referred to Godse as a 
nationalist who ‘did a lot for the nation.’6  
Such controversy is not limited to the Mahatma’s assassin. Ongoing separatist 
movements in India’s northeast, a Kashmiri resistance movement increasingly inflected by 
jihadist idioms, and a ‘Red Corridor’ across eastern India held by Maoist insurgents all 
contribute to an ongoing politically charged public conversation in independent India 
																																																						
1	Yasmin	Khan,	‘Performing	Peace:	Gandhi’s	assassination	as	a	critical	moment	in	the	consolidation	of	the	
Nehruvian	state’,	Modern	Asian	Studies	45,	1	(2011),	pp.	57-80.	
2	The	Manchester	Guardian,	31	January	1948,	p.	1.	
3	The	Hindu,	31	January	1948,	p.	1.	
4	The	New	York	Times,	31	January	1948,	p.	1.	
5	Mainstream	Weekly,	Vol.	LI,	NO.	49,	25	November	2013.	Retrieved	24	April	2017.	
https://mainstreamweekly.net/article4603.html	
6	India	Today,	11	December	2014.	Retrieved	24	April	2017.	http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/gandhi-killer-
nathuram-godse-nationalist-bjp-mp-sakshi-maharaj-assassin-parliament-rajya-sabha/1/406344.html	
	203	
regarding the relationship between ‘terrorism’ and the state. Continued debates regarding 
emergency laws, freedom of expression, and the scope of permissible political dissent all 
carry echoes of the colonial prose of counter-insurgency that formed the topic of this 
dissertation. At the time of writing, a Maoist attack in Chhattisgarh recently resulted in the 
deaths of at least 24 Indian police, demonstrating that these questions have lost none of their 
resonance in the present day, but rather linger in the cultural and political mind of modern 
nation states.7 
This dissertation set out to trace an evolving prose of counter-insurgency in late 
colonial India centred around the emergence of the legal category of ‘the terrorist’. It 
examined the late nineteenth century origins of sedition law in Britain and India, and 
demonstrated the impact of a new ‘politics of the bomb’ in forcing an adaptation and 
expansion of these laws at the beginning of the twentieth century. This analysis went on to 
examine the strategies of legimization adopted by the colonial state in passing emergency war 
measures from 1914 to 1918, and the failure of the government in securing the extension of 
these measures into peacetime following the disastrous massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, 
Amritsar. Following the Montagu-Chelmsford legislative reforms after the end of the war and 
the failure of Mohandas Gandhi’s non-co-operation campaign, the re-emergence of 
revolutionary violence in Bengal prompted the introduction of new emergency measures that 
established ‘terrorism’ as a distinct legal category in India. This genealogy of terrorism as a 
politico-legal category in India was supplemented by two chapters that connected the 
domestic history of political violence in India with the broader international landscape within 
which this prose of counter-insurgency emerged. The first of these chapters told the largely 
ignored story of India’s relationship to the League of Nations from 1919 to 1945, 
demonstrating the role of the international as a site that simultaneously allowed the 
reinforcement and the contestation of British imperialism over the first half of the twentieth 
century, with a particular focus on the internationalist and Pan-Asian engagements of the 
Bengali revolutionary Rash Behari Bose. The final chapter explored India’s participation in 
the largely forgotten League of Nations’ Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism that took place in 1937, in which terrorism acquired an official status within 
international law while simultaneously coming to serve as a trope by which international 
authorities defined internal threats to their own sovereignty. 
																																																						
7	BBC	News,	24	April	2017.	Retrieved	24	April	2017.	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-39696186	
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The assassination of Gandhi and the proliferation of low-intensity insurgencies across 
India in the decades that followed independence clearly demonstrate that governmental 
attempts to define terrorism were not limited to a problem of the colonial state, but maintain 
their relevance for issues of law and sovereignty in the post-colonial nation-state as well. 
Unfortunately, an investigation into the continuities and discontinuities through which a 
colonial prose of counter-insurgency reproduces itself through the postcolonial era to the 
present lies outside the scope of this dissertation. As such, this dissertation does not claim to 
offer a comprehensive longue durée genealogy of terrorism as such, but rather provides a 
window into the evolution of a particular prose of counter-terrorism that developed in 
colonial India during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Future research will be 
needed to trace a longer genealogy that stretches back into the nineteenth century and 
forward into the twenty-first in order to provide a richer understanding of the deep history of 
political violence and the state in modern India. 
More work is also needed that will trace the cross-imperial and, indeed, trans-imperial 
trajectories of the prose of counter-insurgency. While this dissertation illustrated the 
relationship between colonial law in India and the international law of the League of Nations, 
it has not had space to analyze the wider imperial context within which these discourses of 
terrorism emerged. The first half of the twentieth century saw budding insurgencies break out 
in far-flung colonies that included Ireland, Malaya, Burma, East Africa, Iraq, and Palestine. 
British imperial officials often borrowed personnel and tactics from different colonial 
possessions in responding to these insurgencies. But what is less understood by scholars, or 
even remarked upon, is the extent to which an emerging imperial prose of counter-
insurgency, and perhaps of counter-terrorism, became consolidated throughout this period. 
Such an investigation need not limit itself to the British case alone, but would provide a 
fertile lens of comparison for understanding how events within the French empire – notably 
Algeria and Indochina – and the Dutch empire – notably Indonesia – contributed to an 
imperial prose of counter-insurgency that was truly global in character.  
Despite these temporal and geographical limitations, this dissertation provides a fresh 
conceptual framework for approaching the question of ‘terrorism’ in South Asia, and 
contributed new empirical information to the history of revolutionary violence in colonial 
India, and to the relationship between India and the League of Nations. While much of the 
existing conceptual literature on terrorism and exception privileges theory at the expense of 
the archive, and much of the empirical work on ‘terrorism’ in India lacks a rigorous 
conceptual examination of terrorism as a category of politico-legal analysis, this dissertation 
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set out to provide a fresh conceptual approach to the topic through the use of thick archival 
documentation. This approach is valuable not only for deepening current understandings of 
the relationship between terrorism, law, and sovereignty in late colonial India, but also in 
providing a richer perspective on the broader history of legislative reform, exception, and 
international engagement by the British colonial state. Another important contribution of this 
project is that it has shed light on the revolutionary career of Rash Behari Bose, an important 
radical and nationalist from the early twentieth century who is largely forgotten in the 
historiography of Indian independence.  
Given the polarized nature of contemporary global debates on terrorism today and the 
strategies of legitimization through which current governments justify the imposition of harsh 
emergency laws in both domestic and international circumstances, a deeper context for these 
discussions is sorely needed. Limited in both temporal and geographical scope to the 
particular case study of late colonial India, this dissertation nonetheless provides important 
context for rethinking ‘terrorism’ as the product of a particular set of historical circumstances 
and concerns, rather than a natural category of international criminality. In fact, by examining 
the 1937 League of Nations convention on terrorism, this project illustrated the ways in 
which a normative acceptance of terrorism as the default category of analysis for 
understanding global manifestations of political violence was itself shaped by a range of 
particular concerns tied to issues of territory, politics, sovereignty, and authority. Thus, the 
concerns of this research are neither purely historical or wholly contemporary, but rather seek 
to explore the origins of ‘terrorism’ at a particular historical conjuncture. This purview is 
valuable both for the insights it provides into the nature of colonial rule in India during the 
first four decades of the twentieth century, as well as for its broader contribution to what 
Foucault refers to as ‘a history of the present.’8 As future research continues to build upon 
this terrain by expanding beyond the temporal and geographical limits of the current project, 
insight into the origins and legacy of terrorism as a political and legal category of analysis 
will render possible a deeper understanding of both past and present. 
 
																																																						
8	Michel	Foucault,	Discipline	and	Punish:	The	birth	of	the	prison	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1995),	p.	31.	
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